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vABSTRACT
Matching theory is a rapidly growing field in economics that often deals with
markets in which monetary transfers are forbidden. Hence, policy makers often use
centralized procedures to organize markets and coordinate players’ behavior. Three
concerns play central roles in designing the procedures: efficiency, fairness, and
incentive compatibility. These concerns are also what I focus on in my studies.
Specifically, my dissertation consists of three original studies on the allocation of
indivisible resources to agents. The first chapter studies school choice, which is a
centralized market to assign students to public schools. I compare popular matching
mechanisms used in school choice by accommodating the fact that students and their
parents often have heterogeneous sophistication in understanding the mechanisms.
In the second chapter I study abstract object allocation problem in which objects
do not have priority rankings of agents. I want to show that the three objectives
of efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility can be incompatible with each
other: a mechanism that satisfies a minimal efficiency requirement and mild fairness
requirements must be manipulable by some group of agents in a strong sense. Since
the efficiency requirement is weak enough such that policy makers are likely to
pursue, my results suggest that policy makers have to make a choice between
fairness and group incentive compatibility. In the third chapter I study same object
allocation problems except that some agents have private endowments. I propose a
new mechanism that has desirable properties in efficiency, fairness, and incentive
compatibility. In the following I provide more details of each chapter.
School choice is a trend in the K-12 public education of US and many other
countries that allows children to choose schools across neighborhoods. In Chapter
1, “Level-k Reasoning in School Choice”, I compare two matching algorithms that
many cities use to assign children to public schools in school choice. The algorithms
are called Boston Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance. BM is manipulable, while
DA is strategy-proof. Recently several cities decide to switch from BM to DA to
avoid manipulation. However, the effect of the switch has not been well understood.
In this paper I use the level-k model to study the strategies used by parents in BM
by taking account of the fact that parents often have different abilities to manipulate
BM,which are due to their heterogeneous sophistication. Interestingly, I find that the
level-k reasoning process in BM is analogous to the procedure of DA. This analogy
provides a new way to understand how parents may behave in BM. Under some mild
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assumption it implies that for any school choice problem and any sophistication
distribution of parents, the assignment found by BM is never less efficient than
the assignment found by DA. I also examine how parents’ beliefs about others’
sophistication affect their welfare. I find that, in general, a child is guaranteed
to benefit from his parent’s sophistication in BM only when his parent’s level is
high relative to others and his parent’s belief about others’ sophistication levels is
accurate. The simulation results of my model exhibit patterns similar to empirical
datasets.
Without monetary transfers, the concern of fairness motivates policy makers
to use random assignments in objection allocation problems. In Chapter 2, “Ef-
ficient and Fair Assignment Mechanism is Strongly Group Manipulable”, I study
group incentive compatibility in random assignment mechanisms. I show that if a
mechanism satisfies the minimal efficiency requirement (ex-post efficiency), then
it cannot satisfy some mild fairness requirements and be minimally group incen-
tive compatible simultaneously: by misreporting preferences, a group of agents
can obtain lotteries that strictly first-order stochastically dominate the lotteries they
obtain in the truth-telling case. Hence, fairness concerns may force policy maker to
give up group incentive compatibility. My results hold as long as there are at least
three agents and at least three objects, no matter outside option is available or not.
Possibility results exist when there are only two objects and outside option is not
available.
In some object allocation problems, some players have private endowments and
are willing to bring them to the market in exchange for better ones. In Chapter 3,
“A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem with Private Endowment”,
I propose a new mechanism to solve the problems. Intuitively, in my mechanism
the popularity of a private endowment plays the role of “price” in determining
his owner’s advantage in the market. Formally, the mechanism is a simultaneous
eating algorithm, which generalizes Probabilistic Serial, by letting agents obtain
additional eating speeds if their private endowments are consumed by others, and
letting multiple agents trade their private endowments if they form cycles. This
feature can be summarized by the idea of “you request my house - I get your
speed”. Indifferent preferences often cause difficulty in efficient random assignment
mechanisms. Interestingly, I show that the same idea can also be used to deal with
indifferent preferences in a straightforward way. It is in contrast to the mainstream
method of iteratively solving maximum network flow problems in the literature.
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1C h a p t e r 1
LEVEL-K REASONING IN SCHOOL CHOICE
1.1 Introduction
Many countries of the world provide public education, which allows students to
attend schools for free. In the traditional system of K-12 public education in many
countries, students are simply assigned to schools according to their home locations.
This has been changed in the recent school choice trend: students (actually their
parents) can submit their preferences over schools to a school choice office, then the
office runs a computer algorithm to find an assignment. It is believed that the freedom
of express preferences gives parents more control over their children’s education,
and improves diversity in public schools. From the perspective of economics, a
computer algorithm is a mechanism that maps the submitted preferences of students
to an assignment. Therefore, school choice is a game for students.
There are two algorithms that are widely used in school choice: theBostonMech-
anism and the student-proposing deferred acceptance. BM is a status quo algorithm
which has existed for a long time in many cities. DA is a new algorithm, which was
first proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) and then adapted by Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez (2003) to school choice. DA is strategy-proof, which means that reporting
true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for students. But BM is manipulable,
which means that students may obtain better assignments by reporting non-truthful
preferences. This difference motivates some cities to switch from BM to DA. A
lot of studies compare the two algorithms and want to find which one produces a
better assignment for students. However, a major difficulty is that the strategies used
by students in BM have not been understood well. Field and lab evidence shows
that students are often boundedly rational and have different abilities to manipulate
BM. Specifically, some students do not realize that school choice is a game, so they
always report true preference. The remaining may realize it, but some of them play
better strategies than the others. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explore the
strategies used by students in BMwhen they have heterogeneous sophistication, and
to compare the two algorithms.
To model heterogeneous sophistication I use a nonequilibrium model called
level-k. The model was first proposed by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel
2(1995), and then developed by Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998), Costa-Gomes,
Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Crawford and
Iriberri (2007a, 2007b), and Arad and Rubinstein (2012), among many others. The
model shows a good explanatory power in many experiments. In the school choice
game, the setup of themodel is as follows. Every student has a discrete sophistication
level, which is his depth of strategic reasoning. If a student’s level is zero, he is naive
and does not make any strategic reasoning. If a student’s level is a positive integer
k, he makes strategic reasoning and chooses a best strategy based on his belief
about others’ levels. In the paper I consider two extreme settings of the beliefs of
positive-level students. This consideration enables me to check the robustness of my
results, and also examine the effect of beliefs on students’ strategies and welfare. In
the first setting, a level-k student believes that all others are level-k-1 irrespective of
their true levels. It is the setting commonly used in the literature, so I call the model
with this setting original level-k. In this setting a level-k student may overestimate
some students’ levels and underestimate some others’. By contrast, in the second
setting, I let students have as accurate beliefs as possible. However, the spirit of the
level-k model requires that a level-k student cannot believe that any other’s level is
k or higher.1 So in the second setting, any level-k student has a correct belief about
the levels of those whose levels are lower than k, and believes the remaining are
level-k-1. I call the corresponding model the informational level-k.
Both DA and BM are preference revelation games. Since DA is strategy-proof,
students report true preferences even though they have heterogeneous sophistication
levels. So my main task in the paper is to use the two level-k models to analyze
students’s strategies in BM. Hence, in BM level-0 students report true preferences,
while positive-level students behave strategically. To study the problem in the
most transparent environment, I assume a complete information environment. That
is, students commonly know each other’s preferences and the priority rankings
of students at all schools. Complete information is a widely used assumption in
the matching theory literature. In this paper it removes the effect of probabilistic
beliefs and risk attitudes on students’ strategies. So I can focus on the effect of
heterogeneous sophistication. In the following I briefly discuss my main results.
First, in both level-k models of BM, when students reason about the others’
strategies, they essentially reason about the most preferred schools reported by the
others. This is caused by the feature of BM that each school first admits those
1Otherwise, the level-k student should make more steps of reasoning and effectively has a level
higher than k.
3who report it as most preferred. Then I show that the reasoning process in both
level-k models of BM is analogous to the procedure of DA. Specifically, when a
positive-level student thinks about his best strategy, it is as if he runs some rounds
of DA in his mind to decide which school he should report as most preferred; the
higher is his level, the more rounds of DA he runs in his mind. I illustrate it in
Section 1.3 through an example. Formal analysis is in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5.
Second, I compare the assignments found by DA and BM. I find that in both
level-k models the assignment found by BM is not strictly Pareto dominated by
the assignment found by DA for any level distribution of students. Specifically, in
both level-k models of BM a student always reports a school weakly better than his
assignment in DA as most preferred. So it is impossible that all students obtain
worse assignments in BM than in DA. When all students have levels above some
thresholds defined in the paper, all students report their assignments in DA as most
preferred. Hence, BM finds the same assignment as DA does. If I further make a
mild assumption about the strategies of positive-level students, then I prove that the
assignment of BM is never Pareto dominated by that of DA.
Last, I examine the effect of a student’s sophistication level and belief on his
welfare in BM. This is to address the concern in practice that in BM, sophisticated
students may take advantage of naive students and obtain better assignments. I find
that in the original level-k model, a student of a higher level is not guaranteed to
obtain a better assignment. It is because if a student has a higher level, he may
overestimate more others’ levels and choose an overcautious strategy. By contrast,
in the informational level-k model a student never overestimates the others’ levels.
So when a student’s level is sufficiently high, he has a correct belief about the true
levels of most others. Therefore, he can choose a truly best strategy. I show that
students of sufficiently high levels must have weakly better assignments in BM than
in DA. So in this sense they have advantage in BM. Moreover, the contrast between
the two models shows that correct beliefs play a crucial role in the existence of the
advantage.
To quantify the difference between the assignments of DA and BM, I simulate it
by randomly generating school choice problems and sophistication levels of students.
The result shows that neither algorithm dominates the other. Specifically, there are
always some percentage of students who prefer the assignments in BM and some
percentage of students who prefer the assignments in DA. Both percentages are
significantly above zero. However, the former percentage is often higher than the
4latter, so more students prefer BM. To examine the effect of sophistication in BM, I
look at the assignments of students at each sophistication level and compare them
with those in DA. I find that the average assignment of L0 students is worse than that
of students of any positive level in BM, and is also worse than that of L0 students in
DA. By contrast, the average assignment of students of any positive level is better
in BM than in DA. So this implies that in BM naive students have a disadvantage
while sophisticated students have an advantage. But there is a difference between
the two level-k models of BM. In the original level-k model the average assignment
of students is single-peaked, while in the informational level-k model the average
assignment of students is monotonic in their levels. Hence, correct beliefs are
beneficial to students. My simulation results are similar in some respects to recent
empirical studies of He (2014) and Calsamiglia, Fu, and Güell (2015). Both papers
estimate that replacing BM with DA will hurt more students than helping them, and
an average student be worse off. But they do not estimate the possible heterogeneous
sophistication distribution among strategic students.
In the rest of the paper, I present the school choice model in Section 1.2. Then I
provide an example to illustrate BM and DA and the two level-k models in Section
1.3. The two level-k models of BM are in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5. Section 1.6
includes some discussions about models. Section 1.7 presents simulation results.
Section 1.8 includes some extensions of the models. I discuss related literature in
Section 1.9. Section 1.10 concludes. The appendix includes omitted proofs and
additional results.
1.2 School Choice Model
A school choice problem consists of the following elements:
• a finite set of students I;
• a finite set of schools S;
• a capacity vector QS = {qs}s∈S where qs is the number of seats at school s;
• a priority profile of schoolsΠS = {pis}s∈S where pis is the strict priority ranking
of school s over students;
• a preference profile of students PI = {Pi}i∈I where Pi is the strict prefer-
ence ordering of student i over schools. Let Ri denote the associated weak
preference ordering.
5There are enough seats to admit all students such that
∑
s∈S qs = |I |. This
accommodates two cases. First, the law in many cities requires each student attend
a public school, so it is natural to assume enough seats. Second, if students have
outside options (private schools or studying at home), some school in S denotes the
outside options. An assignment of students to schools is a function µ : I → S such
that |µ−1(s)| ≤ qs for all s ∈ S. Here, µ(i) is the assignment of each i and µ−1(s)
is the set of students admitted by each s. I denote the set of all assignments byM.
A student i justified envies another student j in an assignment µ if µ( j)Piµ(i) and
ipiµ( j) j. That is, i has a higher priority than j at school µ( j) but i is assigned to a
school worse than µ( j). An assignment µ is wasteful if |µ−1(s)| < qs and sPiµ(i)
for some s and some i. That is, s has empty seats and i prefers s to his assignment.
An assignment is stable if it does not contain justified envies and is not wasteful.
An assignment µ Pareto dominates another assignment µ′ if µ(i)Riµ′(i) for all
i ∈ I, and µ( j)Pj µ′( j) for some j ∈ I. If µ(i)Piµ′(i) for all i ∈ I, µ strictly Pareto
dominates µ′. An assignment is Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by
any other assignment. I use P to denote the set of all strict preference orderings
of S, and use O to denote the set of all school choice problems. In practice ΠS
is regulated and known by the school choice office. So throughout the paper I fix
I, S,QS,ΠS, and denote a school choice problem simply by PI . A school choice
algorithm is a function ψ : O → M such that ψ(PI) is the assignment found for
PI . ψ is Pareto efficient or stable if ψ(PI) is Pareto efficient or stable for all PI . ψ
is strategy-proof if reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for all
students. Formally, ψ(PI)(i) Ri ψ({P′i, P−i})(i) for all i ∈ I, all PI ∈ P |I | and all
P′i ∈ P.
1.3 Illustrating Example
Consider a school choice problem that contains three students Alex, Bob, and
Charlie, and three schools X, Y and Z. Each school has only one seat. Table 1.1 lists
the preferences of students and the priority rankings at schools.
Alex Bob Charlie X Y Z
X X Y Charlie Bob Alex
Y Y X Alex Alex Bob
Z Z Z Bob Charlie Charlie
Table 1.1: Illustrating Example
61.3.1 Procedures of BM and DA
In school choice each student is required to submit a list of schools, which
is supposed to be his preference ordering, to an office. Then the office runs an
algorithm to find an assignment. BM and DA are two most popular algorithms.
They are run as follows. In the first round the applications of all students are
simultaneously sent to the first schools in their reported lists, and schools tentatively
admit applicants according to priority rankings. Then, the applications of rejected
students are simultaneously sent to the next schools in their reported lists in the next
round, and so on. BM and DA have a crucial difference since the second round: in
BM once a school has no empty seats in some round, it cannot admit new applicants
even though they have higher priorities than students admitted in earlier rounds; but
in DA schools only consider the priority rankings of applicants without considering
the timing of receiving their applications. It is well-known that DA always finds
the student-optimal stable assignment, which Pareto dominates any other stable
assignment. I denoted it by µDA.
The Procedures of BM and DA
Round 1: Each student applies to the first school in his reported list. Each school
tentatively admits its applicants one by one according to its priority ranking until
its all seats are occupied or all applicants are admitted. Remaining applicants, if
any, are rejected. If all students are admitted, stop the procedure and finalize all
assignments.
Round r ≥ 2: Each rejected student applies to the next school in his reported list.
• In BM, each school with empty seats tentatively admits its applicants one
by one according to its priority ranking until its all seats are occupied or all
applicants are admitted. Remaining applicants, if any, are rejected. If all
students are admitted, stop the procedure and finalize all assignments.
• InDA, each school that receives new applications considers its earlier admitted
students and new applicants and admits them one by one according to its
priority ranking until its all seats are occupied or all students are admitted.
Remaining students, if any, are rejected. If all students are admitted, stop the
procedure and finalize all assignments.
7If all students in the example submit true preferences, Table 1.2 summarizes the
procedures of BM and DA by listing the school that each student applies to in each
round. In particular, although Bob has a higher priority than Charlie at Y, Bob loses
his chance at Y in BM because he applies to Y in the second round while Charlie
applies to Y in the first round.
Round BM DA
Alex Bob Charlie Alex Bob Charlie





Table 1.2: Procedures of BM and DA
In BM if a student ranks a school higher in his reported list, his application
will be sent to the school in an earlier round. So in general when students want
to manipulate BM, they often misreport their top ranked schools, especially their
most preferred schools. In this example if Bob reports Y as first choice, he will be
admitted by Y in BM.
1.3.2 Level-k Model of BM
I use two level-k models to analyze the strategies of students in BM in the
complete information environment. In both models a level-0 student is naive and
reports true preferences. In the original level-k model a level-k student for any k > 0
believes others are level-k-1 and chooses a best strategy. In the informational level-k
model a level-k student has a correct belief about the levels of those whose levels are
lower than k and believes the remaining are level-k-1, then chooses a best strategy.
The following presents the reasoning processes in the example.
1.3.2.1 Original Level-k Model of BM in the Example
• Level 0: If a student is level-0, he reports his true preferences in BM. In
particular, he reports his most preferred school as first choice.
• Level 1: If a student is level-1, he believes the others are level-0 and chooses
a best strategy. In the complete information environment he knows the true
preferences reported by the other students. Then if it is Alex, in his best
strategy Alex must report X as first choice since he believes that Bob also
8reports X as first choice. If it is Bob, in his best strategy Bob must report
Y as first choice. Otherwise, he will not be admitted by X but also lose the
chance at Y. If it is Charlie, in his best strategy Charlie must report Y as first
choice. Otherwise, Charlie will be admitted by another school that he reports
as first choice. However, for each student it is uncertain that how he reports
the whole preference orderings in his best strategy.
• Level 2: If a student is level-2, he believes the others are level-1 and chooses
a best strategy. In the complete information environment by conducting the
above level-1 reasoning process in hismind, he knows the first choices reported
by the others at level 1. Although he is uncertain about their whole reported
preference orderings, it is sufficient for him to choose his best strategy in BM.
If it is Alex, Alex knows that X is the school he wants to obtain by using a
best strategy, and he can obtain X for sure by reporting it as first choice. So
I assume that Alex just reports X as first choice.2 If it is Bob, in his best
strategy Bob must report Y as first choice since he believes that Charlie also
reports Y as first choice. If it is Charlie, in his best strategy he must report
X as first choice. Otherwise, he will not be admitted by Y but also lose the
chance at X. However, for each student it is still uncertain that how he reports
the whole preference orderings in his best strategy.
• Level 3: If a student is level-3, he believes the others are level-2 and chooses
a best strategy. In the complete information environment by conducting the
above reasoning process in his mind, he knows the first choices reported by
the others at level 2. If it is Alex, Alex knows that Z is the school he wants
to obtain by using a best strategy, and he can obtain Z for sure by reporting
it as first choice. So by my assumption Alex just reports Z as first choice. If
it is Bob, Bob knows that Y is the school he wants to obtain by using a best
strategy, and he can obtain Y for sure by reporting it as first choice. So by
my assumption Bob just reports Y as first choice. If it is Charlie, in this best
strategy Charlie must report X as first choice since he believes that Alex also
reports X as first choice.
• Level k ≥ 4: If a student is level-4, he believes the others are level-3 and
chooses a best strategy. In the complete information environment by con-
2If Alex believes that Charlie reports the preference ordering ofY  Z  X at level 1, he believes
he can also obtain X by reporting the preference ordering of Y  X  Z . Hence, it is not 100% sure
that Alex must report X as first choice in his best strategy, and so I make the assumption. Arguments
to support the assumption are in Section 6.
9ducting the above reasoning process in his mind, he knows the first choices
reported by the others at level 3. By my assumption Alex still reports Z as first
choice, Bob still reports Y as first choice, and Charlie still reports X as first
choice. It is easy to see that same conclusions also apply to all levels higher
than 4.
There are two observations from the above procedure. First, in the reasoning
process a level-k student essentially reasons about the first choices reported by the
others at level k-1. Second, by looking at the first choices reported by students, the
level-k reasoning process is analogous to the procedure of DA. I illustrate it by Table
1.3. For each round of DA and each student, the school I list is the school admitting
the student in the previous round, or the school the student applies to in the round.
Alex Bob Charlie
Level 0: X X Y
Level 1: X Y Y
Level 2: X Y X
Level 3: Z Y X
Level k ≥ 4: Z Y X
(a) Original level-k model of BM
Alex Bob Charlie
Round 1: X X Y
Round 2: X Y Y
Round 3: X Y X
Round 4: Y Y X
Round 5: Z Y X
(b) The procedure of DA
Table 1.3: The original level-k reasoning process is analogous to the procedure of
DA
1.3.2.2 Informational Level-k Model of BM in the Example
In the informational level-k model a positive-level student’s strategy depends
on the levels of those whose levels are lower than him. Hence, I assume a level
distribution: Alex is level-1, Bob is level-0, and Charlie is level-2. As before, in the
reasoning process students essentially reason about the first choices reported by the
others. So Table 1.4 lists the first choices reported by students at each level.
Alex Bob Charlie
Level 0: X X Y
Level 1: X Y
Level 2: Y
Table 1.4: Informational level-k reasoning process of BM
Since Charlie believes that Bob is level-0, he reports Y as first choice and obtains
Y in BM. By contrast, in the previous model Charlie would believe that Bob is level-
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1, so he would report X as first choice and obtain it. So Charlie obtains a better
assignment by having a correct belief. In the paper I show that the level-k reasoning
process in this model is also analogous to the procedure of DA. But correct beliefs
of high-level students can bring them better assignments.
1.4 The Original Level-k Model of BM
From now on if a student is level-k, I simply say he is Lk. In the original level-k
model L0 students report true preferences. An Lk student for any k > 0 believes
the others are Lk − 1. In the main content of this paper, I assume that the preference
profile and priority rankings are common knowledge among students. Under this
assumption each Lk student can infer others’ strategies at lower levels, then chooses
a best strategy at his level. I call the school an Lk student wants to obtain by
reporting a best strategy the best obtainable school at Lk for him. In general, best
strategies are not unique. In particular, any preference ordering that lists the best
obtainable school at Lk as first choice is a best strategy. In this paper I make the
assumption that an Lk student always reports his best obtainable school at Lk as
first choice, and this is common knowledge among all positive-level students.
Best strategy selection assumption: An Lk student for any k > 0 reports his best
obtainable school at Lk as first choice, and this is commonly known by students at
positive levels.
In the illustrating example of Section 1.3, an Lkstudent often has to report his
best obtainable school at Lk as first choice in his all best strategies. This happens
when he believes that there are enough many other student who also report his best
obtainable school at Lk as first choice, andwhen he believes that if he reports another
school as first choice, he must obtain it. In Section 1.6.3 I discuss the validity of
this assumption. For most results of the paper I do not assume how positive-level
students report the whole preference orderings. This not only make my results
robust to any further assumption, but also captures the uncertainty of students in the
level-k reasoning process about the others’ whole reported preference orderings.
By slightly adjusting the procedure of DA, I prove that the reasoning process in
the original level-k model of BM can be understood through the adjusted procedure.
Formally, I use ski to denote the school each student i reports as first choice at any
Lk. I call the adjusted procedure Fast DA since it usually runs faster than DA. In
any round of Fast DA when an unassigned student applies to a new school, he skips
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any school s that has admitted qs students each of whom has a higher priority than
him at s. Fast DA always find the same assignment as DA.
Fast Deferred Acceptance
Round r ≥ 0: Each unassigned student i applies to his most preferred school s that
he has not applied to and has not admitted qs students who all have higher priorities
than i at s. Each school tentatively admits students according to its priority ranking.
If all students are admitted after this round, stop the procedure.
Note that I index the first round of Fast DA by 0. I denote the last round of Fast
DA by rFDA. Then for each i and each k ≥ 0 I define
aki ≡

the school admitting i in round k − 1, if i is admitted in round k − 1,
the school i applies to in round k, if i is rejected in round k − 1,
ar
FDA
i , if k > r
FDA.
That is, aki is the school that admits i in round k − 1 of Fast DA, or the school i
applies to in round k. If k > rFDA, aki is the school that finally admits i, which is
just µDA(i). Now I prove that aki is exactly the school each i reports as first choice at
any Lk of the original level-k model of BM. So it is as if students run the procedure
of Fast DA in their minds to do their level-k reasoning.
Proposition 1. For any PI , ski = aki for all i and all k ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 implies that each i must report a weakly worse school as first
choice at a higher level, but the school is no worse than µDA(i).
Corollary 1. For any PI and any i,
(1) ski Ri s
k+1
i Ri µ
DA(i) for all k ≥ 0;
(2) there exists some finite ri ≥ 0 such that ski Pi µDA(i) for all k < ri, and
ski = µ
DA(i) for all k ≥ ri.
In general ri depends on PI , which I compress in notation for simplicity. There
is an intuitive explanation of Corollary 1. When i has a higher level, in his belief
others also have higher levels. So i believes that all students use more competitive
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strategies such that i’s best strategy is to cautiously report a weakly worse school as
first choice. However, since students compete with each other only through priority
rankings in DA, the situation in DA is weakly more competitive than all possible
situation in BM. Hence, i’s reported first choice in BM is never worse than µDA(i).
1.4.1 Efficiency Comparison between BM and DA
I use ki to denote any i’s level and use kI ≡ {ki}i∈I to denote any level distribution.
If ki ≥ ri (the threshold defined in Corollary 1), i reports µDA(i) as first choice no
matter how high ki is. So I say i is sufficiently sophisticated. If ki < ri, I say i is
insufficiently sophisticated. I use µBMkI to denote the assignment of BM for any PI
when the level distribution is kI .
Although I do not characterize the whole preference orderings reported by
positive-level students, characterizing their reported first choices is sufficient for
me to make some comparison between µBMkI and µ
DA. Specifically, in the first round
of BM there must be some students who are admitted by their reported first choices.
By Corollary 1, for any i who is admitted by his reported first choice s, if i is
insufficiently sophisticated, s must be strictly better than µDA(i); if i is sufficiently
sophisticated, s must coincide with µDA(i). So I have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For any PI:
1. µBMkI is not strictly Pareto dominated by µ
DA for any kI;
2. If each student is sufficiently sophisticated, µBMkI = µ
DA;
3. If each student is insufficiently sophisticated, µBMkI is not Pareto dominated by
µDA.
So µDA can Pareto dominate µBMkI only when some students are insufficiently
sophisticated while the others are sufficiently sophisticated. In the following I prove
that if that happens, there must be some insufficiently sophisticated student i who
prefers µDA(i) to µBMkI (i) but reports that µBMkI (i) is preferred to µDA(i).
Lemma 1. For any PI and any kI , if µDA Pareto dominates µBMkI , there exists some




but µDA(i) Pi µBMkI (i).
13
So if each insufficiently sophisticated student i reports the truthful preferences
between µDA(i) and any school worse than µDA(i), then µBMkI is never Pareto domi-
nated by µDA.
Proposition 3. For any PI and any kI , if each insufficiently sophisticated student i
reports a best preference ordering P′i such that µ
DA(i) Pi s implies µDA(i) P′i s for
any s ∈ S, then µBMkI is not Pareto dominated by µDA.
There is a simple best strategy P′i for each insufficiently sophisticated i that
satisfies the above condition: i only manipulates his first choice and reports the
truthful preference ordering of the remaining schools. Formally, if i reports s as first
choice, then sP′i s
′ for all s′ , s, and s′P′i s
′′ if and only if s′Pis′′ for all s′, s′′ , s. I
call P′i a topping strategy.
For any PI , I call the ordering of the schools that any i applies to in the procedure
of Fast DA the expressed preferences of i in Fast DA. If µDA is not Pareto efficient
with respect to the expressed preferences of students in Fast DA, there exists a level
distribution kI such that all students obtain their reported first choice and µBMkI Pareto
dominates µDA.
Proposition 4. For any PI , if µDA is not Pareto efficient with respect to the expressed
preferences of students in Fast DA, then there exists some kI such that µBMkI Pareto
dominates µDA.
1.4.2 Advantage of Sophisticated Students in BM
A popular concern in practice about BM is that a student may obtain a better
assignment if he is more sophisticated. It is easy to show that this concern does
not hold in general in the original level-k model of BM. It is because a student of
a higher level may overestimate others’ levels such that he chooses an overcautious
strategy. For example, in the example of Section 1.3 if all students are level-0, Alex
is admitted by X and Bob is admitted by Z. If Bob becomes L1, Bob is admitted by
Y and becomes better off. But if Alex becomes level-3, Alex is admitted by Z and
becomes worse off.
1.5 The Informational Level-k Model of BM
In the informational level-k model an Lk student for any k > 0 has a correct
belief about the level of any Lk′ student if k′ < k, and believes the remaining are
Lk − 1. So his strategy in BM depends on the level distribution kI . Hence, in
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this section I use s˜ki (kI) to denote the first choice reported by any i at Lk for any
0 ≤ k ≤ ki. Interestingly, the level-k reasoning process in this model can still be
understood through an adjusted procedure of DA. Formally, for any PI and any kI ,
I define:
Fast Deferred Acceptance∗
Round r ≥ 0: For each unassigned student i, if ki ≥ r , then i applies to her most
preferred school s that he has not applied to and has not admitted qs students who all
have higher priorities than i at s. Each school tentatively admits students according
to its priority ranking. If ki < r for all unassigned i, or all students are admitted
after this round, stop the procedure.
Fast DA∗ is different from Fast DA in that an unassigned i cannot apply to a new
school in any round r > ki. Since its procedure depends on kI , I denote its outcome
by µFDA∗kI . If some i is unassigned in µ
FDA∗
kI
, I say i is admitted by ∅. Let rFDA∗kI
denote the last round of Fast DA∗. Then for each i and each 0 ≤ k ≤ ki I define:
a˜ki (kI) ≡

the school admitting i in round k − 1, if i is admitted in round k − 1,





i , if k > r
FDA∗
kI .
Proposition 5. For any PI and any kI , s˜ki (kI) = a˜ki (kI) for all i and all 0 ≤ k ≤ ki.
By definition a˜kii (kI) is the last school that each i applies to in Fast DA∗. It is also
the first choice reported by each i in BM. So µFDA∗kI coincides with the assignment
found by the first round of BM.
Corollary 2. For any PI and any kI , µFDA
∗
kI
is the assignment found by the first
round of BM.
If all students are sufficiently sophisticated, each i must finally apply to µDA(i) in
Fast DA∗. Then µFDA∗kI coincides with µ
DA. If some i is insufficiently sophisticated,
since he applies to fewer schools than being sufficiently sophisticated, some other
j of a level higher than i may therefore only apply to schools better than µDA( j) in
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Fast DA∗.3 If all students are insufficiently sophisticated, each i must finally apply
to a school better than µDA(i) in Fast DA∗. So I have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For any PI ,
(1) for any kI , s˜ki (kI) Ri s˜k+1i (kI) Ri µDA(i) for all i and all 0 ≤ k ≤ ki;
(2) if each student is sufficiently sophisticated, µFDA∗kI = µ
DA;
(3) if each student is insufficiently sophisticated, s˜kii (kI) Pi µDA(i) for all i.
1.5.1 Efficiency Comparison between BM and DA
For any PI and any kI , I denote the assignment of BM by µ˜BMkI . Using Corollary
3 I can prove the following result in the same way as in the previous section.
Proposition 6. For any PI:
1. µ˜BMkI is not strictly Pareto dominated by µ
DA for any kI;
2. If each student is sufficiently sophisticated, µ˜BMkI = µ
DA;
3. If each student is insufficiently sophisticated, µ˜BMkI is not Pareto dominated by
µDA;
4. If each positive-level i reports a best strategy P′i such that µ
DA(i) Pi s implies
µDA(i) P′i s for any s ∈ S, then µ˜BMkI is not Pareto dominated by µDA for any
kI .
There is no counterpart of Proposition 4 in this section because if all students
obtain their reported first choice, µ˜BMkI coincides with µ
DA.
1.5.2 Advantage of Sophisticated Students in BM
To investigate the advantage of sophisticated students in BM, I compare the
assignment of BM when j is Lk j with the assignment of BM when j is Lk′j for
any k′j > k j . Since I only characterize the first choices reported by students, I
investigate how the assignment found by the first round of BM changes when j’s
level is increased from Lk j to Lk′j for any k
′
j > k j . By Corollary 2 it is equivalent
to investigating how the outcome of Fast DA∗ changes. My first result is as follows.
3In particular, even though j is sufficiently sophisticated, if his level is not high enough, i can be
unassigned in Fast DA∗. This is different from the previousmodel inwhich a sufficiently sophisticated
j must be assigned to µDA( j) in the first round of BM.
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Proposition 7. For any PI and any kI , if any j ∈ I becomes Lk′j for any k′j > k j ,
then,
• if µFDA∗kI ( j) , ∅, µ˜BMkI = µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j );
• if µFDA∗kI ( j) = ∅, for any i ∈ I such that µFDA
∗
kI
(i) , ∅ and µFDA∗(k ′j,k−j )(i) , ∅:
– if ki ≤ k j + 1, µ˜BMkI (i) = µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j )(i);
– if ki > k j + 1, µ˜BMkI (i) Ri µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j )(i).
The proof is as follows. If j is assigned in µFDA∗kI , it means that j obtains his
reported first choice. Then becoming Lk′j does not change j’s strategy as well as
the others’. So the outcome of BM does not change. If j is unassigned in µFDA∗kI ,
then by becoming Lk′j , j will apply to more schools in Fast DA
∗ than before. Then
for any i such that µFDA∗kI (i) , ∅ and µFDA
∗
(k ′j,k−j )
(i) , ∅, if ki ≤ k j + 1, the level change
of j cannot affect the set of schools that i applies to in Fast DA∗. So i’s assignment
does not change. If ki > k j + 1, since j applies to more schools than before in in
Fast DA∗, i will also apply to weakly more schools than before. So i’s assignment
must be weakly worse off.
For any PI , define r¯ ≡ maxkI rFDA
∗
kI
. That is, r¯ is the largest last round of Fast
DA∗ for all possible kI .4 If any i’s level is weakly higher than r¯ , i must be assigned
in the outcome of Fast DA∗ irrespective of the others’ levels. So I say i is quasi-
rational if ki ≥ r¯ . A quasi-rational student is sophisticated enough in the sense that
he always obtains his reported first choice. For any PI and any kI , I denote the set
of quasi-rational students by M and the set of the remaining by N . Proposition 7
implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4. For any PI and any kI , ifM , ∅ and N , ∅, then if any j ∈ N becomes
Lk′j for any k
′
j > k j ,
µ˜BMkI (i) Ri µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j )(i) for all i ∈ M .
If all students in N become quasi-rational, the outcome of Fast DA∗ will coincide
with µDA. Then Corollary 4 implies the following result.
Corollary 5. For any PI and any kI , if M , ∅, all students in M obtain weakly
better assignments in BM than in DA.
4Given the set I of students and the set S of schools, r¯ ≤ |I | · |S | − 1.
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For any kI , define k¯N ≡ maxi∈N ki. If M = ∅ and there exists a unique Lk¯N
student i, i must be assigned in µFDA∗kI and obtains an assignment weakly better than
µDA(i). It is because no students other than i can apply to schools in round k¯N of
Fast DA∗. Then if i is assigned in round k¯N − 1, i must still be assigned in round
k¯N ; if i is unassigned in round k¯N − 1, i must apply to a school in round k¯N and is
admitted. So Proposition 7 implies the following corollary.5
Corollary 6. For any PI and any kI , if M = ∅ and there is a unique Lk¯N student i,
(1) if any j ∈ N\{i} becomes Lk′j for any k j < k′j < ki, µ˜BMkI (i) Ri µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j )(i);
(2) i obtains a weakly better assignment in BM than in DA.
If µFDA∗kI ( j) = ∅, j may not be better off by becoming more sophisticated. It is
shown by the following example. It is because the other students in N who have
higher levels than j may respond to the level change of j by using more competitive
strategies.
Example 1. I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6} and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}. Each school has
one seat. The preferences of students and the priority rankings of schools are shown
in Table 1.5.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 Pi6 pis1 pis2 pis3 pis4 pis5 pis6
s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s1 i6 i3 i4 i5 i2
...
s2 s1 s2 s3 s4
...












Table 1.5: Example 1
Suppose i1 is L0, i2 is L2, and all others are quasi-rational. The first choices
reported students are shown in Table 1.6a. If i1 becomes quasi-rational, the first
choices reported by students are shown in Table 1.6b.
If all positive-level students use topping strategies, then the outcomes of BM are
shown in Table 1.7. It is easy to see that i1 is worse off by becoming quasi-rational.
However, if j has the highest level among N , I prove that j must be weakly
better off by becoming more sophisticated and using a strategy that satisfies a mild
5If there are multiple Lk¯N students, the corollary may not hold.
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i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
L0: s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s1
L1: s2 s3 s4 s4 s1
L2: s2 s3 s3 s4 s1
Lk ≥ 3: s2 s3 s4 s1
(a) i1 is L0
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
L0: s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s1
L1: s2 s2 s3 s4 s4 s1
L2: s2 s5 s3 s3 s4 s1
L3: s2 s2 s3 s4 s1
Lk ≥ 4: s6 s2 s3 s4 s1
(b) i1 is quasi-rational
Table 1.6: Informational level-k model of BM in Example 1
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
s5 s6 s2 s3 s4 s1
(a) i1 is L0
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
s6 s5 s2 s3 s4 s1
(b) i1 is quasi-rational
Table 1.7: The assignments of BM
condition. Formally, I use Pk jj and P
k ′j
j to denote the preference orderings reported
by j at Lk j and Lk′j respectively. If s is the first choice in P
k ′j
j , I say P
k ′j
j satisfies






Proposition 8. For any PI and any kI , if any j ∈ N of k j = k¯N becomes Lk′j for
any k′j > k j and his strategy satisfies worse-rank invariance, then
µ˜BM(k ′j,k−j )( j) Rj µ˜
BM
kI ( j).
If j uses topping strategies at both Lk j and Lk′j , the worse-rank invariance
condition is satisfied. If j becomes quasi-rational, since j must be admitted by
his reported first choice, j is weakly better off even if his strategy does not satisfy
worse-rank invariance.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Insights from the Two Level-k Models
In both level-k models of BM the iterated reasoning process is analogous to the
procedure of DA. Based on it I prove that BM is not (strictly) Pareto dominated
by DA. Since the two models use extreme belief settings, I believe similar results
will still hold in a level-k model with any other intermediate belief setting. The
two models are different in the advantage of sophisticated students. In the original
level-k model of BM sophisticated students do not have definite advantage because
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they may overestimate others’ levels, while in the informational level-k model a
student has a definite advantage in BM only when his level is high enough relative
to the others. Hence, the two model together imply that both high sophistication
and accurate belief are crucial for a student to have any advantage in BM.
1.6.2 Comparison with Nash Equilibrium Models
It is interesting to compare my results with those of Nash equilibrium models in
the complete information environment. By assuming all students are rational, Ergin
and Sönmez (2006) prove that every NE outcome of BM is a stable assignment with
respect to true preferences of students. Since DA always finds the student-optimal
stable assignment, it implies that BM is weakly Pareto dominated by DA. However,
in the two level-k models if students are sufficiently sophisticated, BM finds the
same assignment as DA. Hence, when students are very sophisticated and are more
likely to use the level-k reasoning than using the circular equilibrium reasoning,
students are more likely to coordinate on the stable-optimal stable assignment.
Pathak and Sönmez (2008) use a NE model to show that rational students can
take advantage of naive students in BM. In their model students are either rational
and naive, and rational students commonly know the identifies of naive students.
By assuming that the best NE outcome of BM is always realized, they prove that
there exists a conflict of interest between naive students and rational students. In
particular, rational students obtain weakly better assignments in BM than in DA.
This dichotomous sophistication distribution can be seen as a special case of my
models. Indeed, I prove that if students are either L0 or quasi-rational, then the
outcome of BM in the informational level-k model is exactly the best NE outcome
in the BM game where L0 students are naive and quasi-rational students are rational.
Then the results of Pathak and Sönmez are corollaries of mine.
Proposition 9. For any PI and any kI , if N,M , ∅ and kN = 0, then µ˜BMkI is the
best NE outcome in the BM game where N are naive and M are rational.
In Appendix A.2 I use a new method to characterize the set of NE outcomes
of BM when N are naive and M are rational. Proposition 9 is a corollary of the
characterization (Proposition 15). Then by Proposition 7 if any j ∈ N becomes
quasi-rational, all students in M are weakly worse off in BM. Since kN = 0, each
j ∈ N has the highest level in N . So by Proposition 8 if any j ∈ N becomes
quasi-rational, j must be weakly better off in BM. Hence, I obtain the main results
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of Pathak and Sönmez.6
Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2011) analyze a special incomplete informa-
tion environment in which schools do not prioritize students and students share a
common ordinal preference ordering over schools (but may have different cardinal
utilities). They prove that in any symmetric Bayesian NE of BM students have
weakly higher utilities in BM than in DA, and if there exist naive students, they can
benefit from the equilibrium strategies of rational students.7 I want to argue that
the driving force behind their result is the special priority and preference assump-
tion, not the incomplete information environment. Specifically, in the no priorities
environment any two students of same cardinal utilities are assumed to play same
strategies and also treated equally by schools. So when a rational student calculates
his best strategy, he does not need to know the identities of others if he knows the
distribution of cardinal utilities in the student population. Hence, assuming com-
mon knowledge of the cardinal utility distribution in the incomplete information
environment is similar to assuming complete information. In Section 1.8 I provide
a preliminary analysis of a level-k model of BM in the incomplete information
environment.
1.6.3 Validity of My Assumptions about Students’ Strategies
L0 strategy Intuitively, L0 strategy captures the instinct response of a player to a
game. Since school choice is a preference revelation game, I believe my assumption
that L0 students report true preferences is valid. In other games such as “p-beauty
contest”,8 there is no natural focal point for L0 players, so it is often assumed L0
players use a random strategy.9
6In Appendix A.2 I show that the other results of Pathak and Sönmez are also proved easily by
my method.
7Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2011) also consider the complete information environment
with strict priorities. They prove that if any naive student becomes rational, the other naive students
must be weakly worse off in the unique NE outcome of BM. So naive students suffer from the
existence of rational students. In Appendix A.5 I show that this result is actually incorrect.
8In the game each player is asked to propose an integer between 0 and 100. The winner is the
one whose proposal is closest to a multiple p of the group average.
9In some games it is believed that some strategies are more likely to become instinct responses
than the others. In the literature they are called salient strategies. For example, Crawford and Iriberri
(2007a) point out the framing effects in the experiments of “hide-and-seek” games. By suitably
adapting L0 behavior to salient strategies, they show that the level-k model can well explain the
experimental dataset. Arad and Rubinstein (2012) conduct experiments of the “11-20” game to
estimate the levels of players. In the game each of two players reports an integer between 11 and 20
and obtains an amount of dollars equaling his report; a player can win additional 20 dollars if his
report is one less than the other’s. Since the game rule is straightforward, Arad and Rubinstein argue
that it is very natural for a naive player to report 20.
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Lk strategy I assume that an Lk student for any k > 0 report their best obtainable
schools as first choice. In many situations students have to do that in their best
strategies. In other situations I believe my assumption is still reasonable. First,
because first choice plays the most important role in determining a student’s assign-
ment in BM, it is natural that students are attracted to focus on first choice. This is
supported by lab evidence. In the experiment of Chen and Sönmez (2006), 70.8%
of students receive their reported first choices in BM, but only 28.5% receive their
true first choices. So over 40% of students manipulate and obtain their first choices.
Second, in practice students may be advertised/convinced to focus on first choice.
For example, Boston provided a reference material to students in 2004 that sug-
gested students to strategically choose their first choices. In Seattle and Tampa-St.
Petersburg similar suggestions appear in local press (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005).
Last, as illustrated in the example of Section 1.3, in the level-k reasoning process
students are often uncertain about the whole preferences reported by others at lower
levels. If students is risk-averse and considers the worst case, they should assume
that others optimally manipulate their first choices. Then my assumption captures
such worst-case consideration.
1.7 Simulation
In previous sections I allow the level distribution to be arbitrary. But many
experiments have found that subjects’ levels are often not high. So in this section I do
simulations by randomly generating students’ levels from a reasonable distribution.
1.7.1 Setup
There are 1000 students and 20 schools. Each school has 50 seats. Although my
models do not involve in utilities, I randomly generate the utilities of students and
schools to generate preferences and priority rankings. Formally, the utility function
of each student i is denoted byUi and the utility function of each school s is denoted
by Us. Each utility consists of a private-value component and a common-value
component:
Ui(s) ≡ αU(s) + (1 − α)i(s),
Us(i) ≡ βU(i) + (1 − β)s(i),
where U(s) and U(i) are the common values of each s and each i, while i(s) is
the private value of each s in the utility of each i and s(i) is the private value of
each i in the utility of each s. All U and  are independently and identically drawn
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from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. α, β ∈ [0, 1] are correlation coefficients.
In my simulation I vary the values of α, β from 0 to 1 in steps of .2. So α, β ∈
{0, .2, .4, .6, .8, 1}. Students’ preferences and schools’ priority rankings are generated
as:
Pi : sa Pi sb ⇔ Ui(sa) > Ui(sb),
pis : ia pis ib ⇔ Us(ia) > Us(ib).
For every value pair of (α, β) I randomly generate 1000 markets. In each
market I draw the levels of students independently and identically from the Poisson
distribution with a mean of 2. This distribution is consistent with the estimation of
level distribution in multiple experiments.10 In particular, in this distribution the
probabilities for L0 to L4 are respectively .135, .271, .271, .180, .090.
In previous sections I do not assume how positive-level students report whole
preferences. In the simulation I consider two strategy settings. In the first setting
positive-level students use topping strategies. That is, they report true preferences
over the schools other than reported first choices. In the second setting they report
random preference orderings over the schools other than reported first choices which
are independently and identically drawn from the uniform distribution. I call them
random strategies. The two settings enable me to check the robustness of simulation
results.
1.7.2 Result
There are 36 pairs of (α, β). For convenience I first report the simulation results
corresponding to (α, β) = (.4, .4). The results for other pairs are similar. To measure
the welfare of students in BM and DA, I calculate the ranks of their assignments in
their true preferences. Table 1.8 reports the rank distribution and the average rank in
the two level-k models of BMwith the counterparts in DA, as well as the percentage
of students that obtain better assignments in BM and the percentage of students that
obtain better assignments in DA.
There are three observations from Table 1.8. First, the rank distributions in the
two level-k models of BM are very close, and the difference between the topping
strategy setting and the random strategy setting is small. Second, BM produces
10Camerer, Ho, andChong (2004) use the Poisson CognitiveHierarchymodel to estimatemultiple
games and find the median estimation of the Poisson mean is 1.61. Arad and Rubinstein (2012) find







1 25.72 25.62 > 18.44
2 18.02 17.55 > 15.77
3 13.93 12.30 < 13.24
4 10.65 9.35 < 11.11
5 8.04 6.71 < 9.35
6 6.08 4.82 < 7.81
7 4.46 3.53 < 6.27
8 3.27 2.64 < 4.91
9 2.40 2.01 < 3.71
10 1.71 1.62 < 2.72
11 1.27 1.36 < 1.95
12 .95 1.21 < 1.41
13 .72 1.10 < 1.03
14 .59 1.05 < .75
15 .46 1.03 < .53
16 .40 1.08 > .38
17 .34 1.18 > .27
18 .30 1.36 > .18
19 .29 1.66 > .11
20 .40 2.13 > .05
Avg rank 4.0 4.9 4.6
Topping: 32.8% prefer BM > 12.6% prefer DA







1 26.44 26.07 > 18.44
2 18.36 17.85 > 15.77
3 14.00 12.92 < 13.24
4 10.54 9.00 < 11.11
5 7.77 6.13 < 9.35
6 5.73 4.21 < 7.81
7 4.18 2.95 < 6.27
8 3.11 2.26 < 4.91
9 2.31 1.84 < 3.71
10 1.70 1.57 < 2.72
11 1.28 1.40 < 1.95
12 .98 1.29 < 1.41
13 .75 1.24 < 1.03
14 .61 1.20 < .75
15 .50 1.23 < .53
16 .42 1.29 > .38
17 .35 1.42 > .27
18 .30 1.63 > .18
19 .29 1.99 > .11
20 .38 2.51 > .05
Avg rank 4.0 5.1 4.6
Topping: 35.1% prefer BM > 14.1% prefer DA
Random: 32.5% prefer BM > 21.1% prefer DA
(b) Informational level-k
Table 1.8: The rank distribution in BM and DA when (α, β) = (.4, .4)
more extreme assignments than DA: in BMmore students obtain high or low-ranked
assignments, while in DAmore students obtain medium-ranked assignments. Third,
although the comparison between the average ranks in BM and DA depends on the
two strategy settings, there are always more students who prefer BM than those who
prefer DA. So neither BM nor DA dominates the other, but more students prefer
BM.
Result 1. For (α, β) = (.4, .4):
1. The rank distribution in BM and DA does not depend on the two level-k
models and the two strategy settings;
2. BM produces more extreme assignments than DA;
3. There are more students who prefer BM than those who prefer DA.
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Level Average rank of assignments
Original level-k of BM Informational level-k of BM DA
topping random topping random
0 6.0 6.6 6.0 6.5 4.59
1 4.5 6.9 4.5 7.2 4.58
2 3.2 3.8 3.1 3.3 4.59
3 3.2 3.2 2.94 3.0 4.59
4 3.6 3.6 2.94 3.0 4.59







Table 1.9: Average assignment rank at each level when (α, β) = (.4, .4)
Level Prefer BM|DA (%)
Original level-k of BM Informational level-k of BM
topping random topping random
0 19.97|41.19 17.11|45.41 19.53|41.39 16.75|45.39
1 31.19|21.15 26.52|36.00 29.18|22.23 23.78|38.68
2 42.20|4.55 40.84|8.45 38.66|7.82 36.44|14.49
3 37.16|.06 37.16|.09 43.03|1.61 42.66|2.87
4 27.62|≈ 0 27.50|≈ 0 44.06|.17 43.78|.26






Table 1.10: Percentage who prefer BM/DA at each level when (α, β) = (.4, .4)
To examine how a student’s welfare depends on his sophistication level, for the
students at each level from L0 to L5, in Table 1.9 I report the average rank of
their assignments in BM and DA, while in Table 1.10 I report the percentage of
students who obtain better assignments in BM and the percentage of students who
obtain better assignments in DA. In DA, the average rank for all levels is almost
always 4.59, but in BM the average rank depends on level. In particular, in BM
the average rank for level-0 students in BM is lower than the average rank for any
positive-level students, and is also lower than the average rank in DA. By contrast,
positive-level students have higher average ranks in BM than in DA. Similar can
also be observed from Table 1.10: among level-0 students more prefer DA, while
among positive-level students more prefer BM.
However, Table 1.9 shows an important difference between the two level-k
models. In the original level-k model the average rank in BM has a single peak at
L3. This is because in my chosen distribution level-3 students correctly believe the
25
largest number of students’ levels. By contrast, in the informational level-k model
the average rank increases in level. So higher-level students on average obtain better
assignments. This is similarly observed in Table 1.10. So I have the following result.
Result 2. For (α, β) = (.4, .4):
1. Level-0 students are on average better off in DA, while positive-level students
are on average better off in BM;
2. The advantage of positive-level students is single-peaked in the original level-k
model of BM, but increases in level in the informational level-k model of BM.
Figure 1.1: Simulation results in original level-k
Figure 1.1 summarizes the simulation results for all pairs of (α, β) in the original
level-k model. The simulation results for the informational level-k model are almost
same and reported in Appendix A.3.11 There are five subfigures for each strategy
11Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2015) show that unbalanced markets perform very differently
from balanced markets. In Appendix A.3 I also report the simulation results for unbalanced markets
by setting U(s) = i(s) = 0 for some s and all i. In this way s becomes the worst school in all
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setting. In each subfigure the horizontal axis is the value of α, and the six lines
correspond to the six values of β. For most pairs of (α, β), there are more students
who prefer BM than those who prefer DA.12 Average rank difference is equal to
the average rank of all students’ assignments in DA minus the average rank of all
students’ assignments in BM. I use it to compare the average welfare of students
in BM and DA. If it is positive, students are on average better off in BM; vice
versa. When topping strategies are used, students are on average better off in BM
for all pairs of (α, β),13 while when random strategies are used, the answer depends
on the pairs of (α, β). So in general it is uncertain that which algorithm gives
students a higher average welfare. The last two subfigures examine the advantage of
sophisticated students in BM. Average level difference is equal to the average level
of those who prefer BM minus the average level of those who prefer DA. In the
figure it is always positive. Corr. of rank & level reports the correlation coefficient
between the preference ranks of students’ assignments in BM and their levels. In
the figure it is always positive and significantly above zero for most pairs of (α, β).
Hence, both subfigures suggest that positive-level students have advantage in BM.
Result 3. For all pairs of (α, β):
1. There are more students who prefer BM than those who prefer DA;
2. Positive-level students have advantage in BM.
1.7.3 Comparison with Empirical Estimation
It is interesting to compare my simulation results with recent empirical esti-
mations conducted by He (2014) and Calsamiglia, Fu, and Güell (2015). He uses
the dataset from Beijing of China, and Calsamiglia et al. use the dataset from
Barcelona of Spain. Both cities implemented some kind of BM in their school
choice programs. The two studies accommodate the fact that students have het-
erogeneous sophistication types. After estimating the preferences of students they
students’ preferences and plays the role of “unassigned”. Unbalanced markets make some of the
simulation results sharper, but my qualitative conclusions do not change.
12α = 1 in the topping strategy setting is an exception. It is because when α = 1 students have
identical preferences, and by using topping strategies they report highly correlated preferences in
BM. So the assignment in BM is mainly determined by priority rankings of schools, which is further
determined by β. By contrast, in the random strategy setting students report weakly correlated
preferences.
13When α = 1, students have identical preferences, and any assignment has the same average rank.
So the average rank difference is zero. While when α = 0, students have uncorrelated preferences.
Then almost all of them obtain their most preferred schools in both BM and DA. So the average rank
difference is almost zero for any β.
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conduct counter-factual analyses to predict the effect of replacing BM with DA in
the two cities. Specifically, He develops an approach to estimate the preferences of
students without having to estimate their sophistication distribution. In his counter-
factual analysis he only considers the welfare of naive students and rational students.
Calsamiglia et al. estimate both the preferences of students and their sophistication
types. But they assume that there are only two sophistication types: being naive or
strategic. The results of the two studies are summarized in Table 1.11. Both studies
predict that replacing BM with DA will hurt more students of any sophistication
type than benefiting them, and an average student of any sophistication type will
have a welfare loss equivalent to either some increase in school distance or some
increase in school fee.
He (2014) Calsamiglia, Fu, and Güell (2015)
Effect naive rational naive strategic all
Benefit 27% 15% 8.6% 9.6% 9.5%
Hurt 55% 66% 35.4% 28.2% 28.5%
Average utility loss 8% ↑ 40% ↑ e117 ↑ e57 ↑ e60 ↑
in school distance in school fee
Table 1.11: Empirical estimation of the effect of replacing BM with DA
My simulation results are consistent with the two studies in that we all predict
that there are more sophisticated students who will be hurt by the replacement
than those who will be helped, and the average welfare of sophisticated students
will be reduced by the replacement. However, my simulations predict that the
replacement will help naive students in general (the only exception happens when
students have uncorrelated preferences). A possible reason for this difference is
that the two studies do not consider the possible heterogeneous sophistication levels
among strategic students.14 Hence, I hope my models and simulation results can
motivate future empirical research to address this problem.
14AlthoughHe somehow considers it, he does notmodel the sophistication distribution of strategic
students. In his second counter-factual analysis of replacing BM with DA, He assumes that students
are either naive or rational. He finds that the result depends on the proportion of naive students
and is different from his first counter-factual analysis. So he concludes that it is important to allow
additional sophistication types beyond naivety or rationality.
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1.8 Extension
1.8.1 Constrained School Choice
There are many schools in a city, but in some cities students are constrained to
report only a few schools in their submitted preferences (Haeringer and Klijn 2009;
Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn 2010). Under this constraint it is impossible for
students to report true preferences in any algorithm. In particular, students cannot
report true preferences in DA. So there should be a level-k model of DA to analyze
the strategies of students. Any such model needs to specify the default strategies
of L0 students and the best strategies of Lk students. However, it is not clear
what specifications are reasonable. In Appendix A.4, I analyze an original level-k
model of DA by assuming that L0 students report true preferences truncated by
the constraint and Lk students use topping strategies. I show that the reasoning
process is similar to that in BM. By contrast, since students manipulate BM through
misreporting first choice, the previous level-k models of BM still hold.
1.8.2 Incomplete Information
In this section I present an original level-k model of BM in the incomplete
information environment. To simplify the analysis I assume that schools do not
exogenously prioritize students and draw priority rankings randomly from uniform
distributions. This is to capture the fact that schools often very coarsely prioritize
students and break the ties by lotteries.
Denote the cardinal utility vector of each student i by vi ≡ (vis)s∈S, where vis is the
utility of obtaining s. vi is also called the type of i. vi is drawn from the type space
V ≡ {(vs)s∈S ∈ [0, 1]|S | : vs , vs′, ∀s, s′ ∈ S} according to a probability distribution
f . I assume f is public information and has full support. That is, f (vi) > 0 for all
vi ∈ V. Let Pv be the preference ordering induced by any v ∈ V.
I use Pkv to denote the preferences reported by any type-v students at any Lk.
As before L0 students report true preferences. So P0v = Pv. I assume positive-
level students are risk-neutral, so they choose strategies to maximize their expected
utilities. Then for any v ∈ V and any k > 0,
Pkv ≡ arg max
P?∈P
EUkv(P?),
where EUkv(P?) is the expected utility of type-v students by reporting P?. Specifi-
cally, let µBM(Pk−1v−i , P?) be the random outcome of BM if a type-v students i reports
P? and the others report Pk−1v−i . Let µ
BM(Pk−1v−i , P?)(i)(s) be the probability that i
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µBM(Pk−1v−i , P?)(i)(s) f (v−i)dv−i
]
vs .
When k = 1, P0v−i are the true preferences of the students other than i. So
EU1v(P?) is well-defined. Since f (v−i) =
∏
j,i f (v j) > 0 for all v−i ∈ V |I |−1,
with probability one there is a unique P1v that maximizes EU1v(P?). If P1v is not
unique, choose an arbitrary best strategy. When k ≥ 2, since f (v−i) > 0 for all
v−i ∈ V |I |−1 and Pk−1v is generally unique, EUkv(P?) is still well-defined. Then Pkv
is still generically unique. If it is not unique, choose an arbitrary best strategy.
As shown above, students’ strategies depend on their beliefs and cardinal utilities.
Without any additional assumptions it is hard to characterize their strategies and
compare the outcome of BM with that of DA. I leave it for future research.
1.9 Related Literature
There are a lot of related papers in the matching theory and especially school
choice literature. In Section 1.6 I have discussed related NE models. Troyan (2012)
generalizes the idea of Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2011) by relaxing the
no priorities assumption to coarse priorities. Featherstone and Niederle (2014)
use experiments to test the idea of Abdulkadirogˇlu et al.. They design a simple
environment in which there is a unique non-truth-telling Bayesian NE in BM,
and find that subjects fail to coordinate on the equilibrium even with feedback and
repetition. Haeringer andKlijn (2009) analyze theNEoutcomes of popularmatching
algorithms in constrained school choice, and find it is hard to compare BM and DA
based onNE outcomes. Specifically, they prove that the set of NE outcomes of BM is
equal to the set of stable assignments, but the set of NE outcomes of DA is a superset
of stable assignments. Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2010) use experiments
to study constrained school choice, and find that constraints significantly reduce the
efficiency of BM and DA as well as the proportion of truth telling in DA.
Basteck and Mantovani (2016) and Dur, Hammond, and Morrill (2015) use ex-
perimental and empirical datasets respectively to examine the advantage of sophis-
ticated students in BM. Basteck and Mantovani first measure the cognitive abilities
of subjects by standard tests in labs, then let them play the BM and DA games.
Although test scores have a wide range, they classify subjects into two groups:
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high-ability group of the top half scores and low-ability group of the remaining. By
matching subjects’ performance in the two games with their groups, Basteck and
Mantovani find that the low-ability group have significantly lower payoffs than the
high-ability group in BM, but the difference is small in DA. Meanwhile, the average
payoff of all subjects is higher in BM than in DA. Dur et al. obtain an interesting
dataset from Wake County of North Carolina. In the city students have two weeks
to submit or revise their preferences as many times as they want through an online
system. Once a student logs into the system, he can see the number of students who
have reported each school as first choice. In the dataset an average student visits
the system 4.61 times with a standard deviation of 8.65; 60.7% of students visit
the system more than once. Dur et al. interpret those who visit once as naive and
interpret the remaining as sophisticated. They find that sophisticated students have
better assignments than naive students.
Agarwal and Somaini (2014) find that BM is significantly manipulated in the
dataset from Cambridge of Massachusetts. So they estimate the preferences of
students by assuming all of them are strategic. They predict that replacing BM
with DA will make students on average worse off. Top Trading Cycle (Shapley
and Scarf 1974) is another popular matching algorithm, but is not widely used
in school choice. One reason is that it is hard to explain the role of priorities in
TTC to schools and students (Pathak 2016). So I do not analyze it in the paper.
Since TTC is strategy-proof, students report true preferences even though they have
heterogeneous sophistication levels. Bade (2016b) is the only paper I am aware of
that discusses the properties of matching algorithms when players are boundedly
rational. She studies the problem of assigning indivisible objects to players in the no
priorities environment, and examines whether the large set of hierarchical exchange
algorithms are still Pareto efficient.
1.10 Conclusion
In this paper I study how students behave in a manipulable school choice algo-
rithm known as Boston mechanism when students have heterogeneous sophistica-
tion, and then compare BM with Deferred Acceptance. In the two level-k models
with extreme belief settings, it is robust that BM is not Pareto dominated by DA.
However, whether the advantage of sophisticated students exists depends on how
accurate their beliefs are. My results provide a new perspective on the comparison
between BM and DA in school choice.
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Pathak and Sönmez (2013) argue that the main motivation behind multiple
school choice reforms in practice is to reduce the manipulability of algorithms in
use. This seems to imply that the strategy-proofness of DA is sufficient to support its
replacement of BM. However, lab and field evidence have revealed that some players
do not understand the strategy-proofness of DA and attempt to manipulate DA: in
the experiment of Chen and Sönmez (2006) 36% of subjects attempt to manipulate
DA; in the survey conducted by Rees-Jones (2015) from the participants in the 2012
National Resident Matching Program, around 5% of respondents report that they
attempt to manipulate DA. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2015) prove that DA is not
obviously strategy-proof, a property that is supposed to be easier to understand than
strategy-proofness (Li 2015). This implies that understanding the strategy-proofness
of DAmay require some level of sophistication. Hence, a natural question for future
research is to understand the behavior of players in DA when they have different
abilities to understand it.
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C h a p t e r 2
EFFICIENT AND FAIR ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM IS
STRONGLY GROUP MANIPULABLE
2.1 Introduction
Assigning indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers is a
common theme in many matching markets. This paper studies the simplest form
of the problem: agents have strict preferences on objects, while objects do not
discriminate agents by priority rankings. Efficiency, fairness, and (group) incentive
compatibility are three most important objectives when policy makers design mech-
anisms to solve the problem. In this paper I show that in the presence of a minimal
efficiency requirement, fairness and group incentive compatibility are not compat-
ible. Specifically, since objects are indivisible, fairness motivates policy makers to
use random assignment mechanisms. I prove that if a mechanism satisfies ex-post
efficiency and some mild fairness criteria, no matter outside option is available or
not, it must be strongly groupmanipulable: bymisreporting preferences all agents of
a manipulating group obtain lotteries that strictly first-order stochastically dominate
the lotteries they obtain in the truth-telling case. When outside option is available,
the manipulating group can be as small as containing only two agents. Since ex-post
efficiency is a very weak requirement that policy makers are very likely to pursue,
my results tell policy makers that they have to make a choice between fairness and
group incentive compatibility.
To illustrate my results, let us look at Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and
Probabilistic Serial (PS), which are two popular mechanisms in the literature. For
the two preference profiles in Table 2.1, both RSD and PS find the assignments
shown in Table 2.2. The lotteries i1, i2 obtain in ◦I strictly first-order stochastically
dominate the lotteries they obtain in ∗I . Therefore, I say i1, i2 can strongly group
manipulate RSD and PS in ∗I by misreporting their preferences as in ◦I .
It is well-known that RSD and PS are ex-post efficient and satisfy some existing
fairness criteria. In particular, RSD satisfies equal treatment of equals and weak
envy-freeness, while PS satisfies a stronger criterion of envy-freeness. Nevertheless,
I show that they also satisfy three new fairness criteria proposed by this paper,
















































(b) RSD(◦I )=PS(◦I )
Table 2.2: The assignments for the two preference profiles
fairness criteria that makes a mechanism inevitably be strongly group manipula-
ble. Therefore, my results provide a better understanding of random assignment
mechanisms.
Two of the three new fairness criteria are weaker than envy-freeness, and the
other one is independent of envy-freeness. Specifically, equal top-assignment of
equal tops is a fairness notion defined only on agents’ top choices. It requires that
any two agents who mostly prefers the same object must receive equal probability
of the object. In other words, the differences in their lotteries exist only in the
assignments of objects other than their common top choice. As discussed in the
paper, this criterion and equal treatment of equals can be seen as two extreme special
cases of a general fairness criterion, which requires that if any two agents have equal
upper contour sets of some object and have equal preferences on the upper contour
set, then they receive equal probability of each object in the upper contour set.
Uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails requires that if all agents have equal upper
contour sets of some object and have equal preferences on the remaining objects,
then they receive equal probability of each remaining object. In other words, the
differences in agents’ lotteries exist only in the assignments of the upper contour set.
It is different from previous criteria in that its restriction is imposed on all agents’
preferences. Both new criteria are weaker than envy-freeness, and are independent
of equal treatment of equals or weak envy-freeness. Top advantage is also a fairness
notion defined on agents’ top choices, and can be seen as a complement of equal
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top-assignment of equal tops. It requires that any agent receives a higher probability
of his most preferred object than any other agent who has a different most preferred
object if the latter agent receives a positive probability of the former agent’s most
preferred object. Top advantage is independent of envy-freeness (therefore, as well
as others).
The paper explicitly distinguishes the cases that outside option is available or
not. When outside option is available, agents can prefer outsdie option to an object.
My first result (Section 2.3) proves that in the simple environment of three agents
and at least three objects, no matter outside option is available or not, any ex-post
efficient mechanism that satisfies equal top-assignment of equal tops, top advantage,
and either equal treatment of equals or weak envy-freeness must be strongly group
manipulable. In this environment Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and Nesterov
(2016) respectively prove that RSD is the only ex-post efficient and strategy-proof
mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals orweak envy-freeness. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between individual incentive compatibility and minimal group
incentive compatibility.
My second result (Section 2.4) considers the environment of at least four agents
and at least three objects. If outside option is available, I prove that the first result
still holds. It is because the previous three-agent environment can be embedded
into this general environment. However, if outside option is not available, I prove
that a mechanism is still strongly group manipulable if it further satisfies uniform
tail-assignment of uniform tails. As a corollary, no matter outside option is avail-
able or not, when there are at three agents and at least three objects, any ex-post
efficient mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness and top advantage is strongly group
manipulable.
The above negative results hold when there are at least three objects. Thus, they
motivate me to consider the two-object environment and investigate whether any
positive result can hold. My third result (Section 2.5) proves that when there are at
least three agents and outside option is not available, any ex-post efficientmehcanism
that satisfies equal treatment of equals and top advantage must not be strongly group
manipulable. If a mechanism further satisfies uniform tail-assignment of uniform
tails, it must be group strategy-proof. However, if outside option is available,
previous negative results still hold.
Related Literature
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Group manipulation has been studied a lot for deterministic mechanisms (Svens-
son 1999; Pápai 2000; Pycia and Ünver 2017). However, the literature mainly focus
on individual manipulation for random mechanisms. To the best of my knowledge,
Bade (2016a) provides the only study of groupmanipulation in randommechanisms.
She proves that when there are at least three objects, any ex-post efficient mechanism
that satisfies equal treatment of equals is not group strategy-proof: by misreport-
ing preferences some members of a manipulating group obtain lotteries that are
not strictly first-order stochastically dominated by lotteries in the truth-telling case,
while the remaining members obtain lotteries same as the truth-telling case. There-
fore, group strategy-proofness is a very strong requirement: no matter what cardinal
utilities a group of agents may have behind their preferences, none of them can
obtain higher expected utilities without hurting others by misreporting preferences.
Accordingly, it is a weak statement that a mechanism is not group strategy-proof.
For example, it is known that PS is not strategy-proof. Thus, Bade’s result does not
have any new implication for PS. By contrast, by imposing more (mild) fairness cri-
teria than Bade, I prove stronger theorems, which imply that no matter what cardinal
utilities a manipulating group may have behind their preferences, all of them must
obtain higher expected utilities by misreporting preferences. In particular, although
PS is not strongly manipulable by individuals (because PS is weakly strategy-proof),
my theorems imply that PS is strongly manipulable by groups. Moreover, in the
two-object environment I prove that by adding some new fairness criteria I introduce
to Bade’s theorem, the theorem becomes positive, that is, any mechanism must be
group strategy-proof. This result is an interesting complement of Bade’s result.
RSD attracts a lot of attention in the literature because of its strategy-proofness
and good fairness properties. Bade (2016c) proves that any random mechanism
defined by uniformly randomizing the roles of agents in a Pareto efficient, strategy-
proof and non-bossy deterministicmechanism is equivalent toRSD.Li (2015) proves
that RSD is obviously strategy-proof if agents take turns to choose objects. Pycia
and Troyan (2016) further prove that RSD is the only mechanism that is obviously
strategy-proof, ex-post efficient and symmetric.1 These results make RSD stand
out from random mechanisms. However, in Section 2.6, I prove that both PS and
RSD satisfy the three new fairness criteria. So both mechanisms are strongly group
manipulable as long as there are at least three objects. It strengthens the implication
of this paper that group incentive compatibility is hard to achieve if policy makers
1Simply speaking, a mechanism is symmetric if its underlying game is anonymous to the roles
of agents. It implies equal treatment of equals.
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want to pursue strategy-proofness and fairness in the way suggested by Bade or
Pycia and Troyan.
The literature (Zhou 1990; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Martini 2016; Nes-
terov 2016) have proved multiple impossibility theorems regarding the tension be-
tween efficiency and fairness for strategy-proof mechanisms. Nesterov proves that
when there are at least three agents, any ex-post efficient and upper-envy-free mecha-
nism must not be upper-shuﬄe-proof. Upper-envy-freeness are stronger than equal-
top assignment of equal tops, equal treatment of equals, and uniform tail-assignment
of uniform tails, while upper-shuﬄe-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness.
As a corollary, any ex-post efficient mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness is not
strategy-proof. In comparison, my Corollary 8 proves that if the mechanism further
satisfies top advantage, it must be strongly group manipulable, which implies that
the mechanism is even not weakly strategy-proof.
Zhou (1990) proves that when there are at least three agents, any ex-ante efficient
and symmetric (agents of identical cardinal utilities obtain equal expected utility)
mechanism is not strategy-proof. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) prove that when
there are at least four agents, any ordinally efficient mechanism that satisfies equal
treatment of equals is not strategy-proof. Martini (2016) strengthens their result
by weakening ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. Zhou, BM and Nesterov all
assume that objects are as many as agents. This assumption allows the authors to
easily embed a small-size problem into a large-size problem.2 Martin does not make
this assumption, but he assumes that outside option is available, which is crucial for
his result.
2.2 Definition
2.2.1 Object allocation problem
A finite set of heterogeneous indivisible objects O is assigned to a finite set of
agents I. I assume that |O | ≥ 2 and |I | ≥ 3. A generic object is denoted by o or
o′ and a generic agent is denoted by i or j. Each i ∈ I demands only one object
and each o ∈ O has only one copy. When an agent does not obtain an object, he
is said to obtain the virtual object ∅. So ∅ plays the role of outside option. Let
Oˆ ≡ O∪{∅}. Each i ∈ I has a strict preference ordering i of Oˆ, with the associated
2For example, after an impossibility result is proved for a three-agent (or four-agent) case, to
prove it also holds for more agents, both Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and Nesterov (2016)
construct a preference profile in which three (or four) agents essentially constitute a subproblem by
requiring the other agents mostly prefer objects of same indexes with them.
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weak ordering denoted by %i. Let SU(i, o) ≡ {o′ ∈ Oˆ : o′ i o} be the strict
upper contour set of o at i. Let i |O′ be the restriction of any i to anyO′ ⊆ Oˆ.
That is, for any o, o′ ∈ O′, o i |O′o′ if and only if o i o′. Any o is acceptable to i
if any o %i ∅. For any J ⊆ I, let J≡ {i}i∈J be the preference profile of the agents
in J.
A deterministic assignment pi is a function from I to Oˆ such that pi(i) = pi( j) for
any distinct i, j if and only if pi(i) = pi( j) = ∅. Let Π be the set of all deterministic
assignments. A random assignment p is a probability distribution on Π such
that p(pi) is the probability that pi is realized, pi ∈ ∆Oˆ is the lottery assigned to
i, and pi,o is the probability that i obtains o. Hence, ∆Π is the set of all random
assignments. From now on whenever I refer to an assignment, I mean it is a random
assignment. For any two lotteries pi, qi ∈ ∆Oˆ, pi strictly first-order stochastically




o′io qi,o′ for all o and∑
o′io pi,o′ >
∑
o′io qi,o′ for some o. I use pi ≥i qi to denote that either pi >i qi or
pi = qi, and use pi ≯i qi and pi 6≥i qi to denote that pi >i qi and pi ≥i qi do not hold
respectively.
Let P be any domain of agents’ preferences. In this paper I focus on two
preference domains: the universal domain U, which contains all strict preference
orderings of Oˆ, and the no outside-option domain Q, which contains all strict
preference orderings of Oˆ that rank ∅ as worst.
Given any P, a random assignment mechanism ρ is a function from P |I | to
∆Π such that ρ(I) is the random assignment found by ρ for any I . Let ρ(I)(pi)
be the probability of any pi in ρ(I), ρi(I) ∈ ∆Oˆ be the lottery assigned to any i,
and ρio(I) be the probability of o that any i obtains.
2.2.2 Group manipulation
I define two group manipulation concepts. In the weak one, a group manipulates
a mechanism if by misreporting preferences some member of the group obtains
new lottery that is not strictly first-order stochastically dominated by the lottery in
the truth-telling case, while the other members obtain lotteries same with the truth-
telling case. In the strong one, a group manipulates a mechanism if by misreporting
preferences every member of the group obtains a new lottery that strictly first-order
stochastically dominates the lottery in the truth-telling case. So they respectively
induce a strong and a weak group strategy-proofness concept.
Formally, a group J ⊆ I weakly group manipulate a mechanism ρ at I if by
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reporting some ′J , {i ∈ J : ρi(I) , ρi(I\J, ′J)} is nonempty, and for every i in
the set, ρi(I) ≯i ρi(I\J, ′J). Then ρ is group strategy-proof if it is not weakly
group manipulable. When J is restricted to be singleton, group strategy-proofness
reduces to strategy-proofness. A group J ⊆ I strongly group manipulate ρ
at I if by reporting some ′J , ρi(I\J, ′J) >i ρi(I) for all i ∈ J. Then ρ is
minimally group strategy-proof if it is not strongly group manipulable. When
J is restricted to be singleton, minimal group strategy-proofness reduces to weak
strategy-proofness defined by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
In the paper I will prove that an efficient and fair mechanism is strongly group
manipulable. By the definition, claiming strong group manipulability is a robust
statement: no matter what cardinal utilities agents may have behind their prefer-
ences, a manipulating group always want to manipulate the mechanism to obtain
higher expected utilities. By contrast, when claiming a mechanism is weakly group
manipulable (Bade 2016a), it only guarantees that a manipulating group want to
manipulate the mechanism when they have some proper cardinal utilities.
To further illustrate that strong groupmanipulation is indeed the strongest manip-
ulation concept in the environment, I define two intermediate concepts. Formally,
at any I , a group J I-intermediately group manipulate a mechanism ρ if by
reporting some ′J , ρi(I) 6≥i ρi(I\J, ′J) for all i ∈ J. That is, every member of
J obtains a new lottery that is not strictly first-order stochastically dominated by
the truth-telling case. Therefore, this concept is a stronger version of weak group
manipulation. At any I , a group J II-intermediately group manipulate ρ if by
reporting some ′J , ρi(I\J, ′J) ≥i ρi(I) for all i ∈ J, and ρ j(I\J, ′J) > j ρ j(I)
for at least one j ∈ J. That is, at least one member of J obtains new lottery that
strictly first-order stochastically dominates the lottery in the truth-telling case, and
the other members obtain lotteries same with the truth-telling case. Therefore, this
concept is a weaker version of strong group manipulation. It is obvious that the





In the following I will define ex-post efficiency and several fairness criteria. A
mechanism ρ is said to satisfy an efficiency or fairness criterion if ρ(I) satisfies
the criterion for all I .
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2.2.3 Ex-post efficiency
For any I , a deterministic assignment pi is Pareto efficient if there does not
exist another pi′ such that pi′(i) %i pi(i) for all i and pi′( j)  j pi( j) for some j. An
assignment p is ex-post efficient if for any pi such that ρ(pi) > 0, pi is Pareto efficient.
In an ex-post efficient mechanism every agent must be assigned an acceptable object.
In the literature there are stronger efficiency criteria such as ordinal efficiency and
ex-ante efficiency. However, since I want to show the tension between fairness
and group incentive compatibility, I use ex-post efficiency as the weakest efficiency
requirement.
2.2.4 Fairness
For any assignment p and any preference profile I , I first define three fairness
criteria that have been studied a lot in the literature.
1. p is envy-free if pi ≥i p j for any distinct i, j. That is, every i thinks that his
lottery is weakly better than any other j’s.
2. p is weakly envy-free if p j ≯i pi for any distinct i, j. That is, every i does not
think that any other j’s lottery is strictly better than his.
3. p satisfies equal treatment of equals if pi = p j for any distinct i, j such that
i= j . That is, any two agents of equal preference orderings obtain equal
lotteries.
In this paper I introduce three new fairness criteria. They capture some crucial
properties of RSD and PS that make them be strongly group manipulable, and play
important roles in my theorems.
4 p satisfies equal top-assignment of equal tops if pi,o = p j,o for any two
distinct i, j that mostly prefer the same object o.
5 p satisfies uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails if there exists some
o ∈ Oˆ such that SU(i, o) = SU( j, o) and i |Oˆ\SU(i,o) = j |Oˆ\SU(j,o) for
all distinct i, j, then pio′ = p jo′ for all o′ ∈ Oˆ\SU(i, o). That is, if all agents’
preferences have equal strict upper contour sets of some object o, and their
preferences on the remaining objects are identical, then all agents obtain equal
probability of each remaining object.
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6 p satisfies top advantage if for any distinct i, j such that i mostly prefers some
o while j does not, then p j,o > 0 implies that pi,o > p j,o. That is, if any j
obtains positive probability of some o that he does not mostly prefer, then any
i who mostly prefers o must obtain a higher probability of o than j.
The common idea behind 3, 4, and 5 is that if agents have somehow “equal” pref-
erences, they should receive somehow “equal” lotteries. Their differences are that,
equal treatment of equals imposes restriction on agents whose whole preferences
are equal, and accordingly requires that those agents obtain equal probabilities of all
objects; equal top-assignment of equal tops imposes restriction on agents who top
choices are equal, and accordingly requires that those agents obtain equal probabil-
ities of the common top choice; while uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails has
a bite only when all agents’ preferences have equal tails, and accordingly requires
that all agents receive equal probabilities of the objects in the common tail.
Criteria 3-5 are related to two other introduced by Nesterov (2016). Specifically,
p satisfies strong equal treatment of equals if any two agentswith equal preferences
from their most preferred objects down to some particular object obtain equal
probabilities of the objects from their most preferred to the particular one. p
is upper envy-free if any two agents whose preferences have equal strict upper
contour sets of some object o obtain equal probability of o.3 It is easy to see
that equal 3 and 4 are two extreme special cases of strong equal treatment of
equals by restricting attention to agents’ top choices or whole preferences, while 5 is
implied by upper envy-freeness by restricting attention to all agents. Nesterov proves
that envy-freeness implies upper envy-freeness, which further implies strong equal
treatment of equals. Therefore, envy-freeness implies 4 and 5. 4 is also implied
by ordinal fairness introduced by Hashimoto et al. (2014), which requires that any
agent’s surplus at any o that he obtains positive probability (i.e., total probability of
received objects weakly better than o) should be no greater than any other agent’s
surplus at o. Thus, I can summarize these observations in Figure 2.1.
The idea behind top advantage is different from 3-5. As the name suggest, it
requires agents have advantage at their top choices.4 It is independent of 1-5, and can
3Formally, p is upper envy-free if SU(i, o) = SU(j, o) implies that pi,o = pj,o, while p
satisfies strong equal treatment of equals if SU(i, o) = SU(j, o) and i |SU(i,o) =j |SU( j,o)
imply that pi,o′ = pj,o′ for all o′ ∈ SU(i, o) ∪ {o}.
4It has a flavor somehow similar to favoring higher ranks introduced by Kojima and Ünver
(2014) for deterministic assignments, which requires that if an agent does not obtain an object
preferred to his assignment, then the object must be assigned to another agent who ranks the object
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equal treatment of equals equal top-assignment of equal tops
strong equal treatment of equals uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails ordinal fairness
upper envy-freeness weak envy-freeness
envy-freeness
Figure 2.1: Relations between multiple fairness criteria
be seen as a complement of equal top-assignment of equal tops. When each agent
obtains positive probability of his most preferred object, ordinal fairness implies top
advantage. If an ex-post efficient assignment satisfies both top advantage and equal
top-assignment of equal tops, then ex-post efficiency guarantees that every agent’s
most preferred object must be assigned, and equal top-assignment of equals and top
advantage guarantee that every agent must obtain positive probability of his most
preferred object, which is greater than that of any other agent who mostly prefers a
different object. This fact plays an important role in the proofs of my theorems.
2.3 Impossibility theorems for |I | = 3 and |O | ≥ 3
In this section I consider the simple environment of three agents and at least
three objects. My first theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1. When |I | = 3 and |O | ≥ 3, in Q (therefore, also in U), an ex-
post efficient mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals (or weak envy-
freeness), equal top-assignment of equal tops, and top advantage is strongly group
manipulable.
In this simple environment an ex-post efficientmechanism that satisfies equal top-
assignment of equal tops and weak envy-freeness must also satisfy equal treatment
of equals. So in the above theorem equal treatment of equals can be replaced by
weak envy-freeness.
In the proof I construct two preference profiles such that if a mechanism satisfies
ex-post efficiency and equal treatment of equals, then the mechanism is minimally
group strategy-proof only if it finds same assignments for the two preference profiles.
However, if the mechanism further satisfies equal top-assignment of equal tops and
top advantage, it must find different assignments for them. Therefore, themechanism
at least as high as the initial agent.
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is strongly group manipulable. The proof is also a good illustration of the roles of
new fairness criteria I introduce.
In this simple environment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and Nesterov
(2016) respectively prove that RSD is the only ex-post efficient and strategy-proof
mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals orweak envy-freeness. Therefore,
I have the following corollary.
Corollary 7. When |I | = 3 and |O | ≥ 3, in Q (therefore, also in U), an ex-post
efficient mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals (or weak envy-freeness)
cannot be strategy-proof and minimally group strategy-proof simultaneously.
Thus, there is a trade-off between individual incentive compatibility andminimal
group incentive compatibility.
2.4 Impossibility theorems for |I | ≥ 4 and |O | ≥ 3
2.4.1 Universal preference domainU
When the preference domain isU, I can construct preference profiles subsume
those in the proof of Theorem 1 by requiring that three particular agents prefer
three particular objects to the remaining ones, while the other agents do not accept
the three objects. Then the previous theorems still hold in this section. Similar
constructions are also used by other papers which assume that outside option is
available or objects are as many as agents (Erdil 2014; Martini 2016; Nesterov
2016).
Theorem 2. When |I | ≥ 4 and |O | ≥ 3, in U, an ex-post efficient mechanism that
satisfies equal treatment of equals (or weak envy-freeness), equal top-assignment of
equal tops, and top advantage is strongly group manipulable.
2.4.2 No outside-option domain Q
If the preference domain is Q, agents must report all objects as acceptable. So
the preference profiles constructed in Section 2.4.1 are not allowed in this domain.
Moreover, when a groupmisreport their preferences, the fairness criteria in Theorem
2 do not have useful restrictions on the change of the assignments. In the following I
prove that if a mechanism further satisfies uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails,
I can recover the previous impossibility result.
Theorem 3. When |I | ≥ 4 and |O | ≥ 3, in Q, an ex-post efficient mechanism that
satisfies equal treatment of equals (or weak envy-freeness), equal top-assignment of
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equal tops, top advantage, and uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails is strongly
group manipulable.
Since envy-freeness implies all fairness criteria in Theorem 1-3 except for top
advantage, I have the following corollary.
Corollary 8. When |I | ≥ 3 and |O | ≥ 3, in Q (therefore, also in U), an ex-post
efficient mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness and top advantage is strongly group
manipulable.
Nesterov (2016) proves that when there are at least three agents and objects are as
many as agents, any ex-post efficient and envy-free mechanism is not strategy-proof.
Therefore, by adding top advantage I obtain a strong impossibility theorem regard-
ing group incentive compatibility. Bade (2016a) proves that any ex-post efficient
mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals is weakly group manipulable.
So by using more mild fairness criteria than her, I obtain a much stronger negative
result (see discussion in Section 2.2).
2.5 (Im)possibility theorems for |I | ≥ 3 and |O | = 2
The previous negative results are proved in the environment of at least three
objects. This motivates me to examine the environment of only two objects. Inter-
estingly, I show that ex-post efficiency and some fairness criteria can guarantee that
a mechanism is (minimally) group strategy-proof, if outside option is not available.
In the absence of outside option, every agent has only one way to misreport prefer-
ences. Therefore, a proper combination of fairness criteria can have strict restriction
on the possible lotteries agents obtain by misreporting preferences.
Theorem 4. When |I | ≥ 3 and |O | = 2, in Q, any ex-post efficient mechanism
that satisfies equal treatment of equals and top advantage must be minimally group
strategy-proof.
As before, equal treatment of equals can be replaced by weak envy-freeness and
equal top-assignment of equal tops.
If a mechanism further satisfies uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails, then
the mechanism must be group strategy-proof. This is an interesting complement of
Bade’s negative result, which is proved in the environment of at least three objects.
44
Theorem 5. When |I | ≥ 3 and |O | = 2, in Q, any ex-post efficient mechanism that
satisfies equal treatment of equals, top advantage, and uniform tail-assignment of
uniform tails must be group strategy-proof.
However, if outside option is available, the previous negative result still holds.
The proof is also similar as before.
Theorem 6. When |I | ≥ 3 and |O | = 2, in U, an ex-post efficient mechanism that
satisfies equal treatment of equals (or weak envy-freeness), equal top-assignment of
equal tops, and top advantage is strongly group manipulable.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 RSD and PS
RSD and PS are two popular mechanisms in the object allocation problem.5
RSD is ex-post efficient and strategy-proof, and satisfies weak envy-freeness and
equal treatment of equals. PS is ordinally efficient and weakly strategy-proof, and
satisfies envy-freeness. In the following I prove that they satisfy the three new
fairness criteria I introduce. So they are strongly group manipulable in general
environments.
Proposition 10. RSD and PS satisfy equal top-assignment of equal tops, top advan-
tage, and uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails.
RSD attracts a lot of attention in literature because it is strategy-proof and treats
agents in a symmetric way, which has a strong implication on fairness. However,
its strong group manipulability is often ignored. PS satisfies a stronger efficiency
criterion (ordinal efficiency) than RSD. Although it is not strategy-proof, it is proved
to be weakly strategy-proof (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001), and is asymptotically
equivalent to RSD (Che and Kojima 2010). However, I show that PS is strongly
group manipulable.
2.6.2 Independence of axioms
A complete analysis requires me to show that the efficiency/fairness criteria in
my theorems are also necessary. I do this below for the two possibility theorems in
Section 2.5. Ex-post efficiency is obviously necessary for impossibility theorems:
5Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Income (CEEI, Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979) is also
a desirable mechanism. But CEEI requires agents to report cardinal utilities, which is beyond the
framework of this paper and also hard to implement in practice.
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the mechanism that always assigns all agents the virtual object ∅ trivially satisfies
all fairness criteria and is group strategy-proof. However, it is hard to show that
each fairness criterion is also necessary for these theorems. That is, it is hard
to propose an ex-post efficient mechanism that satisfies other fairness criteria and
prove it is minimally group strategy-proof. The reason is that, for deterministic
mechanisms there is a equivalence result between group strategy-proofness and the
combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, but for random mechanisms
there is no similar equivalence result between minimal group strategy-proofness
and the combination of (weak) strategy-proofness and some easy-to-check condition
(e.g., non-bossiness). For example, RSD is strategy-proof and non-bossy, but not
minimally group strategy-proof. So to prove minimal group strategy-proofness, I
need to verify all possible deviations of all possible groups, which is difficult in the
general environment of at least three agents and at least three objects (it is possible
to do so for the possibility theorems in the two-object environment because each
agent has only one way to misreport preferences).
Below I show that each efficiency/fairness criterion in the two possibility theo-
rems is necessary.
(1) Ex-post efficiency. The mechanism that assigns all agents ∅ for some prefer-
ence profile and assigns the outcome of RSD for other preference profiles obviously
satisfies equal treatment of equals, top advantage and uniform tail-assignment of
uniform tails. However, it is strongly group manipulable.
(2) Equal treatment of equals. Consider the mechanism ρ that finds the outcome
of RSD for all other preference profiles but finds the assignments for the following
two particular preference profiles shown below. In the table oq means that the

























It is obvious that ρ satisfies top advantage and uniform tail-assignment of uniform
tails but not equal treatment of equals. However, i1 can strongly group manipulate
ρ at ∗I by reporting ◦i1 .
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(3) Top advantage. Consider the mechanism ρ that finds the outcome of RSD for
all other preference profiles but finds the following assignments for two particular

























It is obvious that ρ satisfies equal treatment of equals and uniform tail-assignment
of uniform tails but not top advantage. i1, i2 can strongly group manipulate ρ at ∗I
by reporting (◦i1, ◦i2).
(4) Uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails. Consider the mechanism ρ that
finds the outcome of RSD for all other preference profiles but finds the following

























It is obvious that ρ satisfies equal treatment of equals and top advantage but not
uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails. i1, i2 can weakly group manipulate ρ at ∗I
by reporting (◦i1, ◦i2).
2.6.3 Other efficiency criteria
Since fairness is the motivation for using randommechanisms, this paper focuses
on the tension between fairness and group incentive compatibility and chooses the
weakest efficiency requirement, i.e., ex-post efficiency. Of course, it is an interesting
exercise to examine whether the combination of a stronger efficiency criterion and
weaker fairness criteria than I use still produces impossibility theorems.6 This is
left for future research.
6I pursue this direction but fail to find interesting results. Nesterov (2016) proves that when
there are at least four agents, the combination of ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness (or
equal division lower bound) is incompatible with strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness is a strong
requirement for individual incentive compatibility. Hence, by assuming a mechanism satisfies
the three properties Nesterov can pin down the assignments for some preference profiles and find
contradictions. By contrast, minimal group strategy-proofness is a rather weak requirement. It is not
handy to use along with ordinal efficiency and some fairness criteria to find contradictions.
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2.6.4 Restricted preference domain
In the paper I only consider the universal preference domain and the no outside-
option domain. In some applications the preferences of agents may belong to
a further restricted domain. Then we may hope that the impossibility theorems
disappear in these domains. However, a careful examination of my proofs should
convince the reader that only the following three preference orderings are essential
for Theorem 1 and 3 (Theorem 3 also holds in the universal domainU). The three
orderings differ only in the rank of three objects. So as long as a domain allows such
a small variation, my impossibility theorems still hold. For example, the single-
peaked preference domain, which is often used in spatial competition and voting














C h a p t e r 3
A NEW SOLUTION TO THE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
PROBLEMWITH PRIVATE ENDOWMENT
3.1 Introduction
Inmanymatchingmarkets the central question is how to assign indivisible objects
to agents without using monetary transfers. Examples include the assignment of
public school seats to children, the assignment of on-campus apartments to students,
and the assignment of donated kidneys to patients. Depending on the ownership
structure in the problems, they are often classified as house allocation problem,
house allocation problem with existing tenants and house exchange.
In this paper I make two contributions to the literature. First, I propose a
generalization of the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism to solve house allocation
problems with existing tenants in the strict preferences environment. I denote
my generalization by PSE . Second, I propose a new method to adapt PSE (and
also PS) to deal with indifferent preferences. My method is more straightforward
to understand and easier to implement than the current method in the literature.
Interestingly, both of my contributions are driven the same idea I call “you request
my house - I get your speed”. In the following I elaborate on each contribution.
Bogomolnaia andMoulin (2001) propose PS to solve house allocation problems.
PS is implemented in a simple way: imagine each object as a “divisible cake” and
let agents “eat” objects according to their preference orderings with equal speeds;
each agent’s consumption is the random assignment he obtains in PS. Compared to
previous mechanisms such as Random Priority (RP, Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
1998), the most important property of PS is ordinal efficiency. It is a desirable
efficiency notion between ex ante efficiency1 and ex post efficiency (RP is only ex
post efficient). However, if an agent has a private endowment, he may obtain a
positive fraction of an object worse than his private endowment in PS. So PS is not
individually rational for house allocation problems with existing tenants.
My proposed PSE deviates from PS in two aspects. First, at any time of the
procedure if the private endowment of an agent is eaten by other agents, the agent
1When the cardinal utilities of agents are known, Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) use the peseudo
competitive market to obtain ex ante efficient random assignments.
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can instantly get an additional eating speed, which is equal to the total speed at
which his private endowment is being eaten. This is what I mean “you request
my house - I get your speed”. Second, at any time of the procedure if several
existing tenants (those with private endowments) want to consume each other’s
private endowment such that they form a cycle, I let them trade the fractions of
their private endowments instantly. This is similar to the Top Trading Cycle (TTC)
mechanism proposed by Shapley and Scarf (1974). But in the paper I show that
this aspect is also the outcome of “you request my house - I get your speed”. Both
aspects guarantee that the demand of an existing tenant must be satisfied weakly
before his private endowment is exhausted. So PSE must be individually rational.
PSE is ordinally efficient since it is a still simultaneous eating algorithm.2 PSE
is also envy-free among new agents (those without private endowments) since they
always have equal eating speeds.
The motivation behind PSE is not just to satisfy individual rationality; indeed
there are infinitely many generalizations of PS to satisfy individual rationality. I
argue that PSE is a natural generalization of PS by fully allowing existing tenants to
trade their private endowments with the others. To illustrate it, if the objects without
owners (I call social endowments) are regarded as owned by all agents collectively,
then an algorithm satisfies “you request my house - I get your speed” (each agent’s
eating speed comes from the transfer of his endowments) if and only if it is PSE .
Hence, PSE is essentially a dynamic process of trading eating speeds.
To support the above argument in another way, I prove that PSE generalizes
two equivalence theorems of PS in the literature, which are summarized in Figure
3.1. Here, “a ⇔ b” means that a is equivalent to b, “a ⇔
asym.
b” means that a
is asymptotically equivalent to b, and “a → b” means that a is generalized to b.
Specifically, Kesten (2009) proposes TTC f ED for house allocation problems. It
proceeds by first assigning the fractions of all houses equally to all agents, then
letting agents trade their fractional endowments as in TTC. Kesten proves that PS
is equivalent to TTC f ED. I show that this result still holds between PSE and a
direct generalization of TTC f ED I call TTCE .3 Che and Kojima (2010) prove
that PS is asymptotically equivalent to RP. When there are private endowments,
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) generalize RP to the random “you request
my house-I get your turn” (YRMH-IGYT) mechanism. By using the technique of
2When existing-tenant cycles are traded instantly, it is as if that existing tenants in the cycles
have infinitely large eating speeds.
3In TTCE only the fractions of social endowments are equally assigned to all agents.
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Che and Kojima I similarly prove that PSE is asymptotically equivalent to random
YRMH-IGYT. The intuition behind it is that the additional eating speeds of existing
tenants in PSE correspond to their additional chances to request objects in random
YRMH-IGYT in large markets.
PSE TTCE PSE random YRMH-IGYT






⇐⇒Che and Kojima (2010)
asym.
↓this paper ↓this paper ↓this paper ↓Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999)
Figure 3.1: Equivalence theorems
Since PSE subsumes PS as a special case, it cannot be strategy-proof. But I
prove that it satisfies bounded invariance, which is proposed by Bogomolnaia and
Heo (2012), along with ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness, to characterize PS.
This property implies that PSE cannot be weaklymanipulated by a class of strategies
I call dropping strategies. In particular, PSE cannot be manipulated by truncation
strategies, which have been well studied in the literature (Roth and Rothblum 1999;
Ehlers 2008; Coles and Shorrer 2014; Castillo and Dianat 2016).
I compare PSE with other mechanisms in the literature. Yılmaz (2010) pro-
poses another generalization of PS called Individually Rational Probabilistic Serial
(PSIR). PSIRminimally deviates from PS to accommodate the individual rationality
constraint. So PSIR satisfies a stronger fairness notion (no justified-envy) than PSE .
However, PSIR has a worse incentive property than PSE . In particular, it can be
manipulated by truncation strategies. I have more discussion in Section 3.6. In a not
circulated paper Sethuraman (2001) proposes a generalization of PS called uniform
eating rate (UER) to satisfy individual rationality. According to the description of
Yılmaz (2010),UER is close to PSE : UER lets an existing tenant’s eating speed be
one as long as his individual rationality is not to be violated; otherwise, UER lets
his eating speed equal the total speed at which his private endowment is being eaten.
But there is no any characterization of UER which supports its selection from in-
finitely many algorithms of satisfying individual rationality. RandomYRMH-IGYT
is desirable because of strategy-proofness. But it has weaker efficiency and fairness
properties than PSE .
In my second contribution, I use the idea of “you request my house - I get your
speed” to solve the difficulty caused by indifferent preferences. Katta and Sethu-
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raman (2006) deal with indifferences in PS through iteratively solving maximum
network flow problems. This method is further used by Yılmaz (2009) to deal with
indifferent preferences in PSIR, and used by Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011)
to deal with indifferent preferences in their generalization of PSIR. Compared with
the previous method, mine is straightforward to understand and easy to implement.
Specifically, suppose two agents i, j have preferences over two objects h, h′ such
that h ∼i h′ and h  j h′. If i uses an arbitrary tie-breaking rule such that he first
eats h, then eats h′, then the resulting random assignment in PSE (and PS) is not
ordinally efficient since i, j can exchange an equal fraction of h and h′ such that j
is strictly better off and i is not worse off. In my method, when h is exhausted,
since h′ remains and h ∼i h′, I let i label his consumption of h as “available” for
others to consume. Since j strictly prefers h to h′, j will eat i’s consumption of h.
Then I compensate i by letting he eat h′ with an additional speed that equals the
speed at which i’s consumption of h is being eaten. If h′ is j’s private endowment,
then i and j form a cycle when j consumes i’s consumption of h. Then the cycle
is traded immediately. In either case i’s welfare is exactly compensated when his
consumption of h is consumed by others. My method incorporates an adaption of
PS as a special case.
Related Literature There are a lot of papers studying random assignment prob-
lems and especially PS. I only discuss some of them here. Since PS is not
strategy-proof, Ekici and Kesten (2015) use multiple equilibrium solutions to study
the possible outcome of PS. Hugh-Jones, Kurino, and Vanberg (2014) use labora-
tory experiments to study the incentive property of PS. They find that manipulation
is a significant problem in PS. Dogan, Dogan, and Yildiz (2016) propose a new
efficiency criterion for random assignments. By the criterion PS can be improved
in efficiency without sacrificing fairness. Hashimoto et al. (2014) and Bogomolnaia
(2015) independently characterize PS.
Several papers have extended PS to general environments. Kojima (2009) and
Heo (2014) extend PS to the environment in which agents demand more than one
objects. But in the former paper agents have equal demands, but in the latter agents
mayhave heterogeneous demands. Budish et al. (2013) extendPS to the environment
in which agents have multi-item demands and random assignments are subject to
exogenous constraints. They show that only a special structure of contraints can be
solved. Balbuzanov (2014) extends PS to kidney exchange problems in which the
length of trading cycles is constrained.
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Kesten and Ünver (2015) is different from the above papers in that they extend
the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) to solve a random
assignment problem in which objects have coarse priority rankings of agents. A
house allocation problem with existing tenants can be seen as a special case in their
environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the assignment
problem and defines some concepts. Section 3.3 proposes PSE under the strict
preferences environment. Section 3.4 discusses the properties of PSE . Section
3.5 proves the two equivalence theorems. Section 3.6 compares PSE with the
other mechanisms. Section 3.7 presents my method of dealing with indifferent
preferences. Section 3.8 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
3.2 House Allocation Problem with Existing Tenants
3.2.1 The Model
A house allocation problemwith existing tenants is a four-tuplem = {I,H, pi,%I}
where I is a finite set of agents,H is a finite set of houses, pi : I → H is an endowment
function, and %I= (%i)i∈I is the preference profile of all agents. There is a null
house h0 in H such that if pi(i) = h0, then i has no private endowment. Otherwise,
pi(i) is the private endowment of i. Each non-null house has only one copy and
can be owned by at most one agent. So pi(i) , pi( j) for all distinct i, j ∈ I unless
pi(i) = pi( j) = h0. The agents who own non-null houses are called existing tenants.
Their private endowments are called occupied houses. The set of existing tenants
is denoted by IE , and the set of their private endowments is denoted by HO. The
remaining agents and houses are called new agents and vacant houses, and their
sets are denoted by IN and HV respectively. For convenience I also call HV social
endowments. Each agent i demands one house and has a preference relation%i over
H with the strict part denoted by i. I do not assume that %i is strict, but I assume
that no agent is indifferent between a real house h ∈ H\{h0} and the null house h0.
Every house h satisfying h %i pi(i) is called acceptable to i. I sometimes denote a
problem by {%I} if there is no confusion to omit other elements. LetM denote the
set of all house allocation problems with existing tenants, and R denote the set of
all preference relations over H.
3.2.2 Random Assignment and Other Concepts
A random assignment is a matrix q = (qih)i∈I,h∈H such that ∑i∈I qih ≤ 1 for
∀h ∈ H\{h0} and ∑h∈H qih = 1 for ∀i ∈ I. Here qih is the probability that i is
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assigned the house h, and qih0 is the probability that i is not assigned any house. So
qi = (qih)h∈H is the lottery assigned to i. If qih ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I and all h ∈ H,
then q is a deterministic assignment.
A lottery qi is individually rational for agent i if h %i pi(i) for all h ∈ H such
that qih > 0. That is, i is never assigned an unacceptable house with a positive
probability. A random assignment q is individually rational if qi is individually
rational for every agent i. Given %i, I compare any two lotteries assigned to i
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Formally, a lottery qi first-order





q′ih′ for ∀h ∈ H.
If the above inequality holds strictly for an acceptable h, I say qi strictly stochastically
dominates q′i and denote it by qi Bi q′i . For any two random assignments q and q′, I
say q strictly stochastically dominates q′ if qi Di q′i for all i and q j B j q′j for some j.
I denote it by q B q′. A random assignment q is ordinally efficient if there does not
exist q′ such that q′ B q.
In a random assignment q an agent i envies another agent j if qi Di q j does not
hold, and i weakly envies j if q j Bi qi holds. Then q is envy-free if any i does not
envy any other j, and is weakly envy-free if any i does not weakly envy any other j.
Similarly, q is new-agent envy-free if any new agent i does not envy any other new
agent j, and q is weakly new-agent envy-free if any new agent i does not weakly
envy any other new agent j.
For every problem m ∈ M, let Q(m) be the set of all random assignments
for m. Let Q := ⋃m∈M Q(m) be the set of all possible random assignments. A
random assignment mechanism is a function ϕ : M → Q such that ϕ(m) ∈ Q(m)
for ∀m ∈ M. The above paragraphs have defined multiple properties of random
assignments. Amechanism ϕ is said to have one property if for allm ∈ M, ϕ(m) has
the property. Amechanism ϕ is boundedly invariant if for any h, if any agent i in any
problem m reports a preference relation %′i that coincides with his true preference
relation %i at all houses weakly better than h, the assignments of houses weakly
better than h in %i do not change in ϕ(m). Formally, if letting U(%i, h) := {h′ ∈ H
| h′ %i h} be the upper contour set of %i at h and let %i |U(%i,h) be the restriction
of %i to U(%i, h), then for ∀h and ∀ %′i∈ R such that U(%′i, h) = U(%i, h) and
%′i |U(%′i,h) =%i |U(%i,h), ϕ jh′({%I}) = ϕ jh′({%′i,%−i}) for ∀ j ∈ I and ∀h′ ∈ U(%i, h).
Finally, a mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if ϕi({%I})Di ϕi({%′i,%−i}) for ∀ %′i∈ R,
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∀i ∈ I and ∀m = {%I}, and ϕ is weakly strategy-proof if for ∀i ∈ I there does not
exist %′i∈ R such that ϕi(%′i,%−i)Bi ϕi({%I}).
3.3 The PSE Mechanism
From this section to Section 3.6 I assume all agents’ preferences are strict. I
deal with weak preferences in Section 3.7. As mentioned before, PSE generalizes
PS with two new features. First, at any time t ∈ [0, 1], if an existing tenant’s private
endowment is being eaten by other agents, the existing tenant can immediately
get an additional eating speed which equals the total speed at which his private
endowment is being eaten. I call this feature “you request my house - I get your
speed”. Second, at any time t ∈ [0, 1], if several existing tenants want to consume
each other’s private endowment such that they form a cycle, they trade the fractions
of their private endowments instantly. How much can be traded depends on the
remainder of each private endowment and the residual demand of each existing
tenant in the cycle. The second feature is similar to TTC, but PSE can still be
seen as a simultaneous eating algorithm defined by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (BM
hereafter):4 when there are cycles among some existing tenants, let their eating
speeds be infinitely large. Before giving the formal definition I first illustrate PSE
through a simple example.
Example 2. A problem consists of H = {h0, h1, . . . , h6} and I = {i1, i2, . . . , i6}.
i1, i2, i3, i4, i5 are existing tenants and own h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 respectively. i6 is a new
agent and h6 is a vacant house. The following table is the preference profile of all
agents where %o is io’s preference list (o = 1, . . . , 6). Boxed houses are private
endowments of the corresponding agents. Unacceptable houses for existing tenants
are omitted from their preference lists.
%1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6
h2 h3 h1 h2 h1 h3
h3 h2 h5 h6 h6 h4
h1 h3 h5 h4 h5
h4 h5 h0
PSE will solve this problem in the following steps.
Step 1: At t = 0, i1, i4 want to consume h2, i2, i6 want to consume h3, and i3, i5 want
to consume h1.
4Formally, a simultaneous eating algorithm is identified by a profile of eating speed functions
{si(t)}i∈I where si(t) : [0, 1] → R+ is a measurable function such that
∫ 1
0 si(t)dt = 1.
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There is a cycle consisting of existing tenants i1, i2, i3 and their private endow-
ments. Trade this cycle instantly. Since every private endowment in the cycle
is never consumed and every existing tenant in the cycle demands one house,
I trade one unit of house in the cycle. After the trade i1, i2, i3 own h2, h3, h1
respectively and they stop consuming other houses. Note that after the trading
the time is still at t = 0 since the trading happens instantly.
Step 2: Still at t = 0, i4, i5 want to consume h6 and i6 wants to consume h4.
There is no cycle. i6 eats h4 with speed one. i5 eats h6 also with speed one.
But i4 eats h6 with speed two since his private endowment h4 is being eaten
with a total speed of one.
At t = 1/3, h6 is exhausted. Then i4 consumes 2/3 of h6, i5 consumes 1/3 of
h6, and i6 consumes 1/3 of h4
Step 3: At t = 1/3, i4 wants to consume h5 and i5, i6 want to consume h4.
There is a cycle consisting of existing tenants i4, i5 and their private endow-
ments. h4 has a remainder of 2/3, h5 has remainder of 1, while i4’s remaining
demand is 1/3 and i5’s remaining demand is 2/3. So I trade 1/3 of each
house in the cycle. After the trade i4 gets 1/3 of h5 and stops consuming other
houses, and i5 gets 1/3 of h4. Note that the time is at t = 1/3.
Step 4: Still at t = 1/3, both i5 and i6 want to consume h4. There is no cycle, so
each of them eats h4 with speed one. At t = 1/2, h4 is exhausted. Then each
of i5 and i6 gets 1/6 of h4.
Step 5: At t = 1/2, both i5 and i6 want to consume h5. Since h5 is the private
endowment of i5, I say there is a i5’s self-cycle. Since h5 has a remainder of
2/3 and i5’s remaining demand is 1/2, I trade 1/6 of h5 in the cycle. After
the trade i5 gets 1/6 of h5 and stops consuming other houses.
Step 6: Still at t = 1/2, i6 is the only agent, so he eats h5 with speed one. At t = 1,
h5 is exhausted and i6’s remaining demand is fulfilled.
The above steps are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Formal Definition
I present the formal definition of PSE in this section. As in the above example,
I track the procedure of PSE by discrete steps at which some houses are exhausted
or some agents’ demands are fulfilled.
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Step d: what happened i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
1: i1 − i2 − i3 − i1 cycle h2 h3 h1
2: eating 2/3h6 1/3h6 1/3h4
3: i4 − i5 − i4 cycle 1/3h5 1/3h4
4: eating 1/6h4 1/6h4
5: i5’s self-cycle 1/6h5
6: eating 1/2h5
Table 3.1: The procedure of PSE in Example 2.
d: steps; td: the time at which step d ends;
ri(d): i’s residual demand when step d ends; rh(d): remainder of h when step d ends;
si(t): i’s eating speed at t; sh(t): total speed at which h is being eaten at t;
Ah(t): set of agents who point to h at t;
H(d)/I(d)/IN (d)/IE (d): remaining houses/agents/new agents/existing tenants when step d ends.
Initialization: I(0) = I, H(0) = H, ri(0) = 1 for ∀i ∈ I, rh(0) = 1 for ∀h ∈ H\{h0},
t0 = 0.
Step d ≥ 1: If I(d − 1) = ∅ or H(d − 1) = ∅, stop. Otherwise, proceed to the
Pointing stage.
• Pointing: Every i ∈ I(d − 1) points to his most preferred house in H(d − 1).
If it is h0, let i point to his own copy of h0. Every occupied house in H(d − 1)
point to its owner if its owner is in I(d − 1). Go to the Consuming stage.
• Consuming: If there exist cycles consisting of existing tenants and their
private endowments such as h1 → i1 → h2 → i2 → · · · → ik → h1, go to
the Trading Cycle stage. Otherwise, go to the Eating stage.
– Trading Cycle: Trade the above cycles instantly. For every cycle c, the
trading quota of c is defined as
TQ(c) := min{mini∈I(c) ri(d − 1), minh∈H(c) rh(d − 1)},
where I(c) andH(c) are the set of existing tenants and the set of occupied
houses involved in c respectively. So every agent in I(c) obtains TQ(c)
of the house he points to. Then rh(d) := rh(d−1)−TQ(c) for ∀h ∈ H(c)
and ri(d) := ri(d − 1) − TQ(c) for ∀i ∈ I(c).
For every house h and every agent i not involved in any cycle, rh(d) :=
rh(d−1) and ri(d) := ri(d−1). Agents inG(d) := {i ∈ I(d−1) : ri(d) =
57
0} are full. Then I(d) := I(d − 1)\G(d) and H(d) := H(d − 1)\{h ∈
H(d − 1) : rh(d) = 0}. Step d ends at time td := td−1. Go to step d + 1.
– Eating: All agents simultaneously eat the houses they point to with
eating speeds specified as follows.
For t ≥ td−1, si(t) := 1 for ∀i ∈ IN (d − 1), and s j(t) := spi( j)(t) + 1 for
∀ j ∈ IE (d − 1) where spi( j)(t) := ∑i∈Api(j)(td−1) si(t) is the total speed at
which pi( j) is being eaten.
Define td := min{ta : ra(d − 1) − sa(t)(ta − td−1) = 0, a ∈ H(d − 1) ∪
I(d − 1)}. That is, step d ends when a house in H(d − 1) is exhausted or
an agent in I(d − 1) is full, depending on which happens earlier.
Then rh(d) := rh(d − 1) − sh(td−1)(td − td−1) for ∀h ∈ H(d − 1) and
ri(d) := ri(d − 1) − si(td−1)(td − td−1) for ∀i ∈ I(d − 1). Agents in
G(d) := {i ∈ I(d − 1) : ri(d) = 0} are full. Then I(d) := I(d − 1)\G(d)
and H(d) := H(d − 1)\{h ∈ H(d − 1) : rh(d) = 0}. Go to step d + 1.
3.3.2 Characterization of PSE
Now I show that PSE is characterized by the idea of “you request my house
- I get your speed” among all simultaneous eating algorithms.5 Specifically, by
treating social endowments as equally owned by all agents, I say a simultaneous
eating algorithm satisfies “you request my house - I get your speed” if each agent’s
eating speed at any time comes from the transfer of their endowments (either social
or private). In particular, each social endowment uniformly transfers the total speed
at which it is being eaten to its each owner, and each private endowment transfers
the total speed at which it is being eaten only to its unique owner. If the owner of
a private endowment is satisfied at any time, his private endowment is treated as a
social endowment owned by the remaining agents.
Formally, at any t ∈ [0, 1] let Ei(t) be the set of endowments of each agent i,
which includes social endowments and his private endowment. Let Oh(t) be the set
of owners of each house h. Ah(t), si(t) and sh(t) are defined as before. Then, a
simultaneous eating algorithm satisfies “you request my house - I get your speed” if
for each remaining h and each remaining i at t,
(1) sh(t) = ∑i∈Ah(t) si(t); (2) si(t) = ∑h∈Ei(t) sh(t)/|Oh(t)|.
5Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012) have shown that every random assignment can be seen as the
outcome of a simultaneous eating process. So I essentially characterize PSE among all mechanisms.
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It is interesting to observe that (1) and (2) are similar to market equilibrium
conditions: if I imagine each agent’s eating speed as his budget, then at any time
t each agent spends his budget on his most preferred house; on the other hand,
each agent’s budget comes from the money other agents spend on his endowments.
Hence, (1) and (2) characterize an equilibrium of trading eating speeds.
Proposition 11. A simultaneous eating algorithm satisfies “you request my house -
I get your speed” if and only if it is equivalent to PSE .
By saying two mechanisms are equivalent I mean they always find the same
assignment for the same problem. The proof is rather simple. At any time t, if there
is no cycle among existing tenants, I can normalize the eating speed of every new
agent i, which is equal to
∑
h∈Ei(t) sh(t)/|Oh(t)|, to one. Then the eating speed of
every existing tenant j is s j(t) = spi( j)(t) + ∑h∈Ei(t) sh(t)/|Oh(t)| = spi( j)(t) + 1. If
there are cycles, let a typical cycle be pi( j1) → j1 → · · · → pi( jn) → jn → pi( j1).
Then conditions (1) and (2) implies that s j1(t) ≤ · · · ≤ s jn(t) ≤ s j1(t). So s j1(t) · · · =
s jn(t). However, since s j2(t) = spi( j2)(t) +
∑
h∈Ei(t)(sh(t)/|Oh(t)|) ≥ s j1(t) + si(t), it
must be that si(t) = 0 for every new agent i. Hence, for any existing tenant j who is
not involved in any cycle, spi( j) = 0, which implies that s j(t) = spi( j)(t) + si(t) = 0.
So it is equivalent to trading the cycle instantly.
It is easy to see that when there are no private endowments, conditions (1) and
(2) also characterize PS.
3.4 The Properties of PSE
In this section I discuss the properties of PSE in efficiency, fairness, and manip-
ulability. First, since PSE is a simultaneous eating algorithm, it must be ordinally
efficient. Second, PSE is individually rational since existing tenants are satisfied no
later than their private endowments are exhausted. Third, although PSE does not
satisfy envy-freeness, it satisfies new-agent envy-freeness since new agents always
have equal eating speeds.
Proposition 12. The PSE mechanism is ordinally efficient, individually rational,
and new-agent envy-free.
BM prove that PS is weakly strategy-proof. However, the following example
shows that PSE is not.
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Example 3. A problem consists of H = {h0, h1, . . . , h9} and I = {i1, i2, . . . , i8}.
i1, i2 own h1, h2 respectively. The preference profile is as follows. %o is the true
preference relation of agent io (o = 1, . . . , 9). Agents i3, i4 have identical preferences,
and i5, i6, i7 have identical preferences.
%1 %2 %3 /%4 %5 /%6 /%7 %8
h7 h7 h1 h2 h1
h8 h9 h3 h3 h8













When all agents report their true preferences, the procedure of PSE and the
assignment it finds are shown by Table 3.2.
time i1 i2 i3/i4 i5/i6/i7 i8
1/8 1/2h7 1/2h7 1/8h1 1/8h2 1/8h1
+1/8 1/2h8 1/2h9 1/8h1 1/8h2 1/8h1
+1/7 1/7h3 1/7h3 1/7h8
+1/7 1/7h4 1/7h4 1/7h8
+1/7 1/7h5 1/7h5 1/7h8
+1/14 1/14h6 1/14h6 1/14h8
+1/16 1/16h6 1/16h6 1/16h6
Table 3.2: The procedure of PSE in Example 3
At t = 1/4, h1 is exhausted and i1, i2 are full and stop consuming. Among
the remaining agents only i8 wants to consume h8. But the remaining 1/2h8 can
not satisfy the residual demand of i8 which is 3/4. At this point if i8 strategically
chooses to eat h3, then eats h4 at t = 3/8 and returns to h8 at t = 1/2, his residual
demand can be exactly satisfied by 1/2h8. So by using this strategy i8 can eat more
fractions of h3 and h4 without losing any fraction of h8. So i8 can manipulate PSE
by reporting %′8, and PSE is not weakly strategy-proof.
In the above example i8 manipulates PSE by reshuﬄing his preferences. This
kind ofmanipulation happens because some existing tenantsmay leave the algorithm
earlier than others. However, I prove that PSE is boundedly invariant. This property
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means that the temporary assignment at any step of PSE is determined only by the
preferences revealed by the step. This implies that PSE cannot be manipulated by a
class of strategies I call dropping strategies. Specifically, %′i is a dropping strategy
of%i if it is obtained by dropping some houses from the set of acceptable houses in
%i: U(%′i, pi(i)) $ U(%i, pi(i)) and %′i |U(%′i,pi(i)) =%i |U(%′i,pi(i)). Then a mechanism ϕ
is weakly dropping-strategy-proof if ϕ({%−i,%′i})Bi ϕ({%I}) does not hold for any
i and any dropping strategy %′i in any problem {%I}. I prove that PSE is weakly
dropping-strategy-proof.
Truncation strategies are special cases of dropping strategies: %′i is a truncation
strategy of %i if there exists some h %i pi(i) such that %′i |U(%′i,pi(i)) =%i |U(%i,h). A
mechanism ϕ is truncation-strategy-proof if ϕi({%I})Di ϕi({%′i,%−i}) for any i and
any truncation strategy%′i in any problem {%I}. Hence, PSE is truncation-strategy-
proof.
Proposition 13. The PSE mechanism is boundedly invariant, weakly dropping-
strategy-proof and truncation-strategy-proof.
3.5 Equivalence Theorems
In this section I prove two equivalence theorems, both generalizing the counter-
parts of PS. In the first theorem I prove that PSE is equivalent to a probabilistic
version of TTC, which generalizes a result of Kesten (2009). In the second theo-
rem I prove that PSE is asymptotically equivalent to random YRMH-IGYT, which
generalizes the result of Che and Kojima (2010). I discuss the two theorems one by
one.
When there are no private endowments, Kesten proves that PS is equivalent to
TTC from Equal Division (TTC f ED). TTC f ED proceeds in two steps: at the first
step the fractions of all vacant house are uniformly assigned to all agents such that
each agent has the same endowment profile; at the second step agents trade their
fractional endowments as in TTC. In this paper I repeat the two steps except that
existing tenants have private endowments. I call the corresponding mechanism TTC
from Equal Division of Social Endowments and denote it by TTCE .
TTC from Equal Division of Social Endowments
d/I(d)/H(d)/ri(d): have the same interpretations as in PSE ;
ei(d): the endowment profile of agent i when step d ends;
61
{ih · ∆h : ∀∆h ∈ ei(d)} : set of pseudo-agents representing i when step d ends.
Here ih is the pseudo-agent holding ∆h.6 i is called ih’s host. Pseudo-agents that
hold vacant houses are also called new pseudo-agents, and pseudo-agents that hold
occupied houses are also called pseudo-tenants.
Initialization: I(0) = I, H(0) = H, ei(0) = { 1|I | h}h∈HV ∪ {pi(i)}, and ri(0) = 1 for
∀i ∈ I(0).
Step d ≥ 1: If I(d − 1) = ∅ or H(d − 1) = ∅, stop. Otherwise, proceed to the
following steps.
• Pointing: For every i ∈ I(d − 1) and i’s every pseudo-agent ih, if h is i’s
most preferred house, let ih point to himself. Otherwise, let ih point to all
pseudo-agents jh′ such that j , i and h′ is i’s most preferred house inH(d−1).
There will be multiple cycles.
• Selecting Cycles: I select the following three types of cycles to trade:
(i) existing-tenant cycles: the cycles consisting only of pseudo-tenants;
(ii) new-agent self-cycles: the cycles formed by new pseudo-agents pointing
to themselves;
(iii) feasible new-agent cycles: the cycles involving at most two new pseudo-
agents and not contained in (i) and (ii).
• Trading: For every selected cycle c, the trading quota of c is
TQ(c) := min{mini∈I(c) ri(d − 1), minh∈H(c) ∆h},
where I(c) is the set of hosts of the pseudo-agents involved in c, H(c) is the
set of houses involved in c, and ∆h is the amount of h held by the relevant
pseudo-agent involved in c. Then,
(1) Cycles of types (i) and (ii) are traded immediately with their trading quotas.
(2) Cycles of type (iii) are traded with a common quota, which equals the
smallest trading quota of all type (iii) cycles.
Any house a pseudo-agent obtains by trading cycles belongs to his host.
6For example, if ei(d) = {h1, 1/2h2, 1/3h3}, then i is represented by three pseudo-agents: ih1 ·h1,
ih2 · 1/2h2 and ih3 · 1/3h3.
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• Leaving: If a pseudo-agent uses up the house he holds, the pseudo-agent is
removed. When an agent i’s demand is satisfied, i.e. ri(d) = 0, i leaves the
algorithm along with his all pseudo-agents. The remaining endowments of
i, if any, are regarded as social endowments and uniformly assigned to the
remaining agents in I(d). Go to step d + 1.
Appendix C.3.2 presents the procedure of using TTCE to solve Example 2. Now
I prove that PSE is equivalent to TTCE .7
Theorem 7. The PSE mechanism is equivalent to the TTCE mechanism.
This theorem implies that PSE can be equivalently seen as a dynamic process
of trading ownerships. In Section 3.3.2 I have shown that PSE can be seen as a
dynamic process of trading eating speeds. In an eating algorithm agents spend their
time on the houses they want to consume. If an agent consumes a house, he gives up
the time to consume other houses. So trading eating speeds is equivalent to trading
ownerships. Hence, Proposition 11 and Theorem 7 illustrate the same feature of
PSE .
Although PS is ex ante more efficient than RP, Che and Kojima prove that PS
and RP are asymptotically equivalent if the market size properly grows. Using their
proof method I similarly prove that PSE is asymptotically equivalent to random
YRMH-IGYT,8 which generalizes RP to house allocation problems with existing
tenants. The intuition behind the result is straightforwardly illustrated by the analogy
between “you request my house - I get your speed” and “you request my house -
I get your turn”. Specifically, the advantage of an existing tenant in PSE exactly
corresponds to the advantage of the same existing tenant in random YRMH-IGYT
when the market size is infinitely large.
Theorem 8. The PSE mechanism is asymptotically equivalent to the random “you
request my house - I get your turn” mechanism.
7In my proof I make a slight adjustment of TTCE such that PSE is equivalent to TTCE step by
step.
8RandomYRMH-IGYT proceeds as follows. First randomly draw an ordering of all agents from
the uniform distribution. Then let agents sequentially obtain their most preferred objects among
remaining ones according to the ordering. But if an agent wants to obtain the private endowment of
an existing tenant who has not obtained an object, let the existing tenant points to his most preferred
object. If the object is the private endowment of another existing tenant who has not obtained an
object, repeat the process until I have a chain or cycle such that all agents in the chain or cycle obtain
the objects they want.
63
Since random YRMH-IGYT is strategy-proof, Theorem 8 implies that PSE is
asymptotically strategy-proof. Liu and Pycia (2013) prove that in house allocation
problems all mechanisms that are asymptotically ordinally efficient, asymptotically
strategy-proof and treat equals equally, must be asymptotically equivalent under
some regularity condition. Because of the existence of existing tenants, Theorem 8
is not implied by their result.
3.6 Comparison with Other Mechanisms
In this section I compare PSE with other mechanisms in the literature. Yılmaz
(2010) proposes the PSIR mechanism, which is the minimal deviation from PS by
satisfying the individual rationality (IR) constraint. Specifically, PSIR proceeds by
letting agents eat their most preferred houses with equal speeds, but if at any time the
IR constraint of some group of existing tenants binds, PSIR isolates the group and
their remaining acceptable houses as a sub-problem by blocking other agents from
consuming those houses. To illustrate it I present the procedure of PSIR in solving
Example 2 in Appendix C.3.1. Yilmaz proves that PSIR is ordinally efficient and
satisfies a fairness notion called no justified-envy (NJE). Formally, an assignment
q satisfies NJE if for any two agents i, j, if qi is individually rational for j, then i
does not envy j. Since the IR constraint of new agents never binds, PSIR must be
new-agent envy-free. So PSIR has a stronger fairness property than PSE . On the
other hand, PSIR has worse incentive property than PSE . In particular, PSIR is not
boundedly invariant (see Appendix C.3.1), and can be manipulated by truncation
strategies.
PSE and PSIR are different in their treatments of private ownerships. In PSE
existing tenants can trade their ownerships of private endowments with others, but
cannot in PSIR. In PSIR existing tenants have advantages over new agents only to
the extent that their IR constraint is respected. This difference implies that PSE
and PSIR should be used in different applications. To illustrate it I construct the
following example.
Example 4. There are three agents and two houses. Their preferences and the
assignments found by PSE and PSIR are shown in Table 3.3.
At t = 0, i1, i3 want to consume h2 and i2 wants to consume h1:
• In PSIR all agents have the same eating speed of one. So at t = 1/2, h2 is















Table 3.3: Example 4
• In PSE agent i1 has an eating speed of two and others have an eating speed of
one. At t = 1/3, h2 is exhausted. Then i1 consumes 1/3h1 by trading a self-cycle.
Lastly i2 consumes 1/3h1.
The two ranodm assignments are implemented by putting different probabilities























If this example is the assignment of on-campus apartments, then the school
controls all apartments and can give existing tenants only squatting rights over
their current apartments. In this case PSIR is more appropriate since it gives more
fairness among agents. In the above example i1, i3 have the same chance of obtaining
h2.
If this example is a kidney exchange problem in which h2 is a non-directional
altruistic kidney that is compatible with both i1 and i3, while h1 is the kidney donated
to i1 by his families, but it is incompatible with i1 yet compatible with i2. In this
case i1 controls h1 and can bring h1 away if he wants to. Since maximizing the
number of successful transplants is the main objective in this situation, PSE is
more appropriate since with 2/3 probability there are two transplants and with
1/3 probability there is only one transplant. In general by giving existing tenants
advantages PSE can incentivize them to bring their donated kidneys to the exchange
program.
According to the description of Yılmaz (2010), UER of Sethuraman (2001)
also trades cycles between existing tenants. But when there are no cycles at any
step d, the eating speeds of agents are specified as follows: for t ≥ td , si(t) = 1
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Mechanism Efficiency Manipulability Fairness





PSIR Ordinally efficient None No justified envy





Ex post efficient Strategy-proof Weakly new-agent
envy-free
Table 3.4: Comparison between PSE and other mechanisms
for any i ∈ IN (d − 1), s j(t) = 1 if r j(d − 1) < rpi( j)(d − 1) and s j(t) = spi( j)(t) if
r j(d − 1) = rpi( j)(d − 1) for any j ∈ IE (d − 1). That is, the eating speed of any
existing tenant j becomes equal to the total speed at which his private endowment
is being eaten only when his IR constraint is to be violated. There is no any known
characterization of UER. In Example 4 UER finds the same assignment as PSIR
does. Random YRMH-IGYT is a desirable mechanism because it is strategy-proof.
But it is only ex post efficient and weakly new-agent envy-free. It approximates
PSE in large markets under some conditions. I summarize the properties of these
mechanisms in Table 3.4.
3.7 PSE under Weak Preferences
In this section I use the idea of “you request my house - I get your speed” to adapt
PSE to weak preferences. It incorporates an adaption of PS to weak preferences.9
I briefly describe my method as follows.
3.7.1 The Idea
I first arbitrarily choose an exogenous ordering>H of all houses and an exogenous
ordering >I of all agents. They are used to break ties when necessary. At any step of
PSE , if an agent i is indifferent between two remaining houses, say h and h′, then if
h >H h′, I let i point to h and consume it. Then at some latter step if h is exhausted
but h′ remains, I let i point to h′ and label his consumption of h, denoted by hi, as
“available” for other agents to consume. If hi is indeed consumed by other agents,
I compensate i by letting he consume h′ with an additional speed, which equals the
speed at which hi is being consumed. In this way i is exactly compensated.
9When there are no social endowments and all agents are existing tenants, PSE coincides with
TTC. So it also incorporates an adaption of TTC to weak preferences, which turns out to be very
close to Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012).
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The above describes a simple case. In general more complicated cases can
appear. For example, when agent i labels his consumption hi as available, suppose
another agent k is indifferent between h and some house h′′ in his consumption.
Then k must most prefer h among all remaining houses and all consumptions that
are labeled as available.10 Then I let k point to i’s consumption hi and label his
consumption of h′′ as available. If there exists another agent j who also labels
his consumption h j as available, I let j point to hi if i >I j. After h′′k is labeled
as available, other agents may be further induced to label their consumptions as
available. So in general a chain can exist that looks like
i1 → hi22 → i2 → hi33 → i3 → · · · → himm → im → hm+1,
where every io(o = 2, . . . ,m) labels his consumption hi0o as available because
ho+1 ∼io ho, hm+1 is a remaining house, and i1 strictly prefers h2 to all remain-
ing houses and points to hi22 after breaking any possible ties. Then there are two
cases to consider:
• If i1 eats hi22 , then every io (o = 2, . . . ,m − 1) eats hio+1o+1 and im eats hm+1 with
additional speeds as specified in PSE . But if some agent io(o = 2, . . . ,m) in
the chain has been full, his eating speed will be equal to the speed at which
his consumption hioo is consumed. So io will never over-consume.
• If i1 is an existing tenant and hm+1 is i1’s private endowment, the above
chain becomes a cycle. Then I trade the cycle immediately. But when
calculating how much house can be traded I ignore the residual demands of
all io(o = 2, . . . ,m) since the trade does not increase their total consumptions.
In the above chain every io(o = 1, . . . ,m) is path-linked to a remaining house
hm+1 through the chain. In general only this kind of chains are indispensable to keep
ordinal efficiency of PSE . Any exchange of available consumptions among agents
is unnecessary and may mess the algorithm up. So in my formal definition below,
at every step I introduce a pointing stage in which I carefully construct the chains
to exclude the possibility that agents point to each other’s available consumptions
such that they form an unnecessary cycle.
10It is because in the procedure of PSE agents always consume their most preferred houses. Since
k consumed h′′ earlier and h′′ is as good as h, h must be a best house for k at that step.
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3.7.2 Formal Definition
There are three stages at every step: Pointing stage, Consuming stage, and
Labeling stage.
d: step;
h0(d): The remaining (fractional) house h when step d ends;
H(d) := {h0(d) : h ∈ H, h0(d) > 0}: set of remaining houses when step d ends;
I(d): set of remaining agents when step d ends;
hi(d): agent i’s consumption of house h when step d ends;
pi(d): the (fractional) house agent i points to at step d;
Ci(d) := {hi(d) : h ∈ H, hi(d) > 0}: agent i’s consumption profile when step d
ends;
Hi(d): set of consumptions that agent i labels as available when step d ends;
Initialization: H(0) = H, I(0) = I, and ci(0) = ai(0) = ∅ for ∀i ∈ I. Arbitrarily
choose an ordering >H of all houses and an ordering >I of all agents.
Step d ≥ 1:
• Pointing:
Define the menu of every i ∈ I(d − 1) as Mi(d) := H(d − 1) ∪ H−i(d − 1),
where H−i(d−1) := ⋃ j∈I(d−1): j,i Hj(d−1). Then the set of i’s most preferred
(fractional) houses in Mi(d) is Chi(Mi(d)) := arg %i −max
h∈Mi(d)
h.11
Round 0: For every i ∈ I(d−1), if the (fractional) house he points to at step d−1
is still in Mi(d), let i still point to the house. Formally, if pi(d − 1) = h j(d − 2)
and h j(d − 1) ∈ Mi(d), then pi(d) = h j(d − 1). Denote the set of all such
agents by P0(d). It is obvious that P0(1) = ∅.
Round 1: For every i ∈ I(d − 1)\P0(d), if Chi(Mi(d)) ∩ H(d − 1) , ∅, let
i point to the house in Chi(Mi(d)) ∩ H(d − 1) that is ranked highest in >H .
Formally,
pi(d) := arg >H −max
h0(d−1)∈Chi(Mi(d))∩H(d−1)
h0(d − 1).
11Note that Mi(d)may contain more than one fractions of the same house, for example, h0(d − 1)
and h j(d − 1). Then i is indifferent between them.
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H(d − 1)P1(d)P2(d)P3(d)
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the chains I construct
Note that some agents in P0(d) may also point to some houses in H(d − 1).
Then I denote the set of all agents that point to some houses in H(d − 1) by
P1(d).
Round 2: For every i ∈ I(d − 1)\{P0(d) ∪ P1(d)}, Chi(Mi(d)) ⊂ H−i(d − 1).
Then for every i who most prefers some available consumption held by P1(d),
that is, Chi(Mi(d)) ∩ (∪ j∈P1(d)Hj(d − 1)) , ∅, I let
pi(d) : = arg >H −max
h j (d−1)∈Chi(Mi(d))∩aj (d−1)
h j(d − 1), (3.1)
where j : = arg >I −max
j ′∈Ji(d)
j′, (3.2)
where Ji(d) : = arg >H −max
j ′′∈P1(d):Chi(Mi(d))∩Hj ′′(d−1),∅
p j ′′(d). (3.3)
That is, among the set of agents in P1(d)who hold i’s most preferred available
consumption, Ji(d) are those who point to the house in H(d−1) that is ranked
highest in >H . Then among Ji(d) I choose the agent j who is ranked highest
in >I . Finally, among i’s most preferred available consumptions held by j, i
points to the consumption that is ranked highest in >H .
I denote the set of the agents discussed in this around, and those in P0(d) who
also point to some available consumption held by P1(d), by P2(d).
Round 3: For every i ∈ I(d−1)\{P0(d)∪P1(d)∪P2(d)}whomost prefers some
available consumption held by P2(d), that is, Chi(Mi(d)) ∩ (∪ j∈P2(d)Hj(d −
1)) , ∅, I let
pi(d) : = arg >H −max
h j (d−1)∈Chi(Mi(d))∩Hj (d−1)
h j(d − 1), (3.4)
where j : = arg >I −max
j ′∈Ji(d)
j′, (3.5)




Here p2j ′′(d) is the house that the owner of p j ′′(d) points to at step d. In other
words, it is the house in H(d − 1) to which j′′ ∈ P2(d) is linked through the
chains I construct. Then the explanation of (4)-(6) is that, among the set of
agents in P2(d) who hold i’s most preferred available consumption, Ji(d) are
those who are linked to a house in H(d − 1) that is ranked highest in >H .
Then among Ji(d) I choose the agent j that is ranked highest in >I . Finally,
among i’s most preferred available consumptions held by j, i points to the
consumption that is ranked highest in >H .
I denote the set of the agents discussed in this around, and those in P0(d) who
also point to some available consumption held by P2(d), by P3(d).
· · ·
Round n: For every i ∈ I(d − 1)\∪n−1x=1 Px(d) who most prefers some available
consumption held by Pn−1(d), that is, Chi(Mi(d)) ∩ (∪ j∈Pn−1(d)Hj(d − 1)) , ∅,
I let
pi(d) : = arg >H −max
h j (d−1)∈Chi(Mi(d))∩Hj (d−1)
h j(d − 1), (3.7)
where j : = arg >I −max
j ′∈Ji(d)
j′, (3.8)
where Ji(d) : = arg >H −max
j ′′∈Pn−1(d):Chi(Mi(d))∩Hj ′′(d−1),∅
pn−1j ′′ (d). (3.9)
Here pn−1j ′′ (d) is the house in H(d −1) to which j′′ ∈ Pn−1(d) is linked through
the chains I construct. Then the explanation of (7)-(9) is that, among the set
of agents in Pn−1(d) who hold i’s most preferred available consumption, Ji(d)
are those who are linked to a house in H(d − 1) that is ranked highest in >H .
Then among Ji(d) I choose the agent j that is ranked highest in >I . Finally,
among i’s most preferred available consumptions held by j, i points to the
consumption that is ranked highest in >H .
I denote the set of the agents discussed in this around, and those in P0(d) who
also point to some available consumption held by Pn−1(d), by Pn(d).
Since there are finite agents, the above procedure must stop in some finite
rounds. Then every agent in I(d − 1) points to some house. Then I let every
private endowment and available consumption point to its owner.
• Consuming:
Run the consuming stage of PSE with the following two remarks:
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– An agent whose demand has been satisfied can consume again only if
his available consumptions are consumed by other agents. His eating
speed equals the total speed at which his consumptions are consumed.
– If an agent is involved in a cycle along with his available consumption,
his residual demand is omitted in calculating the trading quota of the
cycle.
This stage ends if an available consumption or a remaining house is exhausted,
or a cycle is traded, or an agent’s demand is satisfied. Let Ci(d) be the new
consumption profile of every i ∈ I(d−1) andH(d) be the new set of remaining
houses. If H(d) = ∅, stop the algorithm.
• Labeling:
I update the available consumption sets of agents in I(d − 1) sequentially in
the following rounds.
Round 1: For every i ∈ I(d − 1), the available consumption set of i is
Hi(d) := {hi(d) : hi(d) ∈ Ci(d) and h ∼i hˆ for some hˆ0(d) ∈ H(d)}. Denote
the set of such agents by L1(d).
Round 2: For every i ∈ I(d − 1)\L1(d), the available consumption set of i is
Hi(d) := {hi(d) : hi(d) ∈ Ci(d) and h ∼i hˆ for some hˆk(d) ∈ ⋃ j∈L1(d) Hj(d)}.
Denote the set of such agents by L2(d).
· · ·
Round n: For every agent i ∈ I(d − 1)\{L1(d) ∪ L2(d) ∪ · · · ∪ Ln−1(d)}, the
available consumption set of i is Hi(d) := {hi(d) : hi(d) ∈ Ci(d) and h ∼i hˆ
for some hˆk(d) ∈ ⋃ j∈Ln−1(d) Hj(d)}. Denote the set of such agents by Ln(d).
Since there are finite agents, the above process must finish in finite rounds.
Then any agent who is full and has an empty set of available consumptions
leaves the algorithm with his consumption. Then the set of remaining agents
is denoted by I(d). If I(d) = ∅, stop the algorithm. Otherwise, go to step
d + 1.
The following example illustrates the algorithm.
Example 5. A problem consists of H = {h0, h1, . . . , h6} and I = {i1, i2, . . . , i7}.
i1, i2, i3, i4 are existing tenants and own h1, h2, h3, h4 respectively. i5, i6, i7 are new
agents and h5, h6 are vacant houses. The following table is the preference profile of
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all agents where%o is io’s preference list. Unacceptable houses for existing tenants
are omitted from their preference lists.
%1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 %7
h2, h3 h1 h1 h4,h5 h4, h5 h4, h6 h5
h1 h3 h2 h6 h5 h6
h2 h3 h0 h0 h0
The two exogenous orderings are: i1 >I i2 >I i3 >I i4 >I i5 >I i6 and
h0 >H h1 >H h2 >H h3 >H h4 >H h5 >H h6.
Step 1: The pointing stage is shown as the following graph. There are two cycles:
i1 → h2 → i2 → h1 → i1 and i4 → h4 → i4. After trading these cycles,
i1 gets h2 and labels it as available since h2 ∼1 h3, i2 gets h1 and leaves the





































Figure 3.3: Steps 1, 2, and 3
Step 2: The pointing stage is shown as the following graph. In particular, i5, i6, i7
point to the same houses as they did at step 1. There is one cycle: i1 → h3 →
i3 → hi12 → i1. After trading the cycle i3 gets h2 and leaves the algorithm.
Then i1 gets h3 and also leaves the algorithm. i4 still labels his consumption
of h4 as available since h4 ∼4 h5.
Step 3: i4, i5, i6, i7 point to the same houses as they did in Step 2. Since i4 is full,
i4’s eating speed is two. Every other agent’ eating speed is one. So h5 is
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exhausted at t = 1/3, and i4 gets 2/3h5, i5, i6 each get 1/3h4, and i7 gets
1/3h5. In round 1 of the labeling stage i6 labels his 1/3h4 as available since













Figure 3.4: Steps 4 and 5
Step 4: The pointing stage is shown as the following graph. Since i4 is full, his
eating speed is one. Thus i6’s eating speed is three. Every other agent’s
eating speed is one. At t = 1/2, i6’s 1/3h4 is exhausted. Then in the labeling
stage only i6 labels his 1/2h6 as available. Since i4 is full, he leaves the
algorithm.
Step 5: All of i5, i6, i7 point to h6. At t = 2/3, h6 is exhausted. Stop the algorithm.
The final assignment is shown as follows:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
h3 h1 h2 1/2h4 1/2h4 2/3h6 1/2h5
1/2h5 1/6h6 1/6h6
3.7.3 Properties
I prove that PSE under weak preferences has the same properties as before.
Proposition 14. The PSE mechanism under weak preferences is ordinally efficient,
individually rational, new-agent envy-free, boundedly invariant, weakly dropping-
strategy-proof, and truncation-strategy-proof.
The equivalence theorems proved before may not hold, depending on how weak
preferences are dealt with in TTCE and Random YRMH-IGYT. That is, an agent
may obtain different assignments in PSE andTTCE (or randomYRMH-IGYT). But
I conjecture that every agent can have (asymptotically) equal welfare in PSE and
TTCE (or random YRMH-IGYT).
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new mechanism to solve random assignment problems in
which some agents have private endowments. The newmechanism PSE generalizes
PS by letting agents benefit from the popularity of their private endowments, which
is illustrated by the idea of “you request my house - I get your speed”. Interestingly,
the same idea can also be used to deal with weak preferences in a simple way.
There are two directions for future research. Athanassoglou and Sethuraman
(2011) generalize PSIR to a fractional endowment setting and prove that the mecha-
nism satisfies NJE. However, since two agents of equal endowments bring the same
resources to the problem, they also believe that equal-endowment no envy (EENE),
which is not satisfied by their mechanism, is a more reasonable fairness criterion
than NJE. It is interesting to extend PSE to their setting such that EENE is satisfied.
In another direction, it is interesting to examine whether PS can be extended to
solve the random assignment problems with coarse priorities proposed by Kesten
and Ünver (2015).
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
For any k ≥ 0, if all students are Lk, I denote the assignment found by the first
round of BM by µk . In the following by induction I prove that µk coincides with the
assignment found by round k of Fast DA. Then the proposition follows.
• At L0, each i reports his most preferred school as first choice. On the other
hand, in round 0 of Fast DA each i applies to his most preferred school. So it
is obvious that s0i = a
0
i and µ
0 coincides with the assignment found by round
0 of Fast DA.
• Suppose for all r ≤ k for some k ≥ 0, µr coincides with the assignment found
by round r of Fast DA. Now I consider k + 1.
If µk(i) = ski , which means that i is admitted by his reported first choice
at Lk in µk , then ski must be i’s best obtainable school at Lk + 1. On the







i . If µ
k(i) = ∅, by the induction assumption the school
i will report at Lk + 1 is also the school that i will apply to in round k + 1 of
Fast DA. So sk+1i = a
k+1
i .
Hence, µk+1 coincides with the assignment found by round k + 1 of Fast DA.
Then by induction, ski = a
k
i for all i and all k ≤ rFDA. For all k > rFDA, i




i for all i and all k > rFDA.
Proof of Lemma 1
I prove it by contradiction. Suppose every insufficiently sophisticated i whose
preferences satisfy µDA(i) Pi µBMkI (i) reports a preference ordering P′i such that
µDA(i) P′i µBMkI (i). Let i1 be any such student. Since µDA(i1) P′i µBMkI (i1), i1 must be
rejected by µDA(i1) in some round of BM. Denote the round by r1. µDA(i1) must
admit qµDA(i1) students in µ
BM
kI
, and there is some i2 who is admitted by µDA(i1)
in µBMkI but µ
DA(i2) , µDA(i1). Since µBMkI Pareto dominates µDA, i2 must prefer
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µDA(i2) to µDA(i1). By assumption, µDA(i2)P′i2µDA(i1). Since i2 must apply to
µDA(i1) in a round no latter than r1, i2 must apply to µDA(i2) in some earlier round
r2 such that r2 < r1. By the same argument as before, there is some i3 who is
admitted by µDA(i2) in µBMkI but µDA(i3) , µDA(i2). Then i3 must prefer µDA(i3)
to µDA(i2). Hence, i3 must be rejected by µDA(i3) in some round r3 of BM, and
r3 < r2. Denote by r x the earliest round in which some student ix is rejected by
µDA(ix) in BM. As before, there is some student ix+1 who is admitted by µDA(ix) in
µBMkI but µ
DA(ix+1) , µDA(ix). Hence, ix+1 must apply to µDA(ix+1) and be rejected
in a round earlier than r x , which contradicts the definition of r x .
Proof of Proposition 4
Let P˜i be the expressed preference ordering of i in Fast DA. Let µ˜ be a Pareto
efficient assignment that Pareto dominates µDA with respect to {P˜i}i∈I . I˜ ≡ {i ∈
I : µ˜(i) P˜i µDA(i)} is the set of students who are better off in µ˜ than in µDA with
respect to {P˜i}i∈I . Since every i ∈ I˜ must apply to µ˜(i) in some round of Fast DA, i
must report µ˜(i) as first choice at some level in BM. Then for any level distribution
in which every i ∈ I˜ reports µ˜(i) as first choice and every j ∈ I\I˜ reports µDA( j) as
first choice, the outcome of BM coincides with µ˜. Since µ˜ also Pareto dominates
µDA with respect to PI , I finish the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. The only difference is that every Lk
student has a correct belief about the level of every Lk′ student if k′ < k. Therefore,
in Fast DA∗ every Lk′ student cannot apply to new schools after round k′, and this
fact is known to every Lk student.
Proof of Proposition 6
1. By Corollary 3, any i at any level must report a school no worse than µDA(i)
as first choice. So µ˜BMkI is never strictly Pareto dominated by µ
DA.
2. If each student is sufficiently sophisticated, the outcome of Fast DA∗ coincides
with µDA. So µ˜BMkI = µ
DA.
3. If each student is insufficiently sophisticated, in the original level-k model
each i, with the belief that the others are Lki − 1, must report a school strictly
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better than µDA(i) as first choice. In the informational level-k model each i
never overestimates the others’ levels. So i must still report a school strictly
better than µDA(i) as first choice. Therefore, µ˜BMkI is not Pareto dominated by
µDA.
4. The proof of Lemma 1 implies that if µ˜BMkI is Pareto dominated by µ
DA, there




but µDA(i) Pi µBMkI (i). So if each positive-level i reports some P′i such that for
any s ∈ S, µDA(i) P′i s if µDA(i) Pi s, then µ˜BMkI must not be Pareto dominated
by µDA.
Proof of Proposition 8
As proved before, if j is admitted by his reported first choice when being Lk j ,
becoming a higher level does not change the outcome of BM. If j is rejected by
his reported first choice when being Lk j , let s be the school that finally admits j in
BM. Then s must have empty seats after the first round of BM. In other words, j
is unassigned in µFDA∗kI and s has empty seats in µ
FDA∗
kI
. Now suppose j becomes
Lk′j for any k
′
j > k j . To study how the outcome of the first round of BM changes, I
study how the outcome of Fast DA∗ changes. In Fast DA∗, j will apply to some new
schools after round k j . Let the sequence of these schools be {s1, · · · , sv}. Since
k j = k¯N , no student in N\{ j} will apply to new schools after round k j of Fast DA∗.
So to obtain the new outcome of Fast DA∗, I can start with the old outcome µFDA∗kI
and let j apply to the schools in the sequence one by one. When j applies to a
school in the sequence, j is either rejected immediately, or is tentatively accepted
and induces a rejection-application chain.
Let sa be the first school in the sequence that accepts j tentatively. Since s has
empty seats, s will accept j immediately if j applies to s. So sa must be better
than s. If sa finally accepts j, which means that j is better off, I finish the proof.
If sa finally rejects j, then in the induced rejection-application chain there must be
a student who replaces j since he has a higher priority than j at sa. Since any
student in N\{ j} cannot apply to a new school if being rejected, the chain cannot
involve any student in N\{ j}. The chain must neither involve any school with empty
seats since any student applying to such a school must be admitted immediately. So
after j is rejected by sa, the only change in the outcome of Fast DA∗ is that some
quasi-rational students exchange their seats. The set of unassigned students and the
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set of empty seats are the same as before. Then I can repeat the above analysis for
sa+1 and all following schools.
If j is rejected by all schools in the sequence, those schools must be strictly
better than s, and sv is just the first choice reported by j when being Lk′j . So all
schools weakly better than sv must be exhausted in the new outcome of Fast DA∗,
and the set of unassigned students and the set of empty seats in the new outcome of
Fast DA∗ are same as before. Note that all unassigned students will report the same
preferences as before since their beliefs do not change. Hence, if j uses a strategy
satisfying the worse-rank invariance condition, j will apply to every school worse
than sv in the same round of BM as before, and every other unassigned student will
apply to the same school in the same round of BM as before. So j must still be
admitted by s. Hence, I finish the proof.
A.2 Results of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) are Corollaries
I prove that all results of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) are either implied by mine
or can be proved easily using my method.
For any PI , if a nonempty N $ I is the set of naive students and M = I\N is
the set of rational students, then I prove that the set of NE outcomes of BM can be
found by the following procedure.
• Construct an artificial economy ({P1j } j∈N, {P`}`∈M) where P1j only lists the
most preferred school of j. LetM1 be the set of stable assignments in this
economy.
• For each µ ∈ M1, finalize the assignments of all assigned students and reduce
the number of seats at each school accordingly. Then run BM in the economy
consisting of remaining unassigned students and unfilled seats. Denote the
final assignment by f (µ). DefineM2 ≡ { f (µ) : µ ∈ M1}.
Proposition 15. M2 is the set of NE outcomes of BM in the economy PI when N is
naive and M is rational.
Proof. By Ergin and Sönmez (2006),M1 is the set of NE outcomes of BM in the
artificial economy if all students are rational. Since in the artificial economy each
j ∈ N only lists his most preferred school in his preference ordering, in each NE
j must still only lists his most preferred school in his reported preference ordering.
For each µ ∈ M1, the students in M must be assigned in µ. So they obtain the same
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assignments in µ and f (µ). Hence, in PI it must be a NE that each j ∈ N reports Pj
and each ` ∈ M reports µ(`) as first choice. So f (µ) is a NE outcome of BM in PI .
Conversely, for each NE outcome µ in PI , it is a NE that each j ∈ N reports
Pj and each ` ∈ M reports µ(`) as first choice. So in the artificial economy it is
still a NE that each j ∈ N reports P1j and each ` ∈ M reports µ(`) as first choice.
The corresponding NE outcome in the artificial economy is f −1(µ). So I finish the
proof.
I denote the student-optimal stable assignment in the artificial economy by µ∗.
Then f (µ∗) must be the student-optimal stable assignment in PI . So f (µ∗) = µDA.
On the other hand, in the informational level-k model of BM, if kN = 0, then all
students in N can only apply to their most preferred schools in Fast DA∗. So the
outcome of Fast DA∗ is µ∗. Hence, µ∗ is also the assignment found by the first
round of BM. Then the outcome of BM must be f (µ∗), which is same with µDA.
This proves Proposition 9. So the main results of Pathak and Sönmez are implied
by Proposition 5 and Proposition 6.
Corollary 9. (Propositions 3 and 4 of Pathak and Sönmez (2008)) Rational students
are weakly better off in the student-optimal NE outcome of BM than in the outcome
of DA. A naive student weakly benefits from becoming rational and all rational
students weakly suffer.
Pathak and Sönmez also prove that each j ∈ N obtains the same assignment in
all NE outcomes of BM in PI . I show that it is straightforwardly implied by the
rural hospital theorem (Roth 1986). Specifically, for each µ ∈ M1, all students in
M must be assigned in µ. Each j ∈ N is either assigned to his most preferred school
or unassigned in µ. By the rural hospital theorem, if j is assigned in one stable
assignment, j must be assigned in all stable assignments. Hence, if j is assigned in
one µ, j must be assigned to his most preferred school in all µ ∈ M1. On the other
hand, by the rural hospital theorem each school must admit the same number of
students in all µ ∈ M1. Hence, the number of unassigned students and the number
of empty seats at each school are same in all µ ∈ M1. Then at the second step of
the above procedure each unassigned j ∈ N must obtain the same assignment in all
µ ∈ M2.
Corollary 10. (Proposition 2 of Pathak and Sönmez (2008)) Each j ∈ N is admitted
by the same school in all NE outcomes of BM in PI
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A.3 Additional Simulation Results
Figure A.1 reports the simulation results for the informational level-k model.
The figure is very close to the original level-k model in Figure 1.1. To check the
robustness of my results I also consider unbalanced markets in which students are
more than schools. In particular, I let some school play the role of being unassigned
by letting all students least prefer it. Figure A.2 reports the simulation results for
the original level-k model in unbalanced markets. The results for the informational
level-k model in unbalanced markets are very similar and omitted.
Figure A.1: Informational level-k model of BM
A.4 A Level-k Model of Constrained DA
Let c < |S | be the constraint on the length of preference orderings that students
can report. I analyze an original level-k model of constrained DA by assuming
that L0 students report their top c choices and positive-level students use topping
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Figure A.2: Original Level-k model of BM in unbalanced markets
strategies.1 Formally, for any P ∈ P, let Pc only rank the top c choices. Denote the
outcome of DA by µc if each i reports Pci . If µ
c(i) , ∅, then µc(i) must be weakly
better than µDA(i). If all students are assigned in µc, then µc = µDA. Let ski be the
first choice reported by each i at Lk, then I have the following result.
Proposition 16. For any PI and any i,
(1) ski Ri s
k+1
i Ri µ
DA(i) for all i ∈ I and all k ≥ 0;
(2) There exists some finite rDAi ≥ 0 for each i such that ski = µDA(i) for all
k ≥ rDAi .
Proof. At L0, each i reports Pci . So s
0
i is the most preferred school of i. Denote the
outcome of DA by µ0 if all students are L0. It is obvious that µ0 = µc. If any school
1That is, they report their best obtainable schools as first choices and report the true preference
ordering of the remaining c − 1 top choices.
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s admits qs students in µ0, denote the priority rank of the lowest-priority admitted
student by z0s . Otherwise, define z0s ≡ |I |. So z0s is the threshold priority rank to
enter s in µ0. Define zDAs similarly for µDA. It is obvious that z0s ≥ zDAs for all s.
At L1, for each i, if µ0(i) , ∅, then µ0(i) is the best obtainable school for i.
Hence, s1i = µ
0(i). If µ0(i) = ∅, then i will report a new best obtainable school s1i
as first choice. Since z0s ≥ zDAs for all s, µDA(i) must be obtainable for i. So s1i must
be weakly better than µDA(i). Denote the outcome of DA by µ1 if all students are
L1. Denote the threshold priority rank to enter s in µ1 by z1s . Then z1s ≤ z0s for all s,
that is, all thresholds are weakly higher. By using topping strategies each i is either
unassigned in µ1 or admitted by a school weakly better than µDA(i). So zDAs ≤ z1s
for all s.
At Lk for any k ≥ 2, suppose it is true that sk ′−1i Ri sk
′
i Ri µ
DA(i) and zDAs ≤
zk
′
s ≤ zk ′−1s for all i, all s and all k′ < k. Then for each i, any s better than sk−1i must
be not obtainable for i. If µk−1(i) , ∅, then µk−1(i) is the best obtainable school
for i. If µk−1(i) = ∅, i will report a new first choice at Lk. But the school must








DA(i) for all i ∈ I and all k ≥ 0.
When k is high enough, all students at Lk must be assigned in µk . Then µk must
weakly Pareto dominate µDA. Since µk(i) is the best obtainable school for each i at
Lk + 1, µk must be stable. So µk = µDA. Hence, there exists some finite rDAi ≥ 0
for each i such that ski = µ
DA(i) for all k ≥ rDAi .
The above original level-k model of constrained DA looks like the corresponding
model of BM. If all students have high enough levels, BM and DA have same
outcomes, which are µDA. If some students have low levels, the comparison between
BM andDA is ambiguous. Therefore, I do simulations to compare them by choosing
c = 5 and letting positive-level students use topping strategies. Figure A.3 shows
that DA is more efficient than BM. Specifically, there are more students who prefer
DA than those who prefer BM. Sophistication level is also positively correlated with
welfare in both BM and DA. However, as discussed before, the level-k model of
constrained DA depends on the specification of students’ best strategies at positive
levels. By using topping strategies positive-level students may report non-truthful
rankings of the schools they report, which are proved to be weakly dominated by
truthful rankings of the schools they report (Calsamiglia, Haeringer, andKlijn 2010).
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Figure A.3: Compare BM and DA in constrained school choice.
A.5 Correction of Proposition 1 of Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2011)
In the strict priorities and complete information environment, Abdulkadiroğlu,
Che, and Yasuda (2011) prove their Proposition 1 in their on-line appendix, which
states that if students have common preference orderings and are either naive or
rational, then if any naive student becoming rational, in the unique NE outcome
of BM all other naive students are weakly worse off. I show that this statement is
incorrect. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 6. There are four schools {s1, s2, s3, s4} and four students {i1, i2, i3, i4}.
Each school has only one seat. Students have the common preference ordering
s1  s2  s3  s4. The priority rankings are shown in Table A.1. Suppose all
students are naive, then they report true preferences. The assignment of BM is
shown in the table. Now if i2 becomes rational, i2 will report s2 as first choice since
s1 must be obtained by i1. Then the new outcome of BM is also shown in the table.
It is easy to see that i2, i4 are better off, i1 remains same, and i3 is worse off.
Now I provide a detailed analysis of the statement using my method in Appendix
A.2. When some naive student j becomes rational, by Proposition 9, it is equivalent
to the situation that kN = 0 in the informational level-k model, but then some j ∈ N
becomes quasi-rational. Suppose there are m schools in total and the common
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pis1 pis2 pis3 pis4
i1 i3 i2 i1
i2 i2 i4 i2
i3 i4 i3 i3
i4 i1 i1 i4
(a) Priority rankings
i1 i2 i3 i4
s1 s3 s2 s4
(b) All students are naive
i1 i2 i3 i4
s1 s2 s4 s3
(c) i2 is rational, the others
are naive
Table A.1: Counterexample
preference ordering is s1  s2  · · ·  sm. As proved before, if j is assigned in Fast
DA∗ when being L0, becoming quasi-rational does not change the outcome of BM.
If j is unassigned in Fast DA∗ when being L0, let {sv, sv+1, · · · , sm} be the set of
schools that have empty seats in the outcome of Fast DA∗. Let the number of empty
seats of sv be esv . Since students have common preferences, the number of empty
seats of each sa with a > v must be qsa . Let su be the school that admits j in the
outcome of BM. So u ∈ [v,m].
By becoming quasi-rational j must be assigned in Fast DA∗. So from the second
round of BM on there will be one fewer empty seat and one fewer unassigned
student than before. Since students have common preferences, the missing empty
seat must belong to sv. Hence, sv has esv − 1 empty seats now. So some student
j1 who was admitted by sv in the second round of BM before will be rejected by
sv now. Then j1 will apply to sv+1, and will either be rejected or replace another
student who was admitted by sv+1 before. If I repeat this argument, there must
be exactly one student ja who was admitted by some school in {sv, · · · , su−1} but
now is rejected. Moreover, all the students who were admitted by the schools in
{sv, · · · , su−1} before are weakly worse off and some is strictly worse off (e.g., j1
and ja). Then ja will apply to su. Since j is assigned in the first round, compared to
the before situation ja essentially replaces j among those who applied to su before.
Let jb be the highest-priority student at su who was rejected by su before. If jb has a
higher priority than ja, then jb will be admitted by su and be strictly better off (this
is what happens in the above example). Then ja will apply to su+1 and essentially
replace jb among those who applied to su+1 before. On the other hand, if jb has a
lower priority than ja at su, then ja is admitted by su. Then the assignments of all
naive students who were admitted by the schools in {su+1, · · · , sm} do not change.
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Proof of Theorem 1
Let I = {i1, i2, j} and O = {o1, o2, o3, . . .}. Consider the two preference profiles
∗I and ◦I shown in Table B.1. Both preference profiles are allowed in bothU and
Q. In both preference profiles all agents prefer o1, o2, o3 to the other objects, and

















Table B.1: Two preference profiles
Lemma 2. When |I | = 3 and |O | ≥ 3, in either U and Q, an ex-post efficient
mechanism that satisfies equal treatment of equals is minimally group strategy-
proof only if ρ(∗I ) = ρ(◦I ).
Proof. In any Pareto efficient deterministic assignment o1, o2, o3 must be assigned
to i1, i2, j. Moreover, since in both preference profiles i1, i2 prefer o1 to o3 while j
prefers o3 to o1, j must never obtain o1. Hence, for both ∗I and ◦I there are only














Table B.2: Pareto efficient assignments for both preference profiles
Any ex-post efficient mechanism ρmust assign positive probabilities to a subset
of the above four assignments for both preference profiles. Hence, ρ(∗I ) can be
denoted by Table B.3. ρ(◦I ) can be denoted similarly and omitted.
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i1 i2 j
o1 ρ(∗I )(pi1) + ρ(∗I )(pi2) ρ(∗I )(pi3) + ρ(∗I )(pi4)
o2 ρ(∗I )(pi3) ρ(∗I )(pi1) [ρ(∗I )(pi2) + ρ(∗I )(pi4)]
o3 ρ(∗I )(pi4) ρ(∗I )(pi2) [ρ(∗I )(pi1) + ρ(∗I )(pi3)]
Table B.3: ρ(∗I )
If ρ satisfies equal treatment of equals, then i1, i2 obtain the same lotteries in
both ρ(∗I ) and ρ(◦I ). So for ∗I I have the following equalities:
ρ(∗I )(pi1) + ρ(∗I )(pi2) = ρ(∗I )(pi3) + ρ(∗I )(pi4), (i1, i2 obtain equal shares of o1)
ρ(∗I )(pi1) = ρ(∗I )(pi3), (i1, i2 obtain equal shares of o2)
ρ(∗I )(pi2) = ρ(∗I )(pi4). (i1, i2 obtain equal shares of o3)
These equalities imply that ρ(∗I )(pi1)+ ρ(∗I )(pi2) = 12 . So ρ(∗I ) can be charac-
terized by one parameter ρ(∗I )(pi1), which is shown in Table B.4. ρ(◦I ) is similarly





o2 ρ(∗I )(pi1) ρ(∗I )(pi1) [1 − 2ρ(∗I )(pi1)]
o3 12 − ρ(∗I )(pi1) 12 − ρ(∗I )(pi1) 2ρ(∗I )(pi1)





o2 ρ(◦I )(pi1) ρ(◦I )(pi1) [1 − 2ρ(◦I )(pi1)]
o3 12 − ρ(◦I )(pi1) 12 − ρ(◦I )(pi1) 2ρ(◦I )(pi1)
Table B.5: ρ(◦I )
Since i1, i2 always obtain 1/2 of o1 in both preference profiles, whenever ρ(∗I
)(pi1) , ρ(◦I )(pi1), the lotteries i1, i2 obtain in one preference profile strictly first-
order stochastically dominate the lotteries they obtain in another preference profile
for both ∗i1, ∗i2 and ◦i1, ◦i2 . Specifically, if ρ(∗I )(pi1) > ρ(◦I )(pi1), i1, i2 can
strongly group manipulate ρ at ◦I by reporting (∗i1, ∗i2). Symmetrically, if ρ(∗I
)(pi1) < ρ(◦I )(pi1), i1, i2 can strongly manipulate ρ at ∗I by reporting (◦i1, ◦i2).
So ρ is minimally group strategy-proof only if ρ(∗I )(pi1) = ρ(◦I )(pi1), which is
equivalent to ρ(∗I ) = ρ(◦I ).
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If a mechanism ρ further satisfies equal top-assignment of equal tops and top
advantage, then it must be that ρ(∗I )(pi1) < 1/3 and ρ(◦I )(pi1) = 1/3. So ρ is not
minimally group strategy-proof.
Lemma 3. When |I | = 3 and |O | ≥ 3, in either U or Q, an ex-post efficient
assignment that satisfies equal top-assignment of equal tops and weak envy-freeness
must satisfy equal treatment of equals.
Proof. Suppose any two agents i, j report equal preferences and most prefer object
o1. Suppose p is the assignment found by the mechanism. Equal top-assignment of
equal tops requires that pi,o1 = p j,o1 . If only o is acceptable to i, j, then i, j obviously
obtain equal lotteries. If their preference ordering is o1  o2  ∅  · · · , then weak
envy-freeness requires that pi,o2 ≥ p j,o2 and pi,o2 ≤ p j,o2 . So i, j still obtain equal
lotteries. If their preference ordering is o1  o2  o3  · · ·  ∅, since there are




k=1 p j,ok = 1. If
pi,o2 > p j,o2 , then pi B j p j , which violates weak envy-freeness. Hence, pi,o2 = p j,o2 ,
and i, j obtain equal lotteries. So p satisfies equal treatment of equals.
Hence, in the theorem equal treatment of equals can be replaced by weak envy-
freeness.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let I ≡ {i1, i2, j, k1, . . . , kn} and O ≡ {o1, o2, . . . , om} with n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 3.
Consider the two preference profiles in Table B.6 that generalize those in the proof of
Theorem 1. In both preference profiles o1, o2, o3 are not acceptable to k1, . . . , kn, but
are preferred by i1, i2, i3 to all other objects. So {i1, i2, i3} and {o1, o2, o3} essentially
constitute a sub-problem. Then I can repeat previous arguments.
∗i1 ∗i2 ∗j ∗k1 · · · ∗kn
o1 o1 o2 o4 · · · o4
o2 o2 o3
... · · · ...
o3 o3 o1 om · · · om
...
...
... ∅ · · · ∅
(a) ∗I
◦i1 ◦i2 ◦j ∗k1 · · · ∗kn
o2 o2 o2 o4 · · · o4
o1 o1 o3
... · · · ...
o3 o3 o1 om · · · om
...
...
... ∅ · · · ∅
(b) ◦I
Table B.6: Two preference profiles
Proof of Theorem 3
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Let I ≡ {i1, i2, . . . , in, j} and O ≡ {o1, o2, . . . , om} with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 3.
Consider the preferences profiles ∗I and ◦I in Table B.7. All agents prefer o1, o2, o3
to other objects, and i1, · · · , in always have equal preferences. As before, in both
preference profiles an ex-post efficientmechanism ρmust assign o1 only to i1, · · · , in.
Moreover, if m ≤ n + 1, o1, . . . , om must be exhausted. If m > n + 1, o1, . . . , on+1
must be exhausted.
∗i1 ∗i2 · · · ∗in ∗j
o1 o1 · · · o1 o2
o2 o2 · · · o2 o3
o3 o3 · · · o3 o1
o4 o4 · · · o4 o4
...
... · · · ... ...
om om · · · om om
∅ ∅ · · · ∅ ∅
(a) ∗I
◦i1 ◦i2 · · · ◦in ∗j
o2 o2 · · · o2 o2
o1 o1 · · · o1 o3
o3 o3 · · · o3 o1
o4 o4 · · · o4 o4
...
... · · · ... ...
om om · · · om om
∅ ∅ · · · ∅ ∅
(b) ◦I
Table B.7: Two preference profiles
Since all agents prefer all objects to ∅, uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails
requires that ρi,∅(∗I ) = ρi,∅(∗I ) for any distinct i, j. Hence, ex-post efficiency
further requires that ρi,∅(∗I ) = max{1 − mn+1, 0} for all i ∈ I. For the same reason,
ρi,∅(◦I ) = max{1− mn+1, 0} for all i ∈ I. Therefore,
∑m
k=1 ρiok (∗I ) =
∑m
k=1 ρiok (◦I ) =
min{ mn+1, 1} for all i ∈ I. Moreover, since all agents prefer o1, o2, o3 to the remaining
objects and their preferences over the remaining objects are equal, uniform tail-
assignment of uniform tails requires that ρiok (∗I ) = ρiok (◦I ) = 1n+1 for all i ∈ I and
all k = 4, · · · ,min{m, n + 1}.
Equal treatment of equals, equal top-assignment of equal tops, and top advantage
further require that for all i ∈ J ≡ {i1, i2, . . . , in}, ρi,o1(∗I ) = 1n , ρi,o2(∗I ) < 1n+1 ,
ρi,o1(◦I ) = 1n , and ρi,o2(◦I ) = 1n+1 . So ρ(∗I ) can be denoted by Table B.8 for
some z < 1n+1 , and ρ(◦I ) can be denoted by Table B.9. It is easy to see that the
lottery obtained by every i ∈ J in ρ(◦I ) strictly first-order stochastically dominates
the lottery obtained by i in ρ(∗I ). So J can strongly group manipulate ρ at ∗I
by reporting ◦J . As before, equal treatment of equals can be replaced by weak
envy-freeness.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let the two objects be o1, o2. I prove the theorem by contradiction. Suppose
at some preference profile I , some group J $ I strongly group manipulates ρ by
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i1 i2 · · · in j
o1 1n
1
n · · · 1n
o2 z z · · · z 1 − nz
o3 2n−1n+1 − z 2n−1n+1 − z · · · 2n−1n+1 − z nz − n−2n+1
o4 1n+1
1
n+1 · · · 1n+1 1n+1
...
...
... · · · ... ...
omin{m,n+1} 1n+1
1
n+1 · · · 1n+1 1n+1
Table B.8: ρ(∗I )
i1 i2 · · · in j
o1 1n
1
n · · · 1n
o2 1n+1
1
n+1 · · · 1n+1 1n+1
o3 2n−1n+1 − 1n+1 2n−1n+1 − 1n+1 · · · 2n−1n+1 − 1n+1 2n+1
o4 1n+1
1
n+1 · · · 1n+1 1n+1
...
...
... · · · ... ...
omin{m,n+1} 1n+1
1
n+1 · · · 1n+1 1n+1
Table B.9: ρ(◦I )
reporting ′J . Suppose there are x > 0 agents in J and y agents in I\J. Among
J there are x1 agents who prefer o1 to o2, while among I\J there are y1 agents
who prefer o1 to o2. Since there are only two objects, all agents in J must switch
their preference ranking of o1, o2 in their misreported preferences. So the true and
misreported preferences can be denoted as follows:
x1 x − x1
o1 o2
o2 o1
y1 y − y1
o1 o2
o2 o1
(a) (J, I\J )
x1 x − x1
o2 o1
o1 o2
y1 y − y1
o1 o2
o2 o1
(b) (′J, I\J )
Hence, in I there are x1 + y1 agents who prefer o1 to o2, while in (′J, I\J)
there are x − x1 + y1 agents who prefer o1 to o2. Since ρ satisfies equal treatment of
equals, ρ(I) and ρ(′J, I\J) can be denoted as follows:




(x − x1) + y1 x1 + (y − y1)
o1 a′ c′
o2 b′ d′
(b) ρ(′J, I\J )
Since ρ satisfies top advantage, if x1+y1 > 0, then a > c; if (x−x1)+(y−y1) > 0,
then d > b; if (x − x1) + y1 > 0, then a′ > c′; if x1 + (y − y1) > 0, then d′ > b′.
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Since J strongly group manipulates ρ, if x1 > 0, then c′ ≥ a; if x − x1 > 0, then
b′ ≥ d.
There are two cases to consider: (x − x1) + y1 > 0 or x1 + (y − y1) > 0. Since
the two cases are symmetric, I only prove the case of (x − x1) + y1 > 0. In this case
a′ > c′. There are further two cases to consider.
Case 1: x1 > 0. Then x1 + y1 > 0, which implies that a > c and c′ ≥ a. Then
the total probability of o1 that assigned in ρ(′J, I\J) is
[(x − x1) + y1]a′ + [x1 + (y − y1)]c′ > [(x − x1) + y1]c′ + [x1 + (y − y1)]c′
= (x + y)c′
≥ (x + y)a
≥ (x1 + y1)a + [(x − x1) + (y − y1)]c.
(x1 + y1)a + [(x − x1) + (y − y1)]c is the total probability of o1 that assigned
in ρ(I). Since ρ is ex-post efficient, o1 must be exhausted in both ρ(I) and
ρ(′J, I\J). So the above strict inequality is a contradiction.
Case 2: x1 = 0. Then x − x1 = x > 0, which implies that d > b and b′ ≥ d.
There are further two subcases to consider.
• If x1+ (y− y1) > 0, then d′ > b′. Then the total probability of o2 that assigned
in ρ(′J, I\J) is
[(x − x1) + y1]b′ + [x1 + (y − y1)]d′ > [(x − x1) + y1]b′ + [x1 + (y − y1)]b′
= (x + y)b′
≥ (x + y)d
≥ (x1 + y1)b + [(x − x1) + (y − y1)]d,
which, as before, is a contradiction.
• If x1 + (y − y1) = 0, then y1 = y. Then all agents in J prefer o2 to o1, while
all agents in I\J prefer o1 to o2. So in the misreported preference profile
(′J, I\J) all agents prefer o1 to o2. Equal treatment of equals implies that
b′ = 1x+y , while top advantage implies that d >
1
x+y . So J cannot strongly
group manipulate ρ, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5
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As before, suppose a group J $ I weakly group manipulates a mechanism ρ.
Besides the properties in Theorem 4, if ρ further satisfies uniform tail-assignment
of uniform tails, then in the proof of Theorem 4 we have a + b = c + d = a′ + b′ =
d′ + c′ = 2|I | .
If some agent in J with the true preference ordering o1  o2 obtains a different
assignment than truth-telling, then weak group manipulation implies that c′ > a.
So the lottery (c′ · o1, d′ · o2) strictly first-order stochastically dominates the lottery
(a · o1, b · o2) for the x1 agents in J. Hence, if x − x1 = 0, then J strongly group
manipulates ρ, which contradicts the fact that ρ is minimally group strategy-proof.
If x − x1 > 0, top advantage requires that a′ > c′. So the lottery (b′ · o2, a′ · o1) is
strictly first-order stochastically dominated by the lottery (d · o2, c · o1) for the x − x1
agents in J. So J cannot weakly group manipulate ρ.
If some agent in J with the true preference ordering o2  o1 obtains a different
assignment than truth-telling, the proof is similar.
Proof of Theorem 6
Let I ≡ {i1, i2, . . . , in, j} and O ≡ {o1, o2} with n ≥ 2. Consider the following
two preference profiles.
∗i1 ∗i2 · · · ∗in ∗j
o1 o1 · · · o1 o2
o2 o2 · · · o2 ∅
∅ ∅ · · · ∅ o1
(a) ∗I
◦i1 ◦i2 · · · ◦in ∗j
o2 o2 · · · o2 o2
o1 o1 · · · o1 ∅
∅ ∅ · · · ∅ o1
(b) ◦I
Table B.12: Two preference profiles
As before, at ∗I each i ∈ J ≡ {i1, · · · , in} obtains 1/n of o1 and less than 1/(n+1)
of o2, while at ◦I each i ∈ J obtains 1/n of o1 and 1/(n+1) of o2. So J can strongly
group manipulate the mechanism at ∗I by reporting ◦J .
Proof of Proposition 10
Since PS is envy-free, I only need to prove top advantage. However, it is obvious.
So in the following I prove the proposition for RSD.
• Equal top-assignment of equal tops: Suppose any distinct i, j most prefer the
same object o. For any ordering of agents in which i obtains o in RSD, there is
a symmetric ordering in which i, j switch their positions and j obtains o. Since
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each ordering is drawn with equal probability, i, j obtain equal probability of
o.
• Top advantage: Suppose i most prefers o while j most prefers a different
object. For any ordering of agents in which j obtains o, there is a symmetric
ordering in which i, j switch their positions and i obtains o. However, for all
orderings in which i is ranked first, i obtains o. But for all orderings in which
j is ranked first, j does not obtain o. Since each ordering is drawn with equal
probability, i obtains higher probability of o than j.
• Uniform tail-assignment of uniform tails: Since SU(i, o) = SU( j, o) for all
distinct i, j, in any ordering of agents SU(i, o) must be exhausted before any
object in Oˆ\SU(i, o) is chosen. So the outcome of RSD can be equivalently
found by first running RSD to assign SU(i, o), then running RSD to assign
Oˆ\SU(i, o). Since all agents have equal preferences over Oˆ\SU(i, o), all
agents must obtain equal probability of each object in Oˆ\SU(i, o).
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Proofs of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8
C.1.1 Proof of Theorem 7
To prove Theorem 7 I first prove a lemma about PSE and two lemmas about
TTCE .
For any d ≥ 0, at the beginning of step d + 1 in PSE , if there are no cycles
among existing tenants, since every agent in I(d) points to a house and every private
endowment in H(d) points to its owner, every agent must be linked through a unique
path to a social endowment (as illustrated by Figure C.1), which is either a vacant
house or a private endowment whose owner has stopped consuming. Then I prove
that for any h ∈ H(d), sh(td) is equal to the number of agents who are linked to h
through some paths. I say an agent i is always linked to himself. Then si(td) is equal







Figure C.1: Illustration of Lemma 4. h1, h2 are private endowments of i1, i2. h3
is a social endowment. Hence, sh1(t) = 2, si1(t) = 3, sh2(t) = 4, si2(t) = 5, and
sh3(t) = 6.
Lemma 4. For all h ∈ H(d) and all i ∈ I(d), sh(td) is equal to the number of agents
who are linked to h, and si(td) is equal to the number of agents linked to i.
Proof. For any h ∈ H(d), recall that Ah(td) is the set of agents who point to h and
sh(td) = ∑i∈Ah(td) si(td).
First, consider all h such that all agents in Ah(td) have an eating speed of one, it
is obvious that sh(t) = |Ah(td)|. Ah(td) is also the set of all agents linked to h. If
h is a private endowment of some i, then si(td) is equal to the number of agents in
Ah(td) plus one. Denote the set of such existing tenants by X1(d).
Then, consider all h such that all existing tenants in Ah(td) are in X1(d). Given
the above result, it is obvious that sh(td) is equal to the number of all agents in
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Ah(td) plus the number of other agents linked to h through existing tenants in Ah(td).
Denote the set of existing tenants whose private endowments belong to this case by
X2(d).
Repeating the above argument proves that sh(td) is equal to the number of agents
who are linked to h. So si(td) is equal to the number of agents linked to i.
With some abuse of notations, I also use sh(td) to denote the set of agents linked
to h. Since every agent is linked to a unique social endowment, all agents in I(d) can
be partitioned into {sh(td)}h∈HV (d), where HV (d) is the set of social endowments.
So ∪h∈HV (d)sh(td) = I(d) and
∑
h∈HV (d) sh(td) = |I(d)|. I use HO(d) := H(d)\HV (d)
to denote the set of private endowments.
In TTCE , for any d ≥ 0, I define Bh(d) and wh(d) as the counterparts of Ah(td)
and sh(td). That is, Bh(d) is the set of agents whose most preferred remaining
house is h, and wh(d) is both the number and the set of agents linked to h through
some paths in the graph of TTCE (see Appendix C.3.2). I still use HV (d),HO(d)
to denote the set of social endowments and the set of private endowments. Then∑
h∈HV (d) wh(d) = |I(d)| and ∪h∈HV (d)wh(d) = I(d).
At the beginning of step 1 of TTCE , if any two pseudo-agents hold same house,
the house must be a social endowment and they must hold an equal fraction. In the
following I prove two lemmas about TTCE , which guarantee that the statement is
true throughout the procedure of TTCE .
Lemma 5. At any step d +1 of TTCE , if there is no existing-tenant cycle, every new
pseudo-agent ih where i ∈ I(d)\Bh(d) and h ∈ HV (d) is involved in wh(d) selected
cycles.
Proof. All remaining agents in I(d) can be partitioned into Bh(d) and I(d)\Bh(d).
Bh(d) can be further partitioned into BNh(d) and BEh(d), the set of new agents in
Bh(d) and the set of existing tenants in Bh(d). For every existing tenant j ∈ BEh(d),
there are wpi( j)(d) agents who are linked to pi( j) and all of them are further linked
to h. So by the definition of wh(d), ∑ j∈BEh(d) wpi( j)(d) + |Bh(d)| = wh(d). For any
new pseduo-agent ih such that i ∈ I(d)\Bh(d) and h ∈ HV (d), i’s most preferred
remaining house is not h. There are two cases:
Case 1. If i’s most preferred remaining house is another h′ ∈ HV (d), then ih must
point to all pseudo-agents {ah′}a∈I(d)\{i}. Then for every kh′ such that k ∈ Bh(d), ih
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and kh′ point to each other and form a cycle of length two. So ih is involved in a total
number of |Bh(d)| of such length-two cycles. All these cycle are selected to trade.
Moreover, since for every j ∈ BEh(d) there are wpi( j)(d) agents linked to j, there are
wpi( j)(d) new pseudo-agents who hold h′ and are linked to jpi( j). Since ih points to
all the wpi( j)(d) new pseudo-agents and jpi( j) points to ih, there are wpi( j)(d) cycles
of the form ih → `h′ → · · · → jpi( j) → ih, where `h′ is a typical new pseudo-agent
linked to jpi( j). Note that ih and `h′ are the only two new pseudo-agents in the cycle.
So all these cycles are selected to trade. Hence the total number of selected cycles
that involve ih is
∑
j∈BEh(d) wpi( j)(d) + |Bh(d)| = wh(d).
Case 2. If i’smost preferred remaining house is a private endowment h′ ∈ HO(d),
then ih points only to gh′ where g is the owner of h′.
If g’s most preferred remaining house is some h′′ ∈ HV (d) other than h, then g
points to all pseudo-agents {ah′′}a∈I(d)\g. As in the first case, for every kh′′ such that
k ∈ Bh(d), there is a length-three cycle ih → gh′ → kh′′ → ih that involves only two
new pseudo-agents. All these cycles are selected to trade, and their total number is
|Bh(d)|. Moreover, for every j ∈ BEh(d), there are wpi( j)(d) new pseudo-agents who
hold h′′ and are linked to jpi( j). For every such new pseudo-agent `h′′ there is a cycle
ih → gh′ → `h′′ → · · · → jpi( j) → ih that involves only two new pseudo-agents ih
and `h′′. So all these cycles are selected to trade. Hence the total number of selected
cycles that involve ih is
∑
j∈BEh(d) wpi( j)(d) + |Bh(d)| = wh(d).
If g’s most preferred remaining house is h, then ih is involved in only one cycle:
ih → gh′ → ih in which ih is the only new pseudo-agent. Then I regard the cycle as
wh(d) cycles.
If g’s most preferred remaining house is in HO(d), then g must be linked to a
house in HV (d). If the house is not h, then as proved before, ih is involved in wh(d)
selected cycles. If the house is h, then ih is involved in only one cycle looking like
ih → gh′ → · · · → j′pi( j ′) → ih, where ih is the only new pseudo-agent. Then I also
regard the cycle as wh(d) cycles.
In the above proof, when ih is the only new pseudo-agent in a cycle, I regard the
cycle as wh(d) cycles. Now if a new pseudo-agent ih most prefers h and points to
himself, I also regard the self-cycle as wh(d) cycles. These cycles may be traded
in one step in the my definition of TTCE . Trading these cycles in multiple steps
does not change the assignment of TTCE , but as shown later, this trick simplifies
the proof of Theorem 7 by making TTCE equivalent to PSE step by step.
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By Lemma 5, the set of new pseudo-agents {ih}h∈HV (d) are involved in a total
number of
∑
h∈HV (d) wh(d) = |I(d)| selected cycles. So I have the following corollary.
Corollary 11. At any step d + 1 of TTCE , if there is no existing-tenant cycle, then
every new agent i ∈ IN (d) is involved in |I(d)| selected cycles.
Remember that every existing tenant is further represented by a pseudo-tenant,
so I have the following lemma.
Lemma 6. At any step d+1 of TTCE , if there is no existing-tenant cycle, then every
pseudo-tenant ipi(i) where i ∈ IE (d) is involved in |I(d)| · wpi(i)(d) selected cycles.
Proof. For any i ∈ IE (d), if i’s most preferred remaining house is some h ∈ HV (d),
then ipi(i) points to all pseudo-agents {ah}a∈I(d)\{i}. For every agent j ∈ wpi(i)(d), jh
is linked to ipi(i). So there is a cycle ipi(i) → jh → · · · → ipi(i) that involves only one
new pseudo-agent jh, and the cycle is regarded as wh(d) selected cycles. Every new
pseudo-agent jh′ such that h′ ∈ HV (d)\{h} is also linked to ipi(i). By Lemma 5, jh′ is
involved in wh′(d) selected cycles. All these cycles also involve ipi(i). By Corollary
11, for every j ∈ wpi(i)(d), { jh′}h′∈HV (d) is involved in |I(d)| selected cycles. So ipi(i)
is involved in |I(d)| · wpi(i)(d) selected cycles.
If i’s most preferred remaining house is in HO(d), then ipi(i) must be linked to a
pseudo-tenant whose most preferred remaining house is in HV (d). Then a similar
argument as before proves that each of the |I(d)| selected cycles that involves every
j ∈ wpi(i)(d) must also involve ipi(i). So ipi(i) is involved in |I(d)| · wpi(i)(d) selected
cycles.
So every existing tenant i ∈ IE (d) is involved in |I(d)| + |I(d)| · wpi(i)(d) =
|I(d)| · [wpi(i)(d) + 1] selected cycles.
Corollary 12. At any step d + 1 of TTCE , if there is no existing-tenant cycle, then
every existing tenant i ∈ IE (d) is involved in |I(d)| · [wpi(i)(d) + 1] selected cycles.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Recall that in Lemma 5 and 6 I use the trick that each cycle inTTCE that involves
only one new pseudo-agent ih at step d + 1 is regarded as wh(d) cycles. Now I use
another trick that if there are existing-tenants cycles at any step d + 1 of TTCE , I
trade existing-tenants cycles at step d + 1, and trade the remaining cycles at step
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d +2. Both tricks do not change the assignment of TTCE , but they will make TTCE
equivalent to PSE step by step.
1. I prove the equivalence result for step d = 1.
At the beginning of step 1, agents and their pseudo-agents point to same
houses in PSE and TTCE respectively. So Ah(t0) = Bh(0) and sh(t0) = wh(0)
for all h ∈ H(0). There are two cases to consider.
1.a If there are existing-tenant cycles in PSE , there must be same existing-
tenant cycles in TTCE . Denote the set of these cycles by C(1). Both
mechanisms trade them immediately. Let TQPc (d) and TQTc (d) be the
trading quotas of cycle c at step d of PSE and at step d of TTCE
respectively. It is obvious that TQPc (1) = TQTc (1) for every cycle c ∈
C(1). Let TQPh (d) and TQTh (d) be the fraction of house h that are
traded at step d of PSE and at step d of TTCE respectively. Then
TQPh (1) = TQTh (1) for every house h ∈ HO(0). So the two mechanisms
are equivalent at step 1.
1.b If there are no existing-tenant cycles in PSE , step 1 of PSE must end with
a house being exhausted. Denote the house by hP(1), then shP(1)(t0) ≥
sh(t0) for any h ∈ H(0). Let EPS(d) (eating per speed) be the fraction of
houses an agent of speed one eats at step d. Then EPS(1) = 1/shP(1)(t0).
So every new agent i ∈ IN (0) eats EPS(1) of his most preferred house,
and every existing tenant j ∈ IE (0) eats s j(t0) · EPS(1) of his most
preferred house.
In TTCE , by Lemmas 5 and 6, every new pseudo-agent ih holds 1/|I(0)|
of h ∈ HV (0) and is involved in wh(0) selected cycles, while every
pseudo-tenant ih′ holds h′ ∈ HO(0) and is involved in |I(0)| · wpi(i)(0)
selected cycles. Since all selected cycles are traded with a common
quota, step 1 of TTCE must end with a house being exhausted, which is








|I(0)|wh(0) } ⇔ minh∈H(0)
1
|I(0)|wh(0) .
Since sh(t0) = wh(0), the solution to the above problem must be hP(1).
Let TPC(d) (trading per cycle) be the common trading quota at step
d of TTCE . Then TPC(1) = 1/[|I(0)|whP(1)(0)] = 1/[|I(0)|shP(1)(t0)].
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So |I(0)|TPC(1) = EPS(1). Hence, every new agent i ∈ IN (0) obtains
|I(0)|TPC(1) = EPS(1) of his most preferred house, and every existing
tenant j ∈ IE (0) obtains |I(0)|[wpi( j)(0) + 1]TPC(1) = s j(t0)EPS(1) of
his most preferred house. So the two mechanisms are equivalent at step
1.
2. Suppose at every step d ≤ k for some k ≥ 1, the two mechanisms are
equivalent, and |I(d − 1)|TPC(d) = EPS(d), TQPh (d) = TQTh (d) for every
h ∈ HO(d − 1) and sh′(td−1) = wh′(d − 1) for every h′ ∈ H(d − 1). Then I
prove that the two mechanisms are still equivalent at step k + 1. There are
three cases to consider.
2.a If there are existing-tenant cycles in PSE , since PSE is equivalent to
TTCE in previous steps, same cycles must exist at step k + 1 of TTCE .
Denote the set of cycles by C(k + 1). Both mechanisms trade these
cycles immediately. Since every agent has the same residual demand and
every house has the same remainder in both mechanisms, TQPc (k + 1) =
TQTc (k + 1) for every c ∈ C(k + 1) and TQPh (k + 1) = TQTh (k + 1) for
every h ∈ HO(k). So every agent i in I(k) must obtain the same fraction
of the same house in both mechanisms, and the two mechanisms are
equivalent at step k + 1.
2.b If there are no existing-tenant cycles in PSE and step k + 1 ends with
some house hP(k+1) being exhausted, then I divide the previous k steps
into two sets: the set α(k) of steps at which there are existing-tenant
cycles and the set β(k) of steps at which there are no existing-tenant
cycles. Then
EPS(k + 1) = min
h∈H(k)
1 −∑d∈α(k) TQPh (d) −∑d∈β(k) sh(td−1)EPS(d)
sh(tk) ,
(C.1)
and EPS(k + 1) ≤ rPi (k)si(tk ) for every i ∈ I(k) where rPi (k) is agent i’s
residual demand. By definition, hP(k + 1) is a solution to the above
problem.
In TTCE every pseudo-agent ih points to the same house as i does in
PSE . I prove that step k + 1 of TTCE must end with hP(k + 1) being
exhausted. Since PSE and TTCE are equivalent step by step before
step k + 1, the previous k steps of TTCE can also be partitioned into
α(k) and β(k). So every remaining agent in I(k) holds an equal fraction
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[1−∑d∈α(k) TQTh (d)−∑d∈β(k) |I(d−1)|wh(d−1)TPC(d)]/|I(k)| of every
h ∈ HV (k).1
By induction assumption, |I(d − 1)|TPC(d) = EPS(d), TQPh (d) =
TQTh (d) for every h ∈ HO(d − 1), and sh′(td−1) = wh′(d − 1) for ev-
ery h′ ∈ H(d − 1). So equation (C.1) implies that hP(k + 1) is also a
solution to the following problem:
TPC(k+1) = min
h∈H(k)
1 −∑d∈α(k) TQTh (d) −∑d∈β(k) |I(d − 1)|wh(d − 1)TPC(d)
|I(k)|wh(k) ,
(C.2)
Since rTi (k) = rPi (k), TPC(k + 1) ≤
rTi (k)
|I(k)|[wpi(i)(k)+1] for every i ∈ I(k)
where rTi (k) is agent i’s residual demand. So step k + 1 of TTCE ends
with hP(k + 1) being exhausted and |I(k)|TPC(k + 1) = EPS(k + 1).
Hence, every new agent i ∈ IN (k) obtains |I(k)|TPC(k+1) = EPS(k+1)
of his most preferred house, and every existing tenant j ∈ IE (k) obtains
|I(k)|[wpi( j)(k)+1]TPC(k +1) = s j(tk)EPS(k +1) of his most preferred
house. So the two mechanisms are equivalent at step k + 1.
2.c If there are no existing-tenant cycles in PSE and step k + 1 ends with
some existing tenant, denoted by iP(k + 1), being full and leaving the
algorithm, I divide the previous k steps into α(k) and β(k) as before.
Then by definition,









By the induction assumption, in TTCE I have










|I(k)|[wpi(i)(k) + 1] }.
1Recall that when an agent leaves the algorithm, his remaining endowments are uniformly
assigned to remaining agents.
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So step k + 1 of TTCE also ends with iP(k + 1) being full and leaving
the algorithm. Moreover, since |I(k)|TPC(k +1) = EPS(k +1), the two
mechanisms are still equivalent at step k + 1.
C.1.2 Proof of Theorem 8
Given any problem, I first define finite large problems and the limit problem.
Then I characterize the procedure of PSE in finite problems, and prove that PSE is
equivalent to random YRMH-IGYT in the limit problem. In the on-line appendix I
provide the characterization of random YRMH-IGYT in finite problems, and prove
that the assignments of the two mechanisms in finite problems converge to their
assignments in the limit problem. Then I finish my proof. The techniques here
are almost same with those of Che and Kojima (2010), so detailed explanations are
omitted.
Given a problem m = {I,H, pi,%I}, for every ` ∈ N\{0}, an `-problem is
m` = (I`,H`, pi`, (γi)i∈I` ) in which every non-null house in H and every existing
tenant in I have ` copies. The endowment function is extended accordingly such
that a copy of an existing tenant j owns a copy of pi( j).2 Each agent i has a preference
type γi, which is a one-to-onemapping fromH to {1, ..., |H |} such that γi(h) < γi(h′)
if and only if h i h′. The set of all preference types is denoted by Γ. The set of
new agents I`N is partitioned into {I`Nγ}γ∈Γ where I`Nγ is the set of new agents with
preference type γ. Let a`Nγ :=
|I`Nγ |
` be the per-unit number of new agents with
preference type γ. The set of new agents grows in the size of the problem under the
requirement that there exists a∞Nγ ∈ R+ such that a`Nγ → a∞Nγ for every preference
type γ as ` → +∞. I define {I`Eγ}γ∈Γ similarly. Obviously,
|I`Eγ |
` = |I1Eγ | for any
` ∈ N ∪ {∞} and γ.
For any set of houses H′ ⊆ H, let Chγ(H′) be the set of houses in H′ that most
preferred by the preference type γ ∈ Γ. When the set of remaining agent is I`′ and
the set of remaining houses isH`′, let S`i (H`′, I`′) := S`pi`(i)(H`′, I`′)+1 be the per-unit







be the per-unit speed at which house h ∈ H`′ is being eaten. Then whenever
H`(d − 1), I`(d − 1), t`d−1, {r`h(d − 1)}h∈H` and {r`i (v − 1)}i∈I` are given, the step d
of PSE in any `-problem can be characterized by the following equations:
2In PS, any two agents are homogeneous if they have equal preferences. But in PSE , any two
existing tenants are homogeneous only if they have equal preferences and equal private endowments.
So I replicate existing tenants in large problems.
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(a) If there are no existing-tenant cycles, define
(a.1) t`h(d) := sup{t ∈ [0, 1] | r`h(d−1)−S`h(H`(d−1), I`(d−1))(t− t`d−1) > 0}
for all h ∈ H`(d − 1);
(a.2) t`i (d) := sup{t ∈ [0, 1] | r`i (d−1)−S`i (H`(d−1), I`(d−1))(t− t`d−1) > 0}
for all i ∈ I`(d − 1);





(a.4) H`(d) := H`(d − 1)\{h ∈ H`(d − 1) | t`h(d) = t`d};
(a.5) I`(d) := I`(d − 1)\{i ∈ I`(d − 1) | t`i (d) = t`d};
(a.6) r`h(d) := r`h(d − 1) − S`h(H`(d − 1), I`(d − 1))(t`d − t`d−1);
(a.7) r`i (d) := r`i (d − 1) − S`i (H`(d − 1), I`(d − 1))(t`d − t`d−1).
Here, t`h(d) is time that h is exhausted; t`i (d) is the time that i is full. Step d
ends with a house being exhausted or an agent being full, depending on which
happens earlier.
(b) Otherwise, denote the set of existing-tenant cycles by C`(d). For each c ∈
C`(d), denote the set of existing tenants and the set of houses involved in c by
c(I) and c(H) respectively. Then define
(b.1) TC(c) = min{ min
h∈c(H)
r`h(d − 1), mini∈c(I)r
`
i (d − 1)} for each c ∈ C`(d);
(b.2) r`h(d) = r`h(d − 1) − TC(c) if there exists c ∈ C`(d) such that h ∈ c(H).
Otherwise r`h(d) = r`h(d − 1);
(b.3) r`i (d) = r`i (d − 1) − TC(c) if there exists c ∈ C`(d) such that i ∈ c(I).
Otherwise r`i (d) = r`i (d − 1);
(b.4) H`(d) = H`(d − 1)\{h ∈ H`(d − 1) | r`h(d) = 0};
(b.5) I`(d) = I`(d − 1)\{i ∈ I`(d − 1) | r`i (d) = 0};




a(d) = t`(d) for a ∈ {h ∈ H`(d − 1) | r`h(d) = 0} ∪ {i ∈
I`(d − 1) | r`i (d) = 0}.
In random YRMH-IGYT, let every agent draw a lottery number uniformly and
independently from [0, 1]. Let agents choose their most preferred houses among
remaining ones according to the increasing ordering of their lotteries numbers. I
say that a step of random YRMH-IGYT ends at tˆ ∈ [0, 1] if in expectation a house
is exhausted or an agent is full when some agent with a lottery number tˆ chooses
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his most preferred house. By this interpretation I can track the procedure of random
YRMH-IGYT by discrete steps. Then I define Hˆ∞(d), Iˆ∞(d), tˆ∞d , {rˆ∞h (d)}h∈H∞ and
{rˆ∞i (d)}i∈I∞ similarly as I do for PSE . Now I want to prove that random YRMH-
IGYT in the limit problem m∞ can be characterized by equations (a.1)-(a.7) and
(b.1)-(b.6) by setting ` = ∞. This implies that PSE and random YRMH-IGYT are
equivalent in the limit problem.
Specifically, supposeH∞(d−1) = Hˆ∞(d−1), I∞(d−1) = Iˆ∞(d−1), t∞d−1 = tˆ∞d−1,
{r∞h (d − 1)}h∈H∞ = {rˆ∞h (d − 1)}h∈Hˆ∞ and {r∞i (d − 1)}i∈I∞ = {rˆ∞i (d − 1)}i∈ Iˆ∞ , which
are true for d = 1, then I prove that they are still true for step d. There are two cases
to consider for step d of random YRMH-IGYT:
(1) If there are no existing-tenant cycles, then for any h ∈ Hˆ∞(d − 1), by the
proof of Theorem 7, S∞h (Hˆ∞(d−1), Iˆ∞(d−1)) is the mass of agents who either most
prefer h, or most prefer the private endowments of some agents who are linked to
h. As long as one of these agents has the chance to consume, h must be consumed.
By the weak law of large numbers (see Che and Kojima 2010), the proportion of
these agents who can draw a lottery number between tˆ∞d−1 and any t > tˆ
∞
d−1 is exactly
S∞h (Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1))(t − tˆ∞d−1) . So the lottery number tˆ∞h (d), which is the
expected “time” that h is exhausted, is exactly characterized by equation (a.1).
A new agent i ∈ Iˆ∞N (d − 1) can choose his most preferred house in Hˆ∞(d − 1)
only if he draws the smallest lottery number among all agents in Iˆ∞(d − 1). Since
the lottery number is drawn from a uniform distribution, i can obtain t − tˆ∞d−1 of his
most preferred house between tˆ∞d−1 and any t > tˆ
∞
d−1. So the lottery number at which
i is full is characterized by equation (a.2) by setting S∞i (Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1)) = 1.
An existing tenant j ∈ Iˆ∞E (d − 1) can choose his most preferred house either
if he draws the smallest lottery number among Iˆ∞(d − 1), or if he is involved in
trading chains, which are triggered by a mass S∞
pi∞( j)(Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1)) of other
agents who draw the smallest lottery number. By the weak law of large numbers,






pi∞( j)(Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1)) + 1
]
(t − tˆ∞d−1). Since S∞j (Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1)) =
S∞
pi∞( j)(Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1)) + 1, j can obtain S∞j (Hˆ∞(d − 1), Iˆ∞(d − 1))(t − tˆ∞d−1)
of his most preferred house. So the lottery number tˆ∞j (d) at which j is full is also
characterized by equation (a.2). So I can use the remaining equations (a.3)-(a.7) to
characterize random YRMH-IGYT.
(2) If there are existing-tenant cycles, all the cycles must also appear at step d
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of PSE . I trade these cycles immediately in random YRMH-IGYT. So equations
(b.1)-(b.6) also characterize random YRMH-IGYT.
If I denote the assignments found by the twomechanisms inm∞ by PSE (m∞) and
RYI(m∞) respectively, then the above arguments prove that | |PSE (m∞)−RYI(m∞)| | =
0.3 In the on-line appendix I prove that | |PSE (m`)−PSE (m∞)| | → 0 and | |RYI(m`)−RYI(m∞)| | →
0 as ` →∞. So | |RYI(m`) − PSE (m`)| | → 0 as ` →∞.
C.2 Proofs of Propositions 10-13
Proof of Proposition 11
For any simultaneous eating algorithm that satisfies conditions (1) and (2), since
any two new agents i, i′ always have same endowments, it is obvious that si(t) = si′(t)
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then there are two cases to consider:
Case 1. If there are no cycles among existing tenants, then I normalize the eating
speed of every new agent to one. That is,
∑
h∈Ei(t)(sh(t)/|Oh(t)|) = 1 for all i ∈ IN and
all t ∈ [0, 1]. So for every existing tenant j ∈ IE , s j(t) = ∑h∈Ej (t)(sh(t)/|Oh(t)|) =
spi( j)(t)+ ∑h∈Ei(t)(sh(t)/|Oh(t)|) = spi( j)(t) + 1 where i is any new agent.
Case 2. If there are cycles among existing tenants, without loss of generality, I
let a typical cycle be pi( j1) → j1 → pi( j2) → j2 → · · · → pi( jn) → jn → pi( j1),
where every jo(o = 1, . . . , n) is an existing tenant. Then “you request my house
- I get your speed” requires that s j1(t) ≤ s j2(t) ≤ · · · ≤ s jn(t) ≤ s j1(t). Hence,
s j1(t) = s j2(t) = · · · = s jn(t). However, s j2(t) = spi( j2)(t) +
∑
h∈Ei(t)(sh(t)/|Oh(t)|) ≥
s j1(t)+ si(t) where i is any new agent. So it must be that si(t) = 0 for any new agent
i. For any existing tenant j who is not involved in any cycle, it must be that spi( j) = 0.
So s j(t) = spi( j)(t) + si(t) = 0. Therefore, only existing tenants in cycles can have
positive eating speeds. This is equivalent to trading the cycles immediately.
Proof of Proposition 12
PSE is ordinal efficient since it can be seen as a simultaneous eating algorithm.
It is obviously individually rational for new agents. It is individually rational for
existing tenants because private endowments are exhausted never earlier than their
owners are full. Since all new agents have equal eating speeds, there is no envy
among them.
Proof of Proposition 13
3 | |PSE (m∞)−RYI(m∞)| | = supi∈I∞,h∈H∞ |PSE (m∞)ih−RYI(m∞)ih | where PSE (m∞)ih and
RYI(m∞)ih are the probabilities that i obtains h in PSE (m∞) and RYI(m∞) respectively.
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For any h ∈ H and any i ∈ I, suppose i reports a strict preference relation
%′i∈ R such that U(%′i, h) = U(%i, h) and %′i |U(%′i,h) =%i |U(%i,h). It is easy to see
that changes happen in the procedure of PSE only after all houses in U(%i, h) are
exhausted. So the assignments of all houses in U(%i, h) do not change, and PSE is
boundedly invariant.
Suppose%′i is a dropping strategy of%i andU(%i, pi(i))\U(%′i, pi(i)) = {h1, h2, . . . , h`}.
If i does not obtain any fraction of the houses in {h1, h2, . . . , h`} by reporting %i,
then the outcome of PSE does not change no matter i reports %i or %′i. So without
loss of generality, I assume that hk is the best house in {h1, h2, . . . , h`} that i obtains
a positive fraction by reporting %i but is dropped in %′i. Since PSE is boundedly
invariant, the fraction of any house better than hk that i obtains does not change if
he reports %′i. However, by dropping hk agent i must lose a positive fraction of hk .
So the lottery i obtains by reporting %′i cannot first-order stochastically dominate
the lottery i obtains by reporting %i. So PSE is weakly dropping-strategy-proof.
If %′i is a truncation strategy of %i, then there exists some h %i pi(i) such that
%′i |U(%′i,pi(i)) =%i |U(%i,h). As before, the fraction of every house better than h
that i obtains does not change if he reports %′i. But by reporting %′i he fills his
remaining demand by pi(i), while by reporting %i he may obtain a positive fraction
of some house strictly better than pi(i). So the lottery obtained by reporting %i
first-order stochastically dominates the lottery obtained by reporting %′i. So PSE is
truncation-strategy-proof.
Proof of Proposition 14
Individual rationality, new-agent envy-freeness and bounded invariance hold in
the same way as before. In the following I prove the remaining properties.
Suppose the random assignment PSE under weak preferences finds for some
problem is not ordinally efficient. Then there must exist k ≥ 2 agents i1, i2, . . . , ik ,
and k houses in their consumption profiles hi11 , h
i2
2 , . . . , h
ik
k such that if the agents
trade their consumptions as the following cycle, none of them is worse off and some
is strictly better off:
i1 → hi22 → i2 → hi33 → i3 → · · · → hikk → ik → hi11 → i1.
Here hioo (o = 1, . . . , k) is the consumption of io and is obtained by io−1 after trading
the cycle. Without loss of generality, I assume that i1 is strictly better offwhile others
are as good as before. That is, i1 strictly prefers h2 to h1, while io(o = 2, . . . , k)
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is indifferent between ho and ho+1. Then in the procedure of PSE under weak
preferences, when i1 starts consuming h1 at some step d, either h1 is not exhausted,
or h1 has been exhausted but some agent labels his consumption of h1 as available,
and at the same time h2 have been exhausted and no agent labels his consumption
of h2 as available. Then since ik is indifferent between h1 and hk , at step d either
hk is not exhausted, or it has been exhausted but ik labels his consumption of hk
as available. By the same argument, since ik−1 is indifferent between hk and hk−1,
at step d either hk−1 is not exhausted, or it has been exhausted but ik−1 labels his
consumption of hk−1 as available. Repeating this argument we reach the conclusion
that at step d, either h2 is not exhausted, or it has been exhausted but i2 label his
consumption of h2 as available. However, this contradicts an earlier argument. So
PSE under weak preferences is ordinally efficient.
Suppose%′i is a dropping strategy of%i andU(%i, pi(i))\U(%′i, pi(i)) = {h1, h2, . . . , h`}.
Let hk be one of the best houses in {h1, h2, . . . , h`} that i obtains a positive fraction
by reporting %i but is dropped in %′i. Let H(hk) and H′(hk) be the set of houses
indifferent with hk in %i and %′i respectively. If H′(hk) = ∅, then it is obvious that
the lottery i obtains by reporting %′i cannot first-order stochastically dominate the
lottery i obtains by reporting%i. If H′(hk) , ∅, then it must be that H′(hk) ⊆ H(hk).
Since PSE under weak preferences is boundedly invariant, i obtains the same frac-
tion of any house better than hk by reporting either %i or %′i. But H′(hk) ⊆ H(hk)
implies that the total fraction of the houses in H′(hk) that i obtains by reporting
%′i cannot exceed the total fraction of the houses in H(hk) that i obtains by report-
ing %i. By repeating the argument for the remaining houses in {h1, h2, . . . , h`}, I
can prove weak dropping-strategy-proofness. Truncation-strategy-proofness can be
proved very similarly.
C.3 PSIR, TTCE
C.3.1 The Procedure of PSIR in Example 2
Step 1: At t = 0, every agent eats his most preferred house with speed one. Since
the set of acceptable houses for i1, i2 is {h1, h2, h3}, when more than one unit
in {h1, h2, h3} are eaten by agents other than i1, i2, the individual rationality
of i1, i2 is violated. So i3, i4, i5, i6 are blocked from eating h1, h2, h3 after
t = 1/4. So at t = 1/4, the problem is broken into two sub-problems:
m1 = {{1/2h1, 1/2h2, 1/2h3}, {i1, i2}} and m2 = {{h4, h5, h6}, {i3, i4, i5, i6}}.
Step 2: For sub-problem m1, at t = 1/4, i1, i2 eat h2, h3 respectively with speed
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one. Then at t = 1/2, i1 obtains another 1/4h2 and i2 obtains another
1/4h3. So i2’s residual demand is 1/2, while his acceptable remaining houses
are {1/4h2, 1/4h3}. So if i1 continues eating h2 after t = 1/2, i2’s individual
rationality will be violated. So at t = 1/2,m1 is broken into two sub-problems:
m11 = {{1/4h2, 1/4h3}, {i2}} and m12 = {{1/2h1}, {i1}}.
Step 3: For each of m11,m12,m2, the procedure of PSIR coincides with that of PS.
The above procedure is summarized as:
time i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
1/4 1/4h2 1/4h3 1/4h1 1/4h2 1/4h1 1/4h3
+1/4 1/4h2 1/4h3 1/4h5 1/4h6 1/4h6 1/4h4
+1/4 1/4h1 1/4h3 1/4h5 1/4h6 1/4h6 1/4h4
+1/4 1/4h1 1/4h2 1/4h5 1/4h5 1/4h4 1/4h4
It is easy to see that PSIR is not boundedly invariant: although at t = 1/4 agents
i1, i2 have not revealed their preferences over houses other than h2, h3 in the above
procedure, PSIR predicts that the set of acceptable houses for them is {h1, h2, h3}
and blocks i3, i4, i5, i6 from eating h1, h2, h3 after t = 1/4.
C.3.2 The Procedure of TTCE in Example 2
Initialization: Uniformly assign the probabilities of h6 to all agents. So each
agent’s endowment contains 1/6h6 and his private endowment, if any.
Step 1: There is one existing-tenant cycle: i1,h1 → i2,h2 → i3,h3 → i1,h1 . After
trading the cycle, i1 gets h2, i2 gets h3 and i3 gets h1. They are full and
leave the algorithm. Their remaining endowments, 3 × 1/6h6 = 1/2h6, are
uniformly assigned to remaining agents. Step 1 ends.
Step 2: There are two self-cycles: i4,h6 and i5,h6 pointing to themselves. Since each
of them holds 1/3h6, the trading quota of both cycles is 1/3. There is also
a feasible new-agent cycle: i4,h4 → i6,h6 → i4,h4 , which involves one new
pseudo-agent i6,h6 . The trading quota of this cycle is also 1/3. After trading
these cycles, i4 gets 2/3h6, i5 gets 1/3h6, and i6 gets 1/3h4. h6 is exhausted.
Step 2 ends.
Step 3: There is one existing-tenant cycle: i4,h4 → i5,h5 → i4,h4 . After trading the




































Figure C.2: Steps 1, 2, and 3
leaves the algorithm. His remaining endowment 1/3h4 is uniformly assigned
to i5 and i6. Step 3 ends.
Step 4: There are two self-cycles: i5,h4 and i6,h4 pointing to themselves. Trade these




i5,h4 · 1/6h4i5,h5 · 2/3h5
(a) Step 4
i6
i5 i5,h5 · 2/3h5
(b) Step 5
i6 i6,h5 · 1/2h5
(c) Step 6
Figure C.3: Steps 4, 5, and 6
Step 5: There is one self-cycle: i5,h5 pointing to himself. After trading the cycle
with quota 1/6, i5 obtains 1/6h5 and leaves the algorithm. His remaining
endowment 1/2h5 is assigned to i6. Step 5 ends.
Step 6: There is one self-cycle: i6,h5 pointing to himself. After trading the cycle
with quota 1/2, i6 gets 1/2h5 and leaves the algorithm. The algorithm stops.
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. 2011. “Resolving Con-
flicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered”.
American Economic Review 101 (1): 399–410.
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Tayfun Sönmez. 1999. “House allocation with existing
tenants”. Journal of Economic Theory 88 (2): 233–260.
– . 1998. “Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in
house allocation problems”. Econometrica: 689–701.
– . 2003. “School choice: Amechanism design approach”. The American Economic
Review 93 (3): 729–747.
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, et al. 2005. “The Boston public school match”. American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings: 368–371.
Agarwal, Nikhil, and Paulo Somaini. 2014. “Demand Analysis using Strategic Re-
ports: An application to a school choice mechanism”. National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Arad, Ayala, and Ariel Rubinstein. 2012. “The 11–20 money request game: a level-k
reasoning study”. The American Economic Review 102 (7): 3561–3573.
Ashlagi, Itai, and Yannai A Gonczarowski. 2015. “No stable matching mechanism
is obviously strategy-proof”. working paper.
Ashlagi, Itai, Yash Kanoria, and Jacob D Leshno. 2015. “Unbalanced Random
Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition”. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, forthcoming.
Athanassoglou, Stergios, and Jay Sethuraman. 2011. “House allocation with frac-
tional endowments”. International Journal of Game Theory 40 (3): 481–513.
Bade, Sophie. 2016a. “Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment
problems”. Journal of Economic Theory 165:257–262.
– . 2016b. “Pareto-Optimal Matching Allocation Mechanisms for Boundedly Ra-
tional Agents”. Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
– . 2016c. “Random serial dictatorship: the one and only”. working paper.
Balbuzanov, Ivan. 2014. “Short Trading Cycles: Kidney Exchange with Strict Ordi-
nal Preferences”. working paper.
Basteck, Christian, and Marco Mantovani. 2016. “Cognitive Ability and Games of
School Choice”. working Paper.
Bogomolnaia, Anna. 2015. “Random assignment: redefining the serial rule”. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 158:308–318.
108
Bogomolnaia, Anna, andEun JeongHeo. 2012. “Probabilistic assignment of objects:
Characterizing the serial rule”. Journal of Economic Theory 147 (5): 2072–2082.
Bogomolnaia, Anna, and Hervé Moulin. 2001. “A new solution to the random
assignment problem”. Journal of Economic theory 100 (2): 295–328.
Budish, Eric, et al. 2013. “Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and
applications”. The American Economic Review 103 (2): 585–623.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Chao Fu, and Maia Güell. 2015. “Structural Estimation of a
Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives”. working
paper.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Guillaume Haeringer, and Flip Klijn. 2010. “Constrained
school choice: An experimental study”. The American Economic Review: 1860–
1874.
Camerer, Colin F, Teck-HuaHo, and Juin-KuanChong. 2004. “A cognitive hierarchy
model of games”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 861–898.
Castillo, Marco, and Ahrash Dianat. 2016. “Truncation strategies in two-sided
matching markets: Theory and experiment”. Games and Economic Behavior
98:180–196.
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Fuhito Kojima. 2010. “Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic
serial and random priority mechanisms”. Econometrica 78 (5): 1625–1672.
Chen, Yan, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2006. “School choice: an experimental study”.
Journal of Economic theory 127 (1): 202–231.
Coles, Peter, and Ran Shorrer. 2014. “Optimal truncation in matching markets”.
Games and Economic Behavior 87:591–615.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A, and Vincent P Crawford. 2006. “Cognition and behavior
in two-person guessing games: An experimental study”. The American economic
review 96 (5): 1737–1768.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel, Vincent P Crawford, and Bruno Broseta. 2001. “Cognition
and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study”. Econometrica 69
(5): 1193–1235.
Crawford, Vincent P, andNagore Iriberri. 2007a. “Fatal attraction: Salience, naivete,
and sophistication in experimental “hide-and-see” games”. The American Eco-
nomic Review 97 (5): 1731–1750.
– . 2007b. “Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Think-
ing Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?”
Econometrica 75 (6): 1721–1770.
Dogan, Battal, Serhat Dogan, and Kemal Yildiz. 2016. “A New Ex-Ante Efficiency
Criterion and Implications for the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism”. Available at
SSRN 2777970.
109
Dur, Umut, Robert Hammond, and Thayer Morrill. 2015. “Identifying the Harm of
Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms”. working paper.
Ehlers, Lars. 2008. “Truncation strategies in matching markets”. Mathematics of
Operations Research 33 (2): 327–335.
Ekici, Özgün, and Onur Kesten. 2015. “An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic
serial mechanism”. International Journal of Game Theory: 1–20.
Erdil, Aytek. 2014. “Strategy-proof stochastic assignment”. Journal of Economic
Theory 151:146–162.
Ergin, Haluk, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2006. “Games of school choice under the Boston
mechanism”. Journal of Public Economics 90 (1): 215–237.
Featherstone, Clayton R, and Muriel Niederle. 2014. “Improving on Strategy-proof
School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation”. working paper.
Gale, David, and Lloyd S Shapley. 1962. “College admissions and the stability of
marriage”. American mathematical monthly: 9–15.
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Flip Klijn. 2009. “Constrained school choice”. Journal
of Economic Theory 144 (5): 1921–1947.
Hashimoto, Tadashi, et al. 2014. “Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic
serial mechanism”. Theoretical Economics 9 (1): 253–277.
He, Yinghua. 2014. “Gaming the boston school choice mechanism in beijing”.
Manuscript, Toulouse School of Economics.
Heo, Eun Jeong. 2014. “Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands:
A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization”. Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 54:40–47.
Ho, Teck-Hua, Colin Camerer, and Keith Weigelt. 1998. “Iterated dominance and
iterated best response in experimental “p-beauty contest””. The American Eco-
nomic Review 88 (4): 947–969.
Hugh-Jones, David, Morimitsu Kurino, and Christoph Vanberg. 2014. “An experi-
mental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism”.Games and
Economic Behavior 87:367–380.
Hylland, Aanund, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1979. “The efficient allocation of indi-
viduals to positions”. Journal of Political Economy: 293–314.
Jaramillo, Paula, and Vikram Manjunath. 2012. “The difference indifference makes
in strategy-proof allocation of objects”. Journal of Economic Theory 147 (5):
1913–1946.
Katta, Akshay-Kumar, and Jay Sethuraman. 2006. “A solution to the random as-
signment problem on the full preference domain”. Journal of Economic Theory
131 (1): 231–250.
110
Kesten, Onur. 2009. “Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random envi-
ronments?” Journal of Economic Theory 144 (5): 2209–2226.
Kesten, Onur, and M Utku Ünver. 2015. “A theory of school-choice lotteries”.
Theoretical Economics 10 (2): 543–595.
Kojima, Fuhito. 2009. “Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects”.Math-
ematical Social Sciences 57 (1): 134–142.
Kojima, Fuhito, andMUtkuÜnver. 2014. “The “Boston” school-choicemechanism:
an axiomatic approach”. Economic Theory 55 (3): 515–544.
Li, Shengwu. 2015. “Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms”. working paper.
Liu, Qingmin, and Marek Pycia. 2013. “Ordinal efficiency, fairness, and incentives
in large markets”. working paper.
Martini, Giorgio. 2016. “Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful”. Games
and Economic Behavior 98:172–179.
Nagel, Rosemarie. 1995. “Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study”.
The American Economic Review: 1313–1326.
Nesterov, Alexander. 2016. “Fairness and Efficiency in Strategy-proof Object Allo-
cation Mechanisms”. working paper.
Pápai, Szilvia. 2000. “Strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange”. Econo-
metrica 68 (6): 1403–1433.
Pathak, Parag A. 2016. “What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mecha-
nisms”. Preparation for 11th Econometric Society World Congress Plenary Talk.
Pathak, Parag A, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2008. “Leveling the playing field: Sincere
and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism”. The American Economic
Review 98 (4): 1636–1652.
– . 2013. “School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mech-
anisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation”. American Economic Review 103
(1): 80–106.
Pycia, Marek, and Peter Troyan. 2016. “Obvious dominance and random priority”.
working paper.
Pycia, Marek, and M Utku Ünver. 2017. “Incentive compatible allocation and ex-
change of discrete resources”. Theoretical Economics 12 (1): 287–329.
Rees-Jones, Alex. 2015. “Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evi-
dence from the residency match”. working paper.
Roth, Alvin E. 1986. “On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general prop-
erty of two-sided matching markets”. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society: 425–427.
111
Roth, Alvin E, and Uriel G Rothblum. 1999. “Truncation strategies in matching
markets–in search of advice for participants”. Econometrica 67 (1): 21–43.
Sethuraman, Jay. 2001. “A New Solution to the House Allocation Problem with
Existing Tenants”. unpublished mimeo.
Shapley, Lloyd, and Herbert Scarf. 1974. “On cores and indivisibility”. Journal of
Mathematical Economics 1 (1): 23–37.
Stahl, Dale O, and PaulWWilson. 1994. “Experimental evidence on players’ models
of other players”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 25 (3): 309–
327.
– . 1995. “On players’ models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence”.
Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1): 218–254.
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar. 1999. “Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods”. So-
cial Choice and Welfare 16 (4): 557–567.
Troyan, Peter. 2012. “Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante
welfare”. Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2): 936–947.
Yılmaz, Özgür. 2009. “Random assignment under weak preferences”. Games and
Economic Behavior 66 (1): 546–558.
– . 2010. “The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments”. Games
and Economic Behavior 69 (2): 475–491.
Zhou, Lin. 1990. “On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems”.
Journal of Economic Theory 52 (1): 123–135.
